

THESIS



# **INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS : A STUDY OF NEHRU'S DIPLOMACY**

**ABSTRACT  
THESIS**

SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF

**Doctor of Philosophy  
IN  
POLITICAL SCIENCE**

By  
**LUBNA FATIMA SAEED**


*Under the Supervision of*  
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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY  
ALIGARH (INDIA)

**2003**

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14 AUG 2006

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## **ABSTRACT**

When India became independent she found herself in a position to face the challenges of cold war scenario. India had to face the international reality of super powers rivalry and at the same time to adjust with this explosive situation. India remained non-aligned but had a soft corner for strategic and economic requirements for Soviet Union. This relationship was always misunderstood by the U.S.A. However, Nehru very tactfully developed special relations with Soviet Union. No, doubt the developmental process of relations between India and Soviet Union starts only in midfifties. During the last four decades, the two have always stood by each other as good friends. The recent changes in Soviet political system have not affected their relations.

Nehru was a man of great foresight. In 1927 he foresaw that Britain would eventually become a satellite of America and that the latter would emerge as the greatest imperialist power. He also foresaw that the only power to oppose the new imperialism would be the Soviet Union and that India and the USSR would have to work together to fight against imperialism and support the subjugated nations in winning independence. In the beginning though Indo-Soviet relations were at halt, he did not loose hope, but continued his efforts to foster those relations. When the Soviet Union also perceived the logic of Nehru's thinking, there was nothing to bar the steady growth of those relations.

As against this, American policies from the very beginning of India's independence were directed to prevent the emergence of a powerful India. India

did not count in American policies because India was not willing to serve American interests. The Soviet Union, on its part, has expressed, time and again, through its leaders that it wants to see India emerge as a powerful country in the world. Just as India saw the need to work together with the Soviet Union in order to defeat imperialism, the Soviet Union, too, perceived that friendship with India was a vital factor in the Soviet struggle against imperialism. It is this factor that the USSR in the mid 1950's hailed Indian non-alignment as a positive force in world affairs, made India the leading recipient of its foreign aid programme, and gave unreserved support to India's position on such sensitive issues as Kashmir and Goa-On its part, India welcomed the willingness of the USSR to co-exist as equals. From 1959 onwards China posed an increasing concern for both New Delhi and Moscow. By then the Indo-Soviet relationship had passed through a stage of cautious co-existence to a phase which might be termed as peaceful co-operation. It is this interlocking interest that has provided the most powerful rationale to this friendship.

The study of India's relations with the USSR reveals that despite wide differences in outlook and policy great advance towards mutual understanding and cooperation was made. In spite of the earlier Soviet indifference and basic differences in socio-political systems of the two countries, mutual relations improved markedly from 1953 onwards. There were many factors which demanded India to move closer to the USSR. Among many underlying factors, geo-political considerations are of considerable importance. Secondly, there



was the practical consideration of the soviet economic aid. Thirdly, to secure political and diplomatic support on Kashmir issue. The most important factor was the identity of views of both the countries on imperialism, colonialism and racialism.

However, it was the US military pact with Pakistan which transformed the entire countext of Indo-Soviet relations and greatly affected India's policy. To Nehru, the military alliances were opposed to non-aligned India's view that military blocs were a step towards war rather than peace. He was also convinced that the inclusion of Pakistan into military alliances would threaten to introduce a system of military blocs into India's immediate neighbourhood, thereby transforming the subcontinent into a theatre of cold war and at the same time would strengthen the latter not agains the USSR but against India with which many important and explosive problems still remain unresolved. In short, military pacts had given India a sense of encirclement. The US military presence in the subcontinent and massive flow of American arms into Pakistan had a tremendous impact on India's policy makers. As a result India began to move closer to the USSR. The indication of this trend was Nehru's acceptance of Soviet invitation to visit Moscow. It was largely around Nehru's perspective of the world, his initiatives and preferences that India's relations with the USSR developed. The image of Soviet Union in his mind was that of anti-imperialist nation trying to build a new socialist-order. He attached highest priority to India's relations with the USSR.

By 1955, India had achieved considerable success in its long cherished aim of establishing an understanding with the USSR without entering into any formal pact or alliance. Nehru's visit to the USSR in early 1955 was one of the most important events in the annals of Indo-Soviet relations. The enthusiastic reception given to Nehru in the Soviet Union and later, the hearty reception accorded to the Soviet leaders in India manifested the feelings of the genuine respect, sympathy and friendship developing between the two nations. The exchange of state visits affirmed the tremendous goodwill that had been generated in the preceding two years in relation between the two countries.

In the year 1958-59 Sino-Soviet relations showed signs of strain. The emerging differences between Moscow and Beijing concided with major Soviet attempts at rapprochement with the west. China's changing attitude on Sino-Indian border problem in 1958-59 resulted in chillness between India and China. Therefore, when China claimed 25,000 square miles of Indian territory in the beginning of 1959, India suddenly faced hostile China.

Hostility to India was a deliberate choice of policy on the part of China. It was no longer in China's interest to play second fiddle to the Soviet Union. In asserting China's claims to leadership of the communist bloc and in attaining what China believed to be a more equitable distribution of power, it became necessary to disrupt the existing equilibrium of forces in South Asia. This could be achieved only by destroying India's prestige. It was a policy designed to expose India's weakness in order to consolidate China's position among the Afro-Asian

countries. At the same time China wanted to challenge the Soviet thesis of co-existence with the West, and USSR'S support to India's policy of nonalignment. Thus, China became a source of common concern to both the countries. This added a new demension to Delhi-Moscow relationship and greatly strengthened the bonds of friendship between the two countries. Their national interests demanded close collaboration with each other to contain China.

Moreover, both India and the Soviet Union attached great significance to peaceful settlement of international issues, specifically through the United Nations. These crises appeared as a common concern of Soviet Union and India alike as they characterized them as western colonialism. Thus Nehru and Soviet leaders had their identical viewpoints on many international issues and, particularly, colonial problems and they were endorsing each others viewpoints too.

It may be said that a community of interests between India and the USSR resulted in a steady growth of friendship and mutual diplomatic support. Indo-USSR relations developed on the basis of mutuality of interests and similarly of actions and reactions to a variety of challenges to both. Though, for different reasons, both were interested in limiting the US presence in Asia, checking the arms flow to Pakistan opposing SEATO, CENTO and NATO, and at a later stage, containing China. Almost through out this decade i.e. from 1953 - 1964, India had a sense of common purpose with the USSR. During this decade, the USSR remained India's principal source of strength in international affairs, as well as


in her material needs. It goes to the credit of shrewd diplomacy of Jawaharlal Nehru that without entering into any formal treaty or alliances or giving the impression of being subservient to the USSR, he secured all from the USSR to suit the national interest of India. India under Nehru's stewardship always retained the freedom of action in her foreign policy.

Even after the disintegration of Soviet Union the relations between the Russian Federation and India remained unchanged and there is a great scope for deepening the bilateral ties in future as well. The Indo-Russian relations are based on the strong foundations of good neighbourly ties, liberal political ideology, convergence of national interests, geopolitical settings, economic opportunities and international interdependence.

The most concrete expression of the new thinking was provided during the visit to India of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in December 1998, when he told reporters that it would be very good if Russia, China and India were able to form a regional bloc. A lot depends in the region on the policies of China, Russia and India, he said that India is a great power and our relationship is based on mutual interest and joint aspirations of the two countries for stability in the world. Primakov also reiterated the Russian stand that Russia supports India's claim to a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

Putin's visit in December 2002, sealed a new special relationship between India and Russia. President Putin described that he was the best friend of India. A statement endorsed by Prime Minister Vajpayee, describing the Russian leader

as a trusted friend of India. The Putin -Vajpayee summit produced a strong statement called upon Pakistan to fulfill its obligations by preventing infiltration of terrorist across the line of control and eliminating the infrastructure of terrorism as a pre-requisite for the renewal of peaceful dialogue. Russia unambiguously endorsed India's stand that the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore declaration provide the sole framework within which any India-Pakistan dialogue should eventually take place.





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
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## **CERTIFICATE**

This is to certify that **Ms. Lubna Fatima Saeed** has pursued research for *Ph.D. Degree* on the topic entitled, "**Indo-Soviet Relations : A Study of Nehru's Diplomacy**" under my supervision and guidance.

Her research work is original and in my opinion suitable for the submission for the award of the *Ph.D. Degree* of the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

  
**(T.A. Nizami)**

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## THESIS

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**(Lubna Fatima Saeed)**

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# *INTRODUCTION*

## INTRODUCTION

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Few other states are so much bound by so many ties as India and the USSR. India's friendly stance towards the USSR has greatly been exaggerated, misunderstood and misinterpreted in India and abroad. An examination of the subject appeared necessary in order to explain the nature, extent, direction, and implications of India's relations with the USSR. It is all the more essential as there is a noticeable tendency among some quarters to gloss over certain events and decisions which do not fall in line with their own views and heavily underscore those which do so. An attempt has been made to analyse India's policy towards the USSR during Nehru era and place it in proper perspective.

The ever growing friendly relations between the two neighbours are the result of many factors such as the complementarity of their national interests and the constantly changing national and international situations. The Soviet Union's huge size, its vast potentialities and the geo-political situation compelled Indian leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru in particular, to realize, even before India attained independence, the need to develop close and friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

The present study seeks to discuss and analyse India's relations with the USSR during a period when crucial transformations



## INTRODUCTION

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took place in the interaction between India and the USSR. It covers a period of a decade after the death of Stalin and discusses how the relations between the two countries were gradually widened and deepened. The period under discussion i.e. 1953-1964 was very important as well as critical from the point of view of their bilateral relations and the emerging political scenario which tended to turn the bi-polar world into a multi polar world. The whole decade had witnessed a number of political developments which has great impact on Indo-Soviet relations. The crisis situations in Korea, Vietnam, Suez and Hungary resulting in the conferences of Bandung and Belgrade to bring about a peaceful resolution of international conflicts. In this situation when the world was divided into two militarily hostile power blocs, demarcated by their military pacts, such as the US led NATO and the USSR led Warsaw pact, India had opted to join none of them. During this phase, almost every international crisis has had its repercussions on India's relations with the USSR.

The purpose of this study is to analyse objectively the nature and contents of India's policy towards the USSR from the point of view of India's national interest. The best way of determining the relations between the two states should be the attitude and response of a country towards one another in moments of crisis for either. For this purpose the issues of national importance for each country have been critically studied.

## INTRODUCTION

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It was Nehru, having an international bent of mind who visualized the significance of Russian Revolution of 1917. Nehru realized that it was a powerful blow to imperialism and that Soviet Russia had emerged as an anti-imperialist force, as an ally of subject peoples. If a new world order was to be created free from imperialism, he argued, India must work together with the Soviet Union. In short, Nehru's policy of friendship with the Soviet Union was inevitable from the premises of his outlook. That was why even when Soviet developments did not always find favour with him, he was confident that the new Soviet society would maintain the main direction of its growth and policies.

Nehru was a man of great foresight. In 1927, he foresaw that Britain would eventually become a satellite of America and that the latter would emerge as the greatest imperialist power. He also foresaw that the only power to oppose the new imperialism would be the Soviet Union and that India and the USSR would have to work together to fight against imperialism and support the subjugated nations in winning independence. In the beginning though Indo-Soviet relations were at halt, he did not loose heart, but continued his efforts to foster those relations. When the Soviet Union also perceived the logic of Nehru's thinking, there was nothing to bar the steady growth of those relations. That they are backed by a powerful logic in our times is exemplified by the fact that there was not one instance to mar those relations in all those forty-four years.

## **INTRODUCTION**

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As against this, American policies from the very beginning of India's independence were directed to prevent the emergence of a powerful India. India did not count in American policies because India was not willing to serve American interests. The Soviet Union, on its part, has expressed, time and again, through its leaders that it wants to see India emerge as a powerful country in the world. Just as India saw the need to work together with the Soviet Union in order to defeat imperialism, the Soviet Union, too, perceived that friendship with India was a vital factor in the Soviet struggle against imperialism. It is this factor that the USSR in the mid 1950's hailed Indian non-alignment as a "positive force" in world affairs, made India the leading recipient of its foreign aid programme, and gave unreserved support to India's position on such sensitive issues as Kashmir and Goa. On its part, India welcomed the willingness of the USSR to co-exist as equals. From 1959 onwards China posed an increasing concern for both New Delhi and Moscow. By then the Indo-Soviet relationship had passed through a stage of cautious co-existence to a phase which might be termed "peaceful co-operation". It is this inter locking interest that has provided the most powerful rationale to this friendship.

Nehru was the architect of this friendship. He was also its proponent and philosopher. If India has inscribed socialism as one of its goals in its constitution, it was because of Nehru's perceptions and policies. If we remain non-aligned, it was because of our experience of imperialism and colonialism, which Nehru articulated. If we

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remained friends of the Soviet Union, it was because we were so before and during the war years, and later, when alone among the rest of the world, the Soviet Union went out of its way to stand by India at every moment of its crisis and to aid and assist it in the fulfillment of the aspirations of our people.

In the *first chapter* an attempt has been made to provide a general historic background, focusing on Russia and British India, the effect of the 1917 revolution on the minds of the Indians in general and on Nehru in particular. The October Revolution stirred the people of India, as nothing else has done before, and broadened their interest in Russia. However, the admiration for the achievements and policies of Soviet Union was never uncritical. While Indians appreciated the policy of peace and anti-imperialism, and heroic efforts made to achieve rapid economic development, they were highly critical of certain other aspects of the Soviet system. There was unreserved disapproval of the excessive use of violence. Nehru also abhorred what he characterized as “unnecessary regimentation of life and suppression of civil liberties”. However, in spite of his likes and dislikes, Nehru always realized, on the whole, the need to forge close relations with the Soviet Union and regarded the USSR as country of great importance for India. It also focuses on Nehru’s participation in the Brussels’s Conference 1927, followed by his visit to the USSR, and his views on the USSR and communism.

The *Second Chapter* discusses the attitude of the USSR towards the independent India during the early years and the

## INTRODUCTION

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consolidation of the Indo-Soviet friendship from 1953 onwards. This chapter also discusses the relations between India and the United States of America, her attitude and policies towards India and also her attitude towards the policy of non-alignment. It also deals though in brief, the relations, attitude and policies of the Peoples Republic of China towards India.

The *Third Chapter* discusses the interplay of Indian and Soviet diplomacy during various international crisis and effect of these crisis on Indo-Soviet relations.

*Chapter Fourth* deals with the study of China as a factor in the Indo-Soviet relations. It also deals with the impact of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations on Soviet policy towards India in the context of the two Sino-Indian border conflicts.

The *Final Chapter* discusses the Soviet programme of economic, technological and military assistance to India, and the commerce and other transactions between the two governments. It also discusses the nature of cultural relations among the two nations.

The present study tries to analyse Indo-Soviet relations broadly, covering all aspects during the period of Nehru's Prime Ministership. In the light of their relations, the difficulties India had to face in the crisis situations during Nehruvian period cannot be ignored.

# *Chapter – 1*

## *Indo-Soviet Historical Perspective*

## **CHAPTER – 1**

### **INDO-SOVIET HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

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#### **Impact of Russian Revolution on Indian National Movement :**

Two International events which moulded the substance and character of the Indian National Movement were the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. Japan's success inspired India to the realization that it would be only a matter of time when her people would also be able to hold their own as free people in their own country. The cry of Swaraj which came in its wake was deafening for the British rulers. The official opinion was that had Russia defeated Japan, there would have been none of the political troubles in India, and the British anticipated that now the Russian Revolution was going to have a similar effect.<sup>1</sup>

The Revolution in Russia received more enthusiastic response from the Indian people than the defeat of Russia by Japan had received in 1905. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was a major blow to the western capitalist system and the imperialist order, which the colonial powers had established over the larger part of the world. The Russian Revolution was a milestone in the history of the human race, which ushered in a new era of hope, a new civilization and a new relationship between man and man. Above, all it marked the point of transition from the era of capitalism to the era of socialism



on a world scale. The movement reached the masses, who posed a challenge not only to British imperialism but also to the capitalists and the landlords.

The stand of the Russian Revolutionary leaders on imperialism, capitalism and the principle of national self-determination naturally produced a very favourable impression in India and among other subject peoples about the Russian Revolution. Indian leaders were convinced that the revolutionary upsurge in Russia would speed up the process of decolonization and strengthen their own freedom struggle. Praising the Russian revolutionaries for their achievements, Mrs. Annie Besant wrote in *New India* (Madras) on May 26, 1917 that the "Tzardom has fallen and the exiles are welcome by crowds rejoicing in the freedom won by their sufferings". She reminded the British rulers that "the whole youth of a nation cannot be permanently crushed. Russia tried to do it with a ruthlessness and thoroughness that can never be surpassed and we see the result is revolution which is applauded by the civilized world".<sup>2</sup>

Leading Journals both in English and in Indian languages published articles and commentaries on the happenings in Russia, emphasizing the force of nationalism working behind them. As early as 24<sup>th</sup> December 1917, a leading nationalist daily of Bombay, *The Bombay Chronicle*, wrote : "We recognize the fact that they could never have met with the present success had their not been something in their programme that was attractive and of promise to serve the

present fear. The Bolshevik came with a definite scheme which took into consideration the necessities of the peasants and promised immediate confiscation of lands for the people".<sup>3</sup>

The influential nationalist Journal *Modern Review* of Calcutta commented: "It is refreshing to turn from the chorus of abuses and misrepresentation directed against the Russian Soviet by the capitalist press to the illuminating sketch of the framework of the Soviet State ..... We are at last given an insight into the mighty efforts of the revolutionary Russia to organize herself and work out her communist ideals.....Infact, (the Bolshevik) is striving to make Russia better and nobler than anything she has ever been".<sup>4</sup>

Another interesting article came out in the Bombay chronicle under the title, "Lenin, the man and his aims". The article ridiculed the idea that the Lenin was a German spy and discussed his programme. It concluded : "If Lenin is successful, the February Revolution will sink into insignificance before the November Revolution, for its success is nothing less than the end of the upper middle class and the final triumph of the common people".<sup>5</sup>

The Soviet pronouncement on the right of self-determination and of all nations had played its role, though a minor one, in projecting the concept of self-determination and also its practicability to the Indian scene, soviet influence proved even more far-reaching and effective than is generally understood because of the sharp contrast in implementing the principle of self-determination in Allied

and Soviet policy. The Indian people saw for itself that self-determination was proclaimed by the Allies but was not applied to India. On the contrary, they noted that the Soviet Government not only promised but also implemented it in the former Tsarist colonies.<sup>6</sup>

The impact of the October Revolution was phenomenal. It had three distinct dimensions-stimulating the consciousness of the Indian people, widening the basis of the national movement and above all, hastening the evolutionary process of the Indian left movement, particularly the Communist movement.

The Great October Revolution and Lenin's political thought considerably influenced the leaders of the Indian National Movement, Jawaharlal Nehru in particular. This is how he assessed the "powerful effect" of this. He said : "A study of Marx and Lenin produced a powerful effect on my mind and helped me to see history and current affairs in a new light. The long chain of history and of social development appeared to have some meaning, some sequence, and the future lost some of its obscurity. The practical achievements of the Soviet Union were also tremendously impressive. Often I disliked or did not understand some developments there and it seemed to me to be too clearly concerned with the opportunism of the moment, of the power politics of the day. But despite all these developments and possible distortions of the original passion for human betterment, I had no doubt that the Soviet Revolution had advanced human society by a great leap and had lit a bright flame which could not be

smothered, and that it had laid the foundations for that new civilization towards which the world could advance".<sup>7</sup>

The president of the Calcutta session of the Indian National Congress, held in December 1917, the first to be held after the Revolution contrasted the despotic nature of British rule in India with that of its "free and self ruling neighbours across the northern frontiers" and declared that "in future unless India wins self-government, she will enviously look at her self-governing neighbours and the contrast will intensify her interest".<sup>8</sup>

#### **British Propaganda & Nehru's Attitude Towards it :**

The success of Russian Revolution no doubt alarmed the British imperialists. Records of this period, the correspondence between the viceroy and the secretary of state for India, Chamberlain, as well as between local British officials in India-reveal the extent of the fears entertained by the British on the impact of the October Revolution on their Indian possession and on the nationalist movement within their country. Chamberlain went to bed with "his mind full of the Revolution in Russia" and considered it "as one of those events, which though long discussed and even foretold, take the world nonetheless by surprise when they happen".<sup>9</sup> To Chelmsford, the viceroy, the revolution in Russia came "as a great shock".<sup>10</sup>

To counter the fear, Britain told the Indian people that since Bolshevism had been checkmated in Europe, it was now looking

towards India to advance its objective of world revolution. Beginning with the October Revolution, British propaganda in India thus concentrated mainly on discrediting Bolshevism and the achievements of the young Soviet State. But the Indian people refused to believe the British propaganda. In any case, they saw no Bolshevik threat to India, which was the main line of British propaganda.

It did not however, take long for a somewhat clear picture of the Russian Revolution to emerge in India through articles and comments in the Indian press. The Amrit Bazar Patrika, The New India and the Bombay chronicle declared from the house tops that "Bolshevism had been much misrepresented by the enemies", and considered it their duty to publish true facts about the success of the Russian people. The Bombay chronicle regarded its success as "nothing less than the end of the upper middle class and the final triumph of common people".<sup>11</sup>

The Kesari, a Marathi Paper founded by Tilak was another paper, which took up the cudgels against the British criticism of Lenin and the October Revolution.

The most powerful writings in support of the October Revolution, however, came from the Independent, a daily started in 1919 from Allahabad by Motilal Nehru. In an editorial on January 14, 1920, under the caption "The Red Menace"? It gave an unequivocal analysis of the Russian Revolution. It said: "...From the time,

Bolshevism first raised its head uptill now, it has steadily grown in power and prestige".<sup>12</sup>

The Independent provided a much clearer analysis of the political and economic objectives of the Bolsheviks. The Independent went on to explain that Bolshevism has declared war on western capitalism which had influenced both politics and economics. It was natural, it said, that the capitalists should look upon Bolshevism as its greatest enemy. The Independent further emphasized the fact that no one who had not realized these facts could understand, why the West talked of the 'Bolshevik menace'.

Indeed, this was the best analysis of the Russian Revolution and the developments taking place in Russia. It is, of course, difficult to say as to who actually wrote these editorials in the Independent, but in thought, dictum and mood the stamp of Jawaharlal Nehru is already there. During the short lived existence of the daily, Jawaharlal Nehru was its virtual editor, albeit not openly. The editorials show a deep knowledge of European politics which neither nor any body else in the nationalist circle, except Jawaharlal Nehru, could have possessed in those days. During his stay abroad and as a result of vast readings, Jawaharlal Nehru had learned how the British government functioned, how it served the interest of the British capitalist class.

He never believed the British propaganda that Russia may threaten our freedom. But, of course, she was certainly powerful enough and favourably placed to attack India. But should India fear

such an attack? He did not think so : “For generations the bogey of a Russian invasion has been held up to us during the days of Tsars we were told that it was Russian imperialism thrusting down to the sea, and now it is communism trying to subvert the world. So we are told by the British”.<sup>13</sup>

He also did not believe this line of talk and attributed to it “the traditional rivalry between England and Russia”. He saw no reason why India “should .....inherit the hate and fear of Russia from England”. Moreover the Soviet Government was beset with many difficulties and enmities which were likely to continue. It could hardly “embark on an aggressive campaign” and indeed, needed peace more than any other country. Russia, he maintained, “suffers from a fear complex”, but she would “have nothing to fear from free India” on the contrary, he argued : “The danger from Russia is caused solely by the rivalry between England and Russia. It ceases as soon as the British connection is severed. Our position thus, in a military sense, is better and stronger as an independent country than it would be if we were within the fold of the British group of nations”.<sup>14</sup>

He admitted that Russia “offers a peculiar problem which requires special attention. She had “adopted an economic policy with the rigid faith of a new religion and she is continually trying to spread it to other countries”. Whether India adopted that policy “or some other form of socialism”, however, should not in his view be an impediment to establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union



whose record in international affairs showed her to be “in favour of the fullest self-determination of various peoples” and one of support for the oppressed and exploited. He considered the possibility that Soviet Russia might develop imperial ambitions one day. But he believed that to be so remote a possibility that it was not immediately relevant. For reasons of self-interest, he said, for the present the Soviet Union was likely to be friendly towards the oppressed nationalities. “India”, he felt, had “every reason to develop friendly relations with Russia. In many ways conditions in Russia are not very dissimilar to Indian conditions, in education and agriculture and the beginnings of industry to mention some instances, and we could learn much from studying their methods”.

It is clear from the above assessment that the Indian national opinion did not foresee any threat to India from Russia. Instead they welcomed and hailed the October Revolution, expressed great appreciation for Lenin and applauded the enlightened principles of Soviet foreign policy, which were advancing the cause of peace and self-determination of the subject peoples.

### **Early Soviet Interest in India:**

Shortly after the October Revolution the Soviet Government turned its attention on India and other Eastern countries. In June 1918 the Soviet commissariat of Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel) published a “Blue Book” containing secret documents taken from the archives of the Tsarist Foreign Ministry. The documents on India contained in

the “Blue Book”, edited by K.M. Trionovsky were mostly confidential dispatches from the Tsarist Consul General in India to the Foreign Ministry. Trionovsky’s 12 page introduction is significant because it is the first of many commentaries on Indian conditions providing some clues to the nature of Soviet interest in India. The introduction by him indicated boldly the Russian policy towards India and the “role which the Russian Revolution could play in combating the world imperialists”.

After briefly describing the deplorable economic, social and political conditions of India under British rule, the author rightly noted that a national liberation movement was growing and threatening British rule in India, a movement which “for the time being has an exclusively national character, uniting all conscious classes and sections of the populations”.<sup>15</sup>

India in revolution , Tronovsky asserted, “would became our national ally in the struggle against the common enemy”.<sup>16</sup> He pleaded for self determination for India and spoke of the importance of the Russian experience for India ..... “Our revolutionary path in the not distant future will bring forth joy”, he said “not only on the plane of the struggle for national liberation from foreign domination but also for the socialist order”.<sup>17</sup> Towards the end, the writer hinted that “we must join our hands with India in her struggle against imperialism. We must help her to free herself from the detested English Yoke”. The success of revolution in India was necessary as it

would influence the political events of the whole world".<sup>18</sup> The Bolsheviks were convinced, he wrote further, "..... that in the British Empire the most vulnerable part was India and they cherish it as an article of faith that unless India was liberated Russia would not be rid of the menace of England".<sup>19</sup>

In 1918-19, the Soviets gave a little more attention to India. In spite of the pre-occupation of the Soviet Government with the prospects of revolutions in the west, the growing upsurge of the National Movement in India did not pass unnoticed. The first Congress of the Communist International issued a manifesto in which the new national upsurge in India was noted : "In India the revolutionary movement has not subsided for a single day and has lately led to the greatest workers strike in Asia which the British Government met by ordering its armoured cars into action in Bombay".<sup>20</sup>

The tragedy of the Jalianwala Bagh in April 1919, when 379 people were shot down by the British army was immediately broadcast by Moscow Radio to show that the British were fighting for their lives in India.<sup>21</sup>

In the summer of 1919, a book was published in Moscow dealing with British rule in India, which characteristically enough, using charts and figures showed the great economic advantage the British were deriving from India.<sup>22</sup> The author Kerzentsev noted that India occupied a pivotal position in the struggle against imperialism.

He pointed out that from the point of view of two important results; first, it would deprive British imperialism of source of huge profits, and second, it would ignite a series of revolution against imperialism through out the colonial world.<sup>23</sup> Such commentaries on Indian affairs, through ill-informed and indeed very limited, tended to show that the importance of India was slowly being realized by the Soviets.

By virtue of its size and population and its recognized value as the most prized possession of the leading imperial power of the day, India occupied a key position in the operation of such a policy. Lenin took note of the general ferment that manifested itself in India immediately after the First World War. He regarded it as indicating a revolutionary situation, and hoped that the masses would rise against their foreign masters. In 1920 Lenin sent a brief message to the Indian Revolutionary association (Mahendra Pratap's Provisional Government of India in Exile in Kabul) in reply to a resolution adopted at a mass meeting held in Kabul on February 17, 1920. The message stated : "I am glad to hear that the principles of Self-determination and the liberation of oppressed nations from exploitation by foreign and native capitalists, proclaimed by the workers and peasants republic have met with such a ready response among progressive Indians who are waging a heroic fight for freedom".<sup>24</sup>

As its hope of a revolution erupting in the west were not fulfilled, the Soviet Government turned its attention increasingly to

the colonial world, especially to India. The last article to come from Lenin's pen, "Better Fewer but better", stated : "In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China etc. account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe".<sup>25</sup>

### **Soviet Writers**

Lenin's interest in India inspired several Soviet writers to observe the Indian situation and present explanations for the events taking shape in India. Thus I. Vanien, in an article entitled "Facts and Impressions of Post War India" (1922), gave an account of some important episodes of Indian history. He mentioned the growth of industries, the development of indigenous capital, and the rising of 1857. He described how, when the Prince of Wales visited Madras in 1921, the people observed hartal and staged demonstrations. He compared the Jalianwala Bagh tragedy of 1919 to the events of January 9, 1905 in Russia.<sup>26</sup>

In his article entitled "The ways and perspective of Indian Revolution" (1922) Tivel outlined the class character of the national revolutionary movement in India. He expressed the view that the Indian National Congress should radically change itself if it wanted to retain control over the masses. Since a revolution was imminent in India, the class controversies would assume importance, and workers and peasants would raise the question of social liberation in India.<sup>27</sup>

In an article entitled “India’s struggle for liberation” (1925), “Big Ben” observed that, on the one hand, the temporary stabilization of capital in India improved the economic situation of the country and strengthened the influence of British capital; and that, on the other, there was the awakening of the masses who had enthusiastically reacted to the October Revolution. The slogan of self-determination had reached the people. In support of this statement he cited the defeat of All-India Congress committee (AICC) resolution of condolence on the death of Lenin by a mere nine votes, which was significant in his opinion. He hoped, in conclusion, that the impact of the revolution would grow day by day.<sup>28</sup>

Thus Soviet writers kept up their interest in India. Indeed, events in India formed an important part of their study of world affairs.

#### **Brussels Conference & Nehru’s Brief Visit to Moscow :**

During a brief visit to Berlin towards the end of 1926 Nehru learned about a proposed Congress of Oppressed Nationalities at Brussels in February 1927. Impressed by the idea, Nehru proposed to the Indian National Congress that the latter should take an official part in the forthcoming Brussels Congress. The proposal was approved and Nehru was appointed to be the spokesman of the Indian National Congress at Brussels.

On February 10, 1927, the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities met in Brussels at the Palais Egmont and remained in session for five days. The first of the 40 resolutions passed by the Congress, moved by Nehru, extended the warm support of the Brussels Congress to the Indian National Movement for “complete freedom” because the “liberation of India from foreign domination and all kind of exploitation is an essential step in full emancipation of the peoples of the world”. He told the cheering delegates that the Indian National Congress had commissioned him to affiliate the latter with the League against Imperialism, the organization which was founded by the Brussels Congress.<sup>29</sup>

Who sponsored the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities and founded the League Against Imperialism? Nehru was not sure, but he had no doubt that the League “was friendly toward the communists”.<sup>30</sup> Though the subsequent activities of the League made it unmistakably evident that it was nothing more than a appendage of the Communist International, the League Against Imperialism was considered, at its inception, as an organization genuinely interested in the emancipation of oppressed people. Infact, the German Council of the League had five-well known figures as its honorary presidents “ Albert Einstein, Romain Rolland, Madame Sun-Yet-Sen, George Lansbury and Jawaharlal Nehru.

The Brussels Congress proved to be a milestone in the development of Nehru’s political thought, notably his espousal of

socialism and a broad international outlook. It was there that he first came into contact with orthodox communists, left-wing, socialists and radical nationalist from Asia and Africa. It was there that the goals of national independence and social reform became linked inextricably in his conception of future political strategy. It was there, that the notion of an Afro-Asian group of nations cooperating with one another was conceived. Indeed, the Bandung Conference in 1955 may be seen as the fruition of an idea which first found emotional expression at Brussels almost thirty years earlier.

Nehru himself sees Bandung in this perspective. In talking about the Bandung Conference he remarked, 'I will tell you a old story. Perhaps you have come across the fact that I attended a conference in Brussels in 1927'. The Asian delegates wanted to meet regularly thereafter but 'found that it was not possible for us to meet anywhere except in some country of Western Europe. When I interjected, 'the world has changed since then', his face glowed and, in slow, measured words, he said, 'the world has changed and of course we meet'.<sup>31</sup>

In a report submitted to the All India Congress Committee, Jawaharlal Nehru termed the Brussels Congress "an event of first class importance" that was likely to have a far reaching impact. Although he could not predict the future of the League, Nehru enthusiastically commented :



“It is a study infant with great possibilities of growth.....it has the germs in it of developing into a real league of Nations of peoples, a truer one than the league of Governments which sits at Geneva”.

“It is clear of course that any association with the league does not limit in anyway the freedom of activity of our Congress.”<sup>32</sup>

The idea for an anti-imperialist conference came from a small group of revolutionaries in Berlin, then the European Centre of political exiles from the colonial world. It had strong moral support from Moscow which welcomed such a gathering as a device for infiltration into nationalist circles through out Asia.<sup>33</sup> Diverse European intellectuals and leftist trade union leaders were drawn by sympathy for the underdog and, possibly, by a sense of guilt over the unsavoury aspects of European domination. Many delegates had strong communist sympathies, though the ideologies of those present varied considerably, from left-centre to orthodox Marxism.

Nehru recognized that the Brussels Congress was entirely in keeping with Russia's present policy of encouraging and supporting every form of nationalism, and indeed, every other force which can help them break imperialism, especially British imperialism.<sup>34</sup> Nehru observed that the Soviet Union “approved” the idea of Brussels Congress, though “they kept themselves severely aloof from the Congress because they thought that too close an association might

frighten away many people. Thus there was no representative from any Russian organization.<sup>35</sup> Nonetheless, there was “a strong undercurrent of sympathy for Russia among the delegates”, “Every reference to Russia was cheered”, Nehru noted and pointed out the case of an African Negro delegate, who said that his people did not know much about communism but felt that Soviet Russia brought a message of hope to the down trodden and the oppressed.<sup>36</sup>

Nehru dismissed the propaganda put out by the British and French media of the day that the whole show at Brussels was a puppet play with the strings being pulled by the Soviets. But he saw that many of speakers were inclined to accept communism as an article of faith and some were even more communist than Moscow. As he explained in his report of the Working Committee :

“The Brussels Congress was .....so far as its delegates were concerned, by no means purely communists. There were important labour leaders who have openly opposed Communism and the Third International. But the organizers were certainly communists or people having full sympathy with Russia. There was also a strong under current of sympathy with Russia among the delegates. As one of the Negro delegates from Africa put it, his people did not know much about

communism but they felt that Soviet Russia brought a message of hope to the down trodden and oppressed".<sup>37</sup>

At the plenary session of the conference he delivered an impassioned address on India's exploitation-how India is maltreated, repressed and plundered. In tone and language it was typical of the radical Socialist pronouncement then in vogue, an angry critique of imperialism and all its misdeeds. He was acutely aware of India's pivotal role in the Afro-Asian world. Politically and strategically noting that many countries in the area would achieve their freedom only when India itself were independent. There was evident, too, of a marked socialist outlook. The resolution on India, drafted and moved by Nehru, declared that 'this congress further trusts that the Indian National Movement will base its programme on the full emancipation of the peasants and workers of India, without which there can be no real freedom'.<sup>38</sup>

Nehru's attraction to Marxism was perhaps the most striking feature of his role at the Brussels Congress. Nor was he unaware of the communist bias of its creation, the league against imperialism. But at this stage of his political outlook, and indeed for the next 15 years, collaboration between nationalism and communism seemed to him natural and desirable. It was not Marxist theory that attracted him at the outset; rather it was an emotional aversion to the social

democrats and faith in the Soviet experiment. Recalling this period in his autobiography he wrote :

“As between the labour worlds of the Second International and the Third International my sympathies were with the latter. The whole record of the second International from the war onward filled me with distaste, and we in India had had sufficient personal experience of the methods of one of its strongest support – the British labour party. So I termed inevitably with goodwill towards communism, for, whatever its faults, it was atleast not hypocritical and not imperialistic .....These attracted me, as also the tremendous changes taking place in Russia”.

And yet, even at this time, Nehru had serious reservations about his communist colleagues.

“But communists often irritated me by their dictatorial ways, their aggressive and rather vulgar methods, their habits of denouncing everybody who did not agree with them”.<sup>39</sup>

Moreover, it was at Brussels that he had his live contact with representatives of resurgent China. Like many among the political intelligentsia of his and succeeding generations in India, he

had followed the course of China's national and revolutionary upsurge with great interest and sympathy which, perhaps, was not always to be reciprocated in an equal measure. He had been particularly incensed and outraged by the British use of Indian soldiery and police to shoot and put down the Chinese people with whom India had deep sentimental ties even though in recent history any direct intercourse had minimal.

He was at pains to stress for the benefit of his congress colleagues not to base their judgement on the Chinese question on the news they read in the Indian papers. "The news that reaches India about the Chinese struggle", he wrote, "Comes almost entirely through British official or semi-official agencies and the real truth seldom appears in the Indian papers". Therefore, must establish effective channel of communication for free flow of information and organize exchange of visits for substantial dialogue, if possible, in China and India on suitable occasion, or in third country if the British Government put obstacles in the way.

The working committee had complied with his plea by passing a resolution which was not very strong but stated that it was "not satisfied with the arguments used by the British Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (Austin Chamberlain) to the necessity of sending any troops to China and demands that the Indian troops sent there be brought back to India forthwith." The resolution called upon "the country to insist on the Government's compliance with this

demand". While about it, the working committee authorized the Congress president to cable the greetings of the Indian National Congress to the secretary of the Congress of Oppressed Nations, Brussels, and offering its "fullest cooperation in world campaign against tyranny of imperialism", and assuring it that all shades of Indian opinion unanimously condemned "employment of Indian troops against China and viceroy's action preventing Legislative Assembly from discussing the subject".

In his statement to the Press at Brussels Nehru had referred to Lord Irwin's veto and added : "India today is with China not only because she has every sympathy for her but because she feels that China's successful fight is the most hopeful sign of the future downfall of imperialism". And he had gone on to argue that "the attempt to use India against China makes it all the more necessary for the forces of nationalism in the subject nations to cooperate together for their common good".<sup>40</sup>

The Chinese at the time seemed desperately keen to draw up a programme for Sino-Indian co-operation as he reported to the working Committee : "I had many talks with Chinese delegates in Brussels. Faced as they were with a critical situation, they naturally wanted immediate action and were intolerant of delay. I pointed out to them that however much we might sympathise with them our internal difficulties prevented us from doing much at present. We would try to do our best now but what was more important was to lay the

foundations of future cooperation. The joint declaration of the British, Indian and Chinese delegates were very keen on the canton government sending a permanent representative to canton or Hankaii. I agree with them about the desirability of the proposal and said that I would place it before the working committee of the Indian National Congress with my strong recommendation. But I pointed out that there may be many difficulties in the way of Indian National Congress and they may not be able to send such a representative. A representative from the canton Government to India would of course be warmly welcome".<sup>41</sup>

His cautionary words notwithstanding, the Chinese were so insistent on an agreement on certain immediate steps taken that Nehru assented. It was not so much a hard and fast agreement as a memorandum of understanding. But it cannot be overstressed. The Chinese delegates were, after all, representatives of a Sovereign Government; though admittedly that Sovereignty was under severe pressure from a combination of colonial powers, principally Britain. They knew that Nehru did not represent a Government, much less a Sovereign State, but national movement struggling for freedom. That they were anxious to win its moral backing and even exchange representatives with it gives some indication of the importance they attached to the Congress as the arbiter of Indian destiny, if not a putative Government; at the time.

Inspite of his early rupture with the Congress of oppressed Nationalities and the League, Nehru's participation in their activities had an abiding influence on his views and political platform. This experience confirmed Nehru as a staunch fighter against imperialism and strengthened his belief in the necessity to fight for genuine and complete independence, and not just for domination status. His experience in the Congress of oppressed Nationalities and in the League Against Imperialism also heightened his interest in social problems, in the conditions of the working masses. He also understood that the struggle for independence should be linked with the struggle for socialist ideals. Nehru now viewed the future of India in an international context. He was getting more and more internationalist in his political philosophy and became aware of the need to unite all colonial and dependent peoples. Nehru discovered for himself, and largely for the National Liberation Movement in India and other countries, the possibility for a firm alliance with world's first socialist state, with the communist and democrats in the west in the struggle against imperialism.

While in Europe, he continued to give much thought to the Soviet developments. His attitude to the Soviet remained extremely favourable as he considered the emergence of Soviet Russia as a very significant factor in the anti-imperialist struggle. In an article which he wrote on September 13, 1927 from Montana, Switzerland<sup>42</sup> Nehru viewed the international situation. He out-rightly rejected the British contention that Russia posed a danger to India. Analyzing



independent India's Foreign Policy Vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, he pointed out that Soviet aims were peaceful and that India had nothing to fear from Soviet Russia.

Nehru also did not feel that the new social system of the Soviet Union would stand in the way of friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union. Even if India Choose a different system, he was confident, it could establish good relations with Russia. "We need not to be communist", he wrote, "nor need we agree with their gospel of communism in order to appreciate much that they have done".

Nehru's gravitation towards the world of Socialism could be judged from his short visit to Moscow in November 1927. This enabled him to verify in some measure with direct observation his notions about the first socialist state in history. He was not of course, a communist at any stage in his life. But as he wrote in his short book on Soviet Russia, "I must confess that the impression I carried back with me from Moscow were very favourable and all my reading has confirmed these impressions, although there is much that I do not like or admire".<sup>43</sup> Thus, it can reasonably be claimed, that many elements in the Foreign Policy of India which he was to pursue when he became the External Affairs Minister as well as free India's first Prime Minister were already well crystallized in his mind by the end of 1927.

Jawaharlal Nehru visited Moscow with his father Motilal Nehru when the Soviet Society for cultural relations with Foreign Countries invited Nehru's for the tenth anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution when they were in Berlin. Russia is the first to invite dependent India to join in international politics and accorded a fitting reception to Jawaharlal Nehru, who represented India.

Nehru's visit to Moscow was a chance event and Nehru was greatly impressed by whatever he saw and his admiration for the Soviet Union and its people grew immensely. Nehru was also greatly influenced by the personality of Lenin, the leader of the Russian Revolution. He considered Lenin as a political genius and a man of action. In a tribute to Lenin, he wrote :

“By an amazing power of will, he hypnotized a nation and filled a disunited and demoralized people with energy and determination and strengthen to endure and suffer for a cause”.<sup>44</sup>

His hosts made it possible for the Nehrus to see various aspects of Soviet life and Jawaharlal Nehru made good use of the opportunity. Nehru was more interested in the Soviet realities, how the new state was tackling its various Socio-economic problems, for he knew that they had a relevance to India as they were more or less identical for both countries. Such commonality made him write : “if

Russia funds a satisfactory solution for these, our work in India is made easier".<sup>45</sup>

Nehru's were on a conducted tour, seeing only what they were allowed to see; he knew too that conditions in the sprawling provinces hardly came up to what was to be found in Moscow. Yet he was convinced that the Soviet Union had made rapid progress in agriculture, prison reform, the eradication of illiteracy, the treatment of women, the handling of the problems of the minorities and the removal of the sharp contrast between luxury and poverty and of the hierarchy of class. He was sure too that the Soviet Union had much to teach India, which also was a large agricultural country with a poor and illiterate population. He was demonstrably impressed by what the Soviets were doing and planned to do. This is abundantly clear from the series of articles he wrote for the Indian News Papers and periodicals on returning to India, eventually to be published as a book entitled *Soviet Russia*. It was the first critical but sympathetic account of the Soviet Union by an Indian political leader of All India stature who was not a devout communist and for the Indian reading public it opened a many window on the young Soviet State, still in the heroic phase of its revolution, making light of all the hardships with which it was beset. It certainly confirmed him in his view that Indian people should steer clear of any war, whether hot or cold, which the imperialist powers might launch against Soviet Russia. As Nehru wrote in his book *Soviet Russia*:

“It is inconceivable that Russia, in her present condition at least, and for a long time to come, will threaten India. She can desire no additional territory, and even if she did the risks are too great for her. She is still mainly an agricultural country trying to develop her industries. For this she requires capital and expert knowledge. She gets neither from India. She produces raw materials, in abundance and not manufactured articles for export and dumping in Foreign countries, so does India. The two countries are today too similar to be exploited by each other, and there can be no economic motive for Russia to covet India. Ordinarily Russia and India should live as the best of neighbours with fewest points of friction. The continual friction that we see today is between England and Russia, not between India and Russia. Indians have for generations been told to fear Russia, and it is perhaps a little difficult to exorcize this fear today. But if we face the facts, we can only come to one conclusion, and that is that India has nothing to fear from Russia.....”<sup>46</sup>

This was by far the most positive pronouncement on the Soviet Union that any Indian leader of national stature had made till

then. However, even Nehru himself some years earlier had been inclined to equate some aspects of Soviet Communism with Fascism which was not surprising, considering that a relentless and systematic campaign of disinformation had been going on in the capitalist press ever since the Russian Revolution and this provided the main source of news even for the nationalist press in India. But having glimpsed the Soviet reality in its light and shade, even though briefly, Nehru had revised his views and judgement about it.

Nehru fully realized the importance of understanding Soviet Union and having friendly relations with her. He wrote; "Russia again cannot be ignored by us, because she is our neighbour, which may be friendly to us and co-operate with us, or may be thorn in our side. In either event, we have to know and understand her and shape our policy accordingly ..... Indifference is out of question".<sup>47</sup>

Nehru's stay in Europe had refreshed his mind and broadened his outlook as he wrote in his Autobiography: "I was returning from Europe in good physical and mental condition. I felt full of energy and vitality, and the sense of inner conflict and frustration that had oppressed me so often previously was for the time being absent. My outlook was wider, and nationalism by itself seemed to me definitely a narrow and insufficient creed. I felt I had a clear perception of World Affairs, more grip on present day world, ever changing as it was. Soviet Russia despite certain unpleasant aspects

attracted me greatly and seemed to hold forth a message of hope to the world".<sup>48</sup>

With the passage of time his belief that Indo-Soviet friendship and co-operation were a historical necessity and imperative for durable peace and progress in Asia and broader sense, the world was to ripen into something akin to a firm conviction.

At the end of December 1927 Jawaharlal Nehru demonstrated his mature outlook on national and international affairs by having the Madras session of Indian National Congress pass three resolutions of considerable importance. Addressing the delegates as "comrades", Nehru had the Congress resolve people was complete national independence with no ties with the British whatsoever.

Nehru's favourable view of the USSR at this time also derived in large measure from the fact that the USSR was the only European nation calling for an end to British rule in India. Speaking in Calcutta, he stressed the anti-imperial record of the USSR:

"And Russia, what of her. An outcast like us from nations and much slandered and often erring. But in spite of her many mistakes she stands today as the greatest opponent of imperialism and her record with the nations of the East has been just and generous".<sup>49</sup>

By 1936, Nehru's interest in world affairs had become very deep indeed and so also his attachment for the Soviet Union, while in prison during 1932-33 he spent a good deal of time pondering over the events in other countries and seriously analyzing the world situation. The more he studied this subject the more fascinated he grew 'India with her problems and struggles', he writes 'became just a part of this mighty world drama, of great struggle of political and economic forces that was going on everywhere, nationally and internationally'. And in that struggle Nehru's sympathies went increasingly to the communist side.

While presiding over Lukhnow Session of the Indian National Congress in 1936, he said : "If the future is full of hope, it is largely because of Soviet Russia and what it had done. The new civilization will spread to other lands and put an end to the wars and conflicts which capitalism feeds".<sup>50</sup>

Nehru found himself in disagreement with several policy moves of the USSR. The German-Soviet non-aggression pact puzzled him. He was much dismayed by the Pact and their subsequent actions. He expressed his dissatisfaction in these words:

"The Russo-German Pact, the Soviets invasion of Finland, the friendly approach of Russia towards Japan. Were there any principles, and standards of conduct in this world, as was it all sheer opportunism".<sup>51</sup>

At the same time Nehru maintained that the USSR had no other alternative after their efforts to contain Germany through common action had failed. He looked at this development against the background of British policy towards her in the past. He observed: "There can be and there is going to be no real alliance between Hitler and Stalin. But both are willing enough to play the game of power politics. Russia has suffered insult enough at the hands of England to resent it bitterly".<sup>52</sup>

However, after Hitler's attack on Russia, Nehru took the first opportunity after his release from prison to laud the heroic struggle of the Soviet people. Acting largely upon his advice, the Congress Working Committee at its Bardoli meeting in 1941 in a resolution expressed its sympathy for the Soviet Union. That country, it declared, had stood for certain human, cultural and Social values which were of great importance to the growth and progress of humanity.<sup>53</sup>

After the war during negotiations between Indian leaders and the British spokesmen the Soviet Press referred to the inadequacies of the British proposal and pleaded for the immediate grant of independence. At the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations, the Soviet Foreign Minister sadly observed that they had at the conference an Indian delegation but India was not yet an independent state; they should all hope that a new team would soon



come and the voice of an Independent India was heard in the UN circles.

The Interim Government was formed on 2 September 1946 with Nehru as Vice-President of the ministerial council. In the first broadcast on 7 September 1946 Nehru greeted the Soviet Union which, he said, 'carries a great responsibility for shaping world events' and added that as 'neighbours in Asia we shall have to undertake many common tasks and much to do with each other'. It was indeed a bold statement as at that time the USA with its then monopoly of the atomic secrets was speaking in very threatening terms to Russia. The cold war had reached a high pitch and it needed courage to make such a bold statement. In January 1947 a delegation from the Soviet academy of sciences came here on invitation sent at the instance of Nehru to the session of the Indian Science Congress where on 7 January he told the guests that "once diplomatic relations are established, the door will be opened for close contacts in many fields of beneficial human activities".<sup>55</sup>

Thus, the Russian Revolution laid the foundation for the building and expansion of new kind of ties between the Indian people and the people of USSR. These friendly relations naturally entered a new phase after India became an independent and sovereign state in 1947.

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49. Jagat Bright, ed., Before and After Independence : A collection of the important speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, 1922-50 (New Delhi, Indian Printing Works, 1950), p.66.
50. Report of the Forty-Ninth Session of the Indian National Congress held at Lucknow, 1936, n.55, p.20.
51. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Op.Cit., p.36.
52. Ibid., p.38.
53. Ibid., p.39.

## *Chapter – 2*

*1947-Year of India's  
Independence & the Relations  
with the Soviet Union*

## **CHAPTER – 2**

### **1947-YEAR OF INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE & THE RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION**

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The core of India's foreign policy since independence has been the non-alignment with major power blocs. When India became independent, the world was divided into two. Nehru did not choose either. India wanted to free herself from the coils of Big Power diplomacy ever since her independence. Indian leaders were convinced that to become embroiled in this bipolar struggle would be tantamount to losing everything that India had gained in her long struggle for national independence. Nehru declared in 1952 :

“If there is a cold war today, certainly we are neutral. It does not matter who is right or who is wrong. We will not join in this exhibition of mutual abuse”.<sup>1</sup>

Nehru the chief architect of India's foreign policy, believed that the ideological struggle between East and West was the result of different economic and political systems, suited to different societies. On March 22, 1949 he observed :

“we must realize that there are different types of economic policies in the world today in

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different countries and they are believed in by their people. Well, the only thing to do is to leave them to work out their destiny. It may be that one of them justifies this policy, another justifies another. It may be that a third follows the middle course...we must proceed on the basis of leaving every country to shift itself in regard to its internal affairs. Any effort to change the economic policy, or any other internal policy, forcibly or to bring pressure to bear upon it, leads to counter-pressure and to continuous conflict...We have had a type of philosophy which is a live and let live philosophy of life. We have no desire to convert other people to any view or thought".<sup>2</sup>

India has been against the cold war ever since her independence and was not ready to see world in terms of communism and anticommunism. She as the largest democracy of Asia, believed in the democratic way of life. Nehru time and again advocated and emphasized that both America and Russia solve the crisis and save humanity from the ultimate disaster.

Emphasizing the importance of those countries who did not belong either to capitalists or communists, he said :



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“Millions of people believe in what is called western capitalism; millions also believe in communism. But there are many millions who are not committed to either of these ideologies, and yet seek, in friendship with others, a better life and more hopeful future”.<sup>3</sup>

According to the United States and the thesis of Western Block countries the whole basis of the western bloc was that Soviet Russia and Communist China along with other smaller communist countries, had hostile and aggressive intentions towards non-communist world. But India rejected this thesis on the plea that India did not see any direct threat or danger to herself from the communist world. India did not believe that Soviet Union would attack India rather she had friendly relations with Russia. It was because of non-recognition of this threat that India did not support the defence arrangements and actions of the western block and avoided external pressures.

India's Policy towards the Cold War has been one of keeping out of it. In her view it existed because the West and the Soviet Union found themselves engaged in a grim competition for world power and position and that Asia and Africa were not in the picture except as play things of the Big Powers. G.L. Mehta, Indian Ambassador to the USA, once wrote :

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“The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Russia which has thus become basis is partly ideological and partly a reflection of power politics. In any case distrust and fear of the Soviet Union are at the root of American strategy and tactics. It is these feelings which make the government give the first priority to building up an alliance against Soviet and communist powers in both military and economic spheres. It is the cleavage which makes them think in terms of “bipolarization” of the world. And from this top priority given to making the world safe from the communist menace arise many of the difficulties of American foreign policy”.<sup>4</sup>

Writing clearly in his book *The Discovery of India* about India's role to be played after independence in world affairs he insisted that India could not play a secondary role in the world affairs. Nehru's mind and thought were working to the future shaping of Indian foreign policy, VIZ, the concept of non-alignment. It reflects that India should have its own independent policy in regard to establishing relations with countries of the world. He was firm that India would never be a protégé of any big power and her freedom would make a vital difference to Asia and therefore to the world.

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Nehru who was the witness to the games of power politics and holy alliances during the two world wars was very careful and cautious in aligning India definitely with any one of the emerging power blocs. He proposed, as far as possible, to keep away from the politics of groups aligned against one another which had led in the past to world wars and which might again lead to disaster on an ever vaster scale.<sup>5</sup> It was this experience and realization that Nehru after independence made it a corner-stone of his foreign policy to remain non-aligned and away from blocs. No doubt he himself realized that it was difficult position, because, when people were full of fear of one another, any person who tried to be neutral was suspected of sympathy with the other party. Replying to a debate on the objectives of Resolutions in the Constituent Assembly on January 22, 1947, Nehru declared, "I am not enough of prophet to know what will happen, but I do know that those desire peace must deprecate separate block which necessarily become hostile to other blocs. Therefore, India in so far as it has foreign policy, has declared that it wants to co-operate on equal terms with all countries".<sup>6</sup>

Nehru, however never lost sight of the two powers – USA and the USSR. He realized that these two powers counted in the ultimate analysis. The USA was almost unapproachable and their resources were enormous. The Soviet Union was not so situated geographically but was yet almost unbeatable. All other powers were of the second rank compared to those two and had to rely on alliances for their protection.<sup>7</sup> He proposed to keep on the closest terms of

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friendship with other countries unless they themselves created difficulties. In a speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947, Nehru voiced his feelings, saying, "we shall be friends with America and we intend co-operating fully with the Soviet Union".<sup>8</sup>

Nehru considered that non-alignment was a technique, a method by which one keeps out of trouble by decreasing tension. He pursued as a way of life and action, a matter of principle not of opportunism or of convenience.<sup>9</sup> Nehru's idea was that the approaches to world affairs of both the powerful blocs were out of date in this atomic age and non-alignment was the only possible road to peaceful relations and co-existence which meant no prior commitment coupled with dynamic participation in world affairs. Nehru also stood for ideological disarmament and in this connection he criticized organizations like cominform which were against peaceful co-existence and entirely opposed to Panchsheel principles.<sup>10</sup>

The term "non-alignment" according to Michael Brecher, was first used by V.K. Krishnamenon at the United Nations in 1953-54. Between 1947-54 the term neutrality was often used to describe the attitude of the non-aligned countries.

While in jail (1942-45) Nehru clearly foresaw the emergence of two power blocs in the post-War world. Writing in 1944, he noted that the outstanding international consequences of the second world war could be the supremacy of the USA and the Soviet

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Union, and much in the world was going to depend upon the policy pursued by these two countries and on the degrees of co-operation or conflict between them. He was the proud man and an intellectual, and was proud of his intellect. Accordingly he strongly resisted any attempt to make him yield his right of individual judgement through blind obedience or subservience to the judgement of other leaders, even if they were leaders of large and powerful countries. Once he said :

“I am not prepared even as an individual, much less as an foreign minister of this country, to give up my right of individual judgement to anybody else in other countries. That is the essence of our policy. And that is the essence of non-alignment”.<sup>11</sup>

From this point of view non-alignment can claim, perhaps, to have survived the pulls and pressures, the stress and strain from various quarters and became a viable policy especially suited to the needs, requirements and aspirations of the Third World. This was because newly independent countries wanted to rebuild their society in accordance with their cultural identities and their own peculiar needs.

Jawaharlal Nehru mooted the idea of Asian Conference which could promote Asian solidarity, much before he became the

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Vice President of the Executive Council of the Viceroy and formed an Interim Government for India on September 2, 1946. Once he wrote :

“There is much talk now of some kind of an Asian Federation. The immediate need is, however, for a drawing together of the countries of Asia so that they can consider their common problems together.....I trust that a fully representative Asian Conference will be able to meet before long probably India will be best place for such conference to meet”.<sup>12</sup>

This conference which represented all Asian Countries except Japan and Six Soviet Asian Republics reflected growing awareness of Indian interest in Asian affairs and also the conviction that with India on the verge to complete political freedom, she should take the initiative in Asian affairs. This was in line with a statement by Nehru to the Constituent Assembly in December 1946 in which he had expressed his hope that the new constitution would not only permit India to realize real freedom, but would also lead to the freedom of other countries of Asia.

Nehru while addressing the conference revealed acute consciousness of Asian affairs. He said :

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“Standing on the watershed which divides two epochs of human history and endeavour we can look back on our long past and look forward to the future that is taking shape before our eyes. Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs”.<sup>13</sup>

At this conference, which heralded the solidarity movement of the Afro-Asian countries, Nehru said :

“For too long, we, of Asia have been petitioners in western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own feet and to co-operate with us. We do not intend to be the playthings of others”.<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet observers were carefully watching the political dimensions which arose out of this conference. One Soviet observer reported to Moscow that the Indian efforts at the proceedings were opposed sharply by the delegates of “those countries within US sphere of influence”. The Chinese “counter imperialism” which developed during the meetings, he pointed out, was equally denounced with the Indian by the Southeast Asian delegates who “vigorously expressed the imperialist nature of the Pan-Asiatic theories of Japanese militarists and called for an attitude of the

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greatest circumspection towards the attempts of certain Indian and Chinese delegates to revive Pan-Asiatic slogans".<sup>15</sup>

In America and Europe the conference was viewed as some kind of a Pan Asian movement directed against Europe or America. Nehru, however, declared that India has no designs against anybody, "we propose, he said, to stand on our own legs and to co-operate with all others who are prepared to co-operate with us".<sup>16</sup>

India is often looked upon by Asian countries as a big and reliable brother and India proved her capacity to interpret faithfully to the world the mind and spirit of resurgent Asia. In a way India is the natural and focal point of many forces at work in Asia. It was imperative for Asia to draw close together to put her house in order for defence and to further world peace.

At the end of the conference it was decided to establish Asian Relations organization and Nehru because of his key role was unanimously elected President of its provisional general council. The same concern for Asia led Nehru to convene two years later another conference in Delhi to support the cause of Indonesian independence. When the Dutch launched their military action on July 20, 1947, New Delhi became in a sense the capital and clearing house for the "movements of protests which arose through out Asia".<sup>17</sup>



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**Opposition to Military Alliances :**

India deprecated military alignment of nations, because in her view, the same led to the creation of a 'War Psychosis', increasing fear and race of armaments, all these factors working together in the direction of war. While not denying the rights of nations to take legitimate precautions for self defence, Nehru held that defensive alliances openly aiming against some other country or countries defeat their own purpose of trying to 'maintain peace through strength'.<sup>18</sup> This is what he said at a press conference on July 27, 1953 :

“...Large organizations have grown up ....It is open for any country to have such organizations. But if I may say so, with all respect to them, my own approach to this question is without creating any hostile alliance. I do not deny the necessity of any country or group of countries protecting themselves or taking steps to protect themselves against possible danger. They may do so by all means. At the same time again and again what a country should decide is, whether its policy generally leads towards promoting a peace or war atmosphere. Sometime I find very little difference – people

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talk of defence-whether it is defence or something else – one country calls it defence and the other country says that this defence is aimed against it. The other country also talks about defence and takes some other measures. So they go on mounting armaments”.<sup>19</sup>

Here again India's attitude with the western bloc as to the nature of the communist threat, and, of course, from her main objective of not getting involved into a world war, for which end she wanted to minimize international tensions. Since, in her view, military and defensive pacts added to these tensions, India's general attitude was that she could not fully support the western bloc's view that peace could be maintained only through such alliances, as the communist bloc would not dare to risk a war if the west was strong. Another argument which, in India's opinion, went against such alliances was the fact that these inter-linked defence arrangements might lead to a general conflagration, out of local troubles where otherwise the same might be localized.

#### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization :**

So far as the western bloc is concerned, the NATO has been their chief defensive measure and the reaction of the Soviet Union to this also has been extremely unfavourable. In the North Atlantic Pact India saw provisions which could be interpreted to mean that this huge bloc of western nations might intervene on behalf of those of its

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members, which were colonial powers, to protect their colonial establishments.

As India strongly opposed colonialism in any form, she had a particular interest in this aspect of the North Atlantic Pact. Moreover two of the NATO members, France and Portugal, held small colonial territories on the Indian main land itself.<sup>20</sup> Otherwise India did not consider NATO as too directly affecting her, notwithstanding the fact that she regarded the alliance as born out of fear and creating counter fear. On June 21, 1952 Nehru expressed himself on NATO in the following words:

“I do not know if NATO affects India; may be very distantly. We are not worried about the Atlantic Pact. I was thinking of certain general trends like the Atlantic Pact based very rightly on self-defence, mutual defence against aggression obviously they have every right to do that. But geographically it spreads. I have no objection to that.....But what is more important is the tendency for the Pact to include in its scope the protection of colonial territories of Atlantic Powers. The Pact does not contain this but subsequent conversations between Foreign Ministers and others gradually bring that in, thus changing its

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character. With regard to that, I thought that there was something essentially opposed to the basic character of the United Nations”.<sup>21</sup>

#### **SEATO and Baghdad Pact :**

In the Past, India had been opposed to these pacts and alliances in principle only, since they did not directly affect her, but with the creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty organization and the Baghdad Pact in the course of 1954 and 1955, her opposition could not be limited to principle, but became matter of practical policy. Nehru believed that these alliances represented an indirect return of western power to former colonial areas to exploit them. He believed that the cold war between the Super powers served as a deterrent to world peace and could eventually precipitate an armed conflict. Raising his powerful voice against SEATO on September 29, 1954, in the Lok Sabha he said :

“Honourable members may remember the old days when the great power had spheres of influence in Asia and else where.....It seems to me that this particular Manila Treaty is inclined dangerously in the direction of influenced to be exercised by powerful countries....After all, it is the big and powerful countries that will decide the matter

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and not the two or three weak and small Asian Nations that may be allied to them”.

He did not leave at that. He pointedly said : “One can understand mention of external aggression in a defence treaty, but there is reference also to a fact or situation created within this area which might entitle them to intervene”.<sup>22</sup>

Jawaharlal Nehru warned the members of the Lok Sabha to “observe these worlds” and said, “They do not refer to external invasion. Any internal development in that area might also entitle these countries to intervene”.

Besides these objections, India was directly affected by the SEATO because India came under the ‘treaty area’ of the pact, as well as the fact that a none-too-friendly Pakistan was one of its members.<sup>23</sup> India believed that the only reason for her joining the Pact was her hostility towards India. This was obvious from the facts while signing the Manila Treaty on the SEATO, the Pakistan Foreign Minister emphasized the point that it was aimed at ‘aggression’ from whichever quarter, i.e., not merely from the communist quarter – it may proceed in a region where ‘aggression has unhappily been a common experience during the past many years.’<sup>24</sup>

Another consideration was the apprehension of India that the SEATO would mean a return of the west to Asia<sup>25</sup> and a domination of a Asian countries in a new form because the western powers would

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provide the military assistance under the pact and naturally the Asian countries would be dominated by those powers and would only be junior powers to the pact.

Though India did not join the communist block, the signing of the SEATO did help India in coming to a better understanding with that bloc, and added to the suspicion of the west in the minds of the Indians.<sup>26</sup>

The Indian attitude to, and opinion on, the Baghdad Pact which was established in April 1955, was not very different. In the Indian view, there was even less justification for the Baghdad pact than for the SEATO. It was justified by its members, more especially the united Kingdom, on the ostensible ground of Russian designs on West Asia. India was not convinced of this reason because the pact came after the Soviet Union had settled its frontier dispute with Iran and after it had publicly renounced her claim to Turkey's Eastern Province; there was also little communist activity in West Asian countries at that time. Indian opinion believed that the Baghdad Pact, instead of assuring security to West Asian region, actually brought insecurity, partly by provoking active Soviet interest in the region and partly by bringing about a split among the Arab countries because Iraq, a member of the Arab League, became a member of the pact and persistently tried to enlist more members to the Baghdad Pact – resulting in bitterness between two opposing groups, and 'disruption, insecurity and discontent'.<sup>27</sup> In so far as India's own interest were

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concerned, Nehru observed that the Baghdad Pact had a 'greater relation to us than the SEATO Pact. Its effect on India will be more, if not today, then tomorrow or the day after.'<sup>28</sup>

Early in 1956, the Indian attitude and opinion in respect of military alliances received support from an unusual, but extremely competent, source. Former US secretary of state, Dean Acheson, who wrote in the New York Times Magazine on April 15, 1956 that military pacts in west and South Asia had not produced 'strength and unity. They have produced division and weakness. They have not been a supplement to economic development. The West, far more than the Russians, has succeeded in cancelling out its own efforts'. The Indian attitude was also demonstratively vindicated by the events that led to the resort of force by Britain and France in Suez and by the Soviet Union in Hungary in October – November 1956. Indian opinion believed that the Baghdad Pact was in a way responsible for the events leading to Anglo-French action. The Hungarian tragedy occurred largely because of the Warsaw Pact and presence of Soviet armed forces in Hungary under that pact. Indian opinion therefore hoped that the realization of the futility and dangerousness of the military alliances and the existence of foreign military bases would lead to a change of policy on the part of the Greater Powers, of both the East and the West, so that the world might go back to the normal sense of relative security. Only Panchsheel and the Bandung Principles could assure the peace and security sought by the two blocs of nations by military measures.<sup>29</sup>

Thus, Nehru combined the realistic and the practical when he emphasized that Afro-Asia needed a generation of peace to allow its plan of economic development to get underway,<sup>30</sup> and that non-alignment helped forward the great cause of world peace by holding the balance of power between the two sides; this it did by keeping them guessing and by extending the area of non-military buffer zone.<sup>31</sup> This reasoning not only provides non-alignment with a moral basis against the 'immoral' Cold War, it also enables Afro-Asia to play a distinctive part in great affairs.<sup>32</sup>

### **Indo-US Relations and Non-Alignment :**

In August 1947, India had just attained her independence. She was internally and militarily weak and ridden by internal strife and economic distress. In the sphere of foreign affairs she did not wish to concern herself with other people's troubles, and was content with taking a vocal and diplomatic stand on issues of colonialism and the practice of racial discrimination. Towards the cold war her attitude was definitely cold. The United States on the other hand, at this stage, was devoting all her attention to contain communist expansion in Western Europe.

But, Nehru was not blind to the role which the United States was playing and expected to play in the future. He looked more towards the United States with some feeling of confidence which was necessary before India could really develop co-operative relations. It was desirable and perhaps inevitable that India and the United State



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should know each other more and co-operate with each other more. Nehru believed that what happened in India would attract attention in the United States and that they would seek to understand India's problem in relation to the world, for on the United States ultimately would fall the burden of the future, whether they wished it or not. He realized material resources of that country and her dominating and major position in international affairs is, more especially because of her leadership of the forces of democracy. Nehru who was inspired by President Roosevelt's leadership felt that to "keep ablaze the flames of human liberty, reason, democracy and fair play" the United States would have to throw their weight on the side of liberty and democracy in other parts of the world also, so that out of chaos and violence, real peace and freedom might emerge.<sup>33</sup>

The US response to New India was cold and disinterested. When the newly independent India was engaged in the crucial task of strengthening it, American efforts were directed to inducing the Indian government to follow a pronouncedly pro-American policy. The US Ambassador Henry F. Grady stated on December 7, 1947 : "It is tremendously important to keep India on our side in the world struggle,<sup>34</sup> but this statement was not backed by any action and was merely tautological.

The record of Indo-American relations since 1947 reveals a deep and abiding friction between the two largest democratic states in the world. The United States department sees the contemporary world

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in a rigid black and white perspective, as a struggle between good and evil, between democracy and communism. The great issue of our time is freedom or slavery. There is no room for a 'middle way'. Non-alignment is immoral or at the very least, amoral, for how can a state be neutral in a contest of this kind? Non-alignment weakens the 'free world' and serves objectively to strengthen the communist bloc. Not all Americans share this view. But it is clear that United States policy makers think and act within this frame of reference.

Nehru rejects the premises and, therefore, the policy implications of this arguments. To divide the world into rigid moral categories, he replies is to indulge in fanciful self-righteousness. No state or way of life has a monopoly of truth or virtue, though one may be more admired. None is an absolute threat to peace and freedom. On the contrary, both East and West share the blame for international tension which hangs like a shadow of impending death over the entire planet. Both are guilty of provocative deeds and words. Indeed, the moral imperative is to rule out war and to concentrate on the difficult but essential task of relaxing tensions, to recognize the harsh realities of international life, and to search unceasingly for a negotiated settlement between the two blocs. The greater the scope of the bloc system, the greater the likelihood of ultimate war. Hence non-alignment is vital to peace, an ethical and practical necessity. As long as India and the 'uncommitted' countries persist in this policy, they help to delay a catastrophe. And in positive terms they fulfill the historic role of maintaining a bridge between the hostile blocs.<sup>35</sup>

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Jawaharlal Nehru, far sighted as he was, correctly visualized that Indo-Soviet and Indo-US relations could not develop on the same line. Nehru got his first share of disappointment with US policy back in 1949 when the American government attempted to link economic assistance with political commitments. The leaders of American diplomacy thought that they were in a position to foist terms upon a country which was experiencing tremendous economic hardships. However, Nehru refused to accept American aid on terms that might jeopardize India's sovereignty and might draw it into the Cold War : "We do not seek any material advantage in exchange for any part of our hard-won freedom".<sup>36</sup> This move caused displeasure in the Indian reactionary circles and irritated the Americans in the talks. The New York Times called Nehru "one of the greatest disappointment of the post-war era".<sup>37</sup>

In the early fifties, Indian public opinion was outraged at the ruthless ways of American warfare in Korea. It rightly saw that the American policy in Asia was not a series of action with no concern for Asian lives or interests. It was in this direction that Nehru again and again pressed the proposal at all national and international forums for a peaceful solution of the conflict in Asia. This stand of Nehru was described in the American press as the voice of abnegation and a policy of appeasement.

When India started openly resisting the American pressure on its relations with the People's Republic of China and the question

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of its admission to the United Nations, it became the target of even more violent American attacks. India's boycott of the Japanese Peace Treaty made the American policy makers resort to harsher steps towards this country. The Americans looked at India's emerging new foreign policy based on independent assessment and sovereignty with disfavour and distrust. On August 28, The New York Daily Mirror accused Nehru of "Asiatic intrigue" and charged that "one of the enemies of this country is the India of Nehru".

Looking back, Nehru was vindicated when America decided to arm Pakistan in 1954. And yet Vice President Richard Nixon gave Nehru the impression that the USA appreciated Indian fears. But as soon as Nixon reached Karachi from Delhi, he briefed Robert Trumbell of The New York Times to write that the USA had decided to arm Pakistan and that the time had come to put "an end to Washington's patience with Asian nationalism".

The Unity of the non-aligned on different issues had worried the USA and it gave free expression to its fears. It was reported, by The New York Times on September 25, 1975, that Dr. Kissinger said:

"as tensions between the two original blocs had eased, a third grouping increasingly assumes the characteristic of a bloc of its own the alignment of the non-aligned".<sup>38</sup>

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A most important foreign policy problem which the Indian government had to tackle at the end of 1949 was the question of India's relations with China. India was one of the first non-socialist state to recognize the Chinese People Republic<sup>39</sup> on December 30, 1949. In a parliamentary speech Nehru rightly said that "it was not a question of approving and disapproving the changes that have taken place. It was a question of recognizing a major event in history and appreciating and dealing with it. The new government was a stable government and there is no force likely to supplant or push it away."<sup>40</sup>

Following the formation of People's Republic of China in 1947, Nehru gave clear instructions to the then representative at the UN regarding China's admission to the UN. He said :

"we recognize the new China and deal with it through our embassy. We do not recognize the Kuomintang, wherever it might be, it is clear that the Chinese government has a right to Formosa, which is Chinese territory. If Formosa rebels against it, it is another matter. But for the USA to come into the picture as defenders of Formosa is clearly an intervention by an outside power in favour of a regime which has been knocked out of China. It is a challenge to the China with which we wished to be friends".<sup>41</sup>

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India had been trying not only to make the world more acceptable to China but also to make China more acceptable to the world.<sup>42</sup> India recognized Communist China not because she liked communist bloc and also not because she wanted to win support from the communist countries. She also did not intend to pose any hostile attitude towards the United States, but it recognized a simple fact i.e., the existence of People's Republic of China.

But unfortunately the way China behaved can be characterized in the mildest terms, as breach of trust India's growing support to China and the fraternal relationship that was becoming increasingly cordial made some people think differently. India appeased her, as Peter Calvocoressi puts it, in hope that India China could together constitute a third force, which might perhaps build a bridge between Washington and Moscow.<sup>43</sup>

But all hopes of India for maintaining good relations, and the feeling that China was Asian first and communist afterwards were belied when China launched a massive attack on India, violating all rules of international morality and abandoning the Five Principles (Panchsheel) saying that she would respect them at her own convenience.<sup>44</sup>

After the Chinese aggression Nehru made a *frank admission*, when he said that India had been out of touch with reality in modern world and living in an artificial atmosphere of her own creation.<sup>45</sup> Nehru behaved with great restraint "what China has done is an insult

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to the conscience of the world. That is clear from the very great response we have received from a large number of countries. We still hope that our peaceful approach will be agreed to otherwise, this conflict may spread and may bring widespread disaster not only to India and China, but the whole world".<sup>46</sup>

#### **Indo-Soviet Relations : Stalin Era :**

Indian independence according to the Soviet press, was the outcome of the "Political Compromise" of the "Indian bourgeoisie", the Indian leadership in Soviet assessment continued to be "lackeys" and "vassals of Anglo-American imperialism".

After the collapse of Kuomintang regime in China, Dyakov wrote that the Nehru government was turning India into an "Anglo-American colony in the East", and that, "recent lessons of history show that the role of imperialist comes to a sad end for those who choose to assume it".<sup>47</sup> For Soviet Press, India's decision to join the Commonwealth, was tantamount to remaining "a part of British Empire."<sup>48</sup>

According to an Izevestia article, "In 1947, India was divided into two states. In January 1950 the dominion of India was proclaimed a Republic. This Republic however, remained a part of the British Empire and recognized the hegemony of the king of England. The dominant position of the English capital remained intact in all English colonies now called "independent".<sup>49</sup>

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But, the significant feature that marked India's attitude towards the Soviet Union was the personal initiative of the Indian Prime Minister towards the development of bilateral relations between the two countries.

Soon after the formation of the interim government early in September 1946 Nehru, as its head, announced his policy of developing close and friendly relations with the USSR. In his very first policy speech, Nehru laid great emphasis on relations with the Soviet Union saying that with our neighbours in Asia we shall have to undertake many common tasks.

But the British government was opposed to this suggestion on the ground that Soviet government was out to harm British interests in India and the other adjoining countries, that the Indian leaders were novice in international politics, certainly naïve about the Soviet policy and the Soviet diplomatic mission would subvert Indian Socio-economic structure, thereby harming India in particular and the west in general. These arguments were repeated by the British Foreign Office to the State Department in Washington to influence their mind to take such a pessimistic view of Indian initiative.

Despite these British objections, Nehru remained firm in his resolve. Towards the middle of September he asked Krishna Menon who had for long been working in London for Indian independence to seek an interview with Soviet foreign minister Molotov and propose the idea of having diplomatic relations between the two countries.



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Menon met him in Paris on September 28, 1946, when the Soviet leader was there for some UN meeting. Menon discussed with him two issues; the desirability of establishing diplomatic contacts between India and the USSR and the possibility of the Soviet Union supplying food grains to India which was likely to face soon the situation of famine. Molotov favoured the idea of having diplomatic relations between the two countries and asked him to go ahead with follow up measures but as regards the supply of food grains he expressed his country's inability to do anything in that respect as his country was badly ravaged during the war particularly the Ukraine region which was the wheat bowl of the Soviet Union. It was also realized in the political circles in India that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries would facilitate such a transaction.

In this context, it should be stated that the Russian attitude towards the interim government was one of doubt and suspicion. In his talks with Menon, Molotov raised the question of Indian delegation that was working in the UN then. He doubted whether it was going to represent the spirit of free India. Menon had to tell him the truth that the Indian delegation to which he referred was appointed by the British government before the formation of the interim government and as such it was likely to be what it was. He assured that henceforward Indian delegation would be in composition and ideological make-up truly Indian.

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As a result of these negotiations, an announcement was made on April 13, 1947, that the government of India and the USSR had agreed to exchange diplomatic relations at the ambassador's level.<sup>50</sup> It means that diplomatic relations were established between the two countries four months before India actually became independent. The initiative and the promptness on the part of India in this regard well demonstrated Nehru's intense desire to establish contacts with Moscow as early as possible. The importance that India attached to the USSR was manifested when Nehru appointed his own sister as ambassador to the USSR. It was in a sense, symbol of India's desire for close relations and cooperation with the USSR. With a powerful and resourceful country like the USSR, India wanted to maintain friendly but not subservient relations. In the course of a foreign policy speech, Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly : "We intend cooperating with the United States of America and we intend cooperating with the Soviet Union".<sup>51</sup> On the other occasion, Nehru emphasized the need for cultivating the USSR in these words :

"..... The Soviet Union being our neighbour,  
we shall inevitably develop closer relations  
with it. We cannot afford to antagonize  
Russia."<sup>52</sup>

Mrs. Pandit, who stayed in Moscow for about two and a half years used to feel lonely and isolated. The movements of foreigners, including diplomats, were restricted. What is worth noting is that

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during her entire stay Mrs. Pandit never felt encouraged to seek an interview with Stalin. This she could not do because the entire atmosphere was surcharged with indifference and suspicion. It was also because Stalin did not seem to be happy with the policy of equidistance that India had preferred to follow with regard to the two super powers.

In the first place, the USSR pointedly refused to acknowledge India's sovereign status for some years after India became free in August 1947. The news of the transfer of power in the sub-continent was never published in the Soviet press. One of the secretaries of the CPSU, Zhdanov declared in September 1947 that the imperialists were keeping China and India in "obedience and enslavement".<sup>53</sup> This clearly indicated that the USSR considered India's status after August 1947 at par with that of China under Chiang Kai-shek. Similarly, E. Zukov, a Soviet writer on Eastern affairs, ridiculed the US secretary of state Acheson's contention that India was free and China was not.<sup>54</sup> The Soviet government official organ published an article entitled "The colonial Policy of the British Labourite" as late as September 1950 in which the author argued that the British Act of granting independence to India had in no way changed the latter's status in the British Empire.<sup>55</sup> These extracts amply demonstrate that the USSR did not accept the genuineness of India's independence for quite some time.

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During this period, the Soviets did not hesitate to call Mahatma Gandhi, a “bourgeoisie reactionary”. While the grief evoked by Gandhi’s assassination was almost universal, K.P.S. Menon noted : “one country, and one only passed over his death in silence. No message of condolence came from Russia, not a word of comment appeared in the Soviet newspapers”.<sup>56</sup>

According to T.N. Kaul, “the most astonishing thing was the failure of the Soviet government to even send a message of condolence on Gandhi’s assassination”.<sup>57</sup> In the United Nations, the Soviet delegate spoke rather formally and very briefly.<sup>58</sup>

Further it was alleged that Nehru government was deliberately following anti-Soviet policies. Thus its criticism tended to be unsympathetic and sometimes even hostile. Everything for which India stood was strongly criticized and ridiculed. The objective of democratic socialism set out by the Congress Party was ridiculed and the policy of non-alignment was dubbed as a myth designed to confuse socialist states and thus regarded too ridiculous to be taken seriously.

At the same time in the United Nations, the USSR successfully opposed India’s candidacy for a seat in the security council in June 1947. The USSR supported the Ukraine while the United States backed India. India lost the bid as a result of previous understanding between the USSR, UK and China commenting on this, K.M. Pannikar wrote :

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“It was clear that Russia had become uncertain of India's attitude and was generally suspicious of our approach to questions of vital interests”.<sup>59</sup>

The question of Kashmir which came before the Security Council in January 1948, the USSR took up an indifferent attitude. An analysis of speeches made by the Soviet delegate on this issue reveals that right upto early 1952, when the council discussed the Graham Report, the Soviet representative rarely participated in the deliberations. On an occasion when he spoke he dealt either with some procedural matters or referred to some aspects of a resolution under consideration. Being indifferent to the issue, his participation in the Kashmir debate, was on occasions, pointless.

However, despite mounting Soviet criticism, Nehru kept the door open for cordial relations with the USSR. Although dismayed by the verbal assault, Nehru was not too surprised, for over the twenty years he had observed the fluctuations of Soviet policy and was accustomed to its abrupt shift. Illustrative of Nehru's attitude towards this treatment by the Soviet media is the following incident recalled by H.V.R. Ienger. One day he brought a sheet of extracts from Radio Moscow broadcasts which described Nehru as a tool of British imperialism. Nehru glanced cursorily at the extracts, smiled a little wanly, and said, “The heat is not against us though it looks like it. the heat is against the British. The British have always tried to keep

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Russians out of this sub-continent, and the Russians cannot believe that the policy has changed. Let us wait and see. If we show the world that we are, infact, an independent country, the world will change its attitude to us. In the meantime, you may study these things, but do not get bowled over by them”.<sup>60</sup>

The above cited incidents illustrate that Nehru had decided to embark on a policy of almost unilateral effort for the cultivation of friendship regardless of the Soviet attitude.

#### **Post-Stalin Era :**

The shift in the Soviet Policy came soon after Stalin's death, almost as soon as Malenkov came to power the Soviet ceased being hostile to India. In a speech to Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, Malenkov said : “The position of such a considerable state as India is of great importance for strengthening of peace in the East”. Recognizing India's role in ending the Korean War, he said, “we hope that relations between India and the Soviet Union would continue to develop and strengthen with friendly co-operation as their keynote”.<sup>61</sup>

However this change towards India was exploited mainly by Khrushchev. His most notable contribution to communist ideology is contained in his doctrinal development of the strategy of peaceful coexistence. He maintained that peaceful co-existence was the only alternative to the “most devastating war in history. There is no fatal

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inevitability of war”,<sup>62</sup> said Khrushchev. Explaining the point further he said :

“In this nuclear age war can no longer be a means of setting controversial international questions and the policy of peaceful co-existence is the only foundation upon which the states can and should build their relations”.<sup>63</sup>

This thesis of peaceful co-existence has tremendous implications for the underdeveloped countries. The policy of “peaceful competition from the position of strength ushered in an era of Soviet diplomacy at once mature and flexible imaginative Khrushchev not only recognized non-alignment of underdeveloped nations but supported it. It is interesting to note that Stalin had referred to co-existence but only as an extremely temporary expedient.<sup>64</sup> Now the situation has changed. The Soviet leaders are well aware that nuclear explosions know no political boundaries. Khrushchev advocated communist alignment with all the progressive forces in the underdeveloped countries, and in this context it is important to note that he regarded Nehru as a “progressive leader”.

By the end of 1954, the Soviet media began to speak highly of Nehru government. Some articles praised the peace loving nature of the Indian people while others the diversity of Indian culture. In an editorial Pravda acknowledged India's valuable contribution for

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strengthening peace.<sup>65</sup> Referring to the rapid shift in the Soviet treatment of India, a Congress M.P. S.N. Sinha pointed out in the Indian Parliament :

“Formerly they (Soviets) used to criticize us and say that our government was a tool of British imperialism.....Any Soviet Paper you will find today is all praise for our culture, for our government, for our Prime Minister”.<sup>66</sup>

The ties between India and USSR were strengthened by the mediator's role which India played during the Korean Peace conference in Geneva in May-July 1954. The conference offered the USSR an opportunity to capitalize on Indo-American tensions. The US opposition to India's participation in the conference heightened Moscow's campaign to demonstrate its friendship for New Delhi. The USSR pleaded for India's inclusion and recognized India's desire to be included in the conference where the future of Asia would be discussed. The American effort to exclude India from the conference was criticized by the Soviet delegate at the UN and the Soviet press played up the American opposition in an attempt to stimulate anti-American feeling in India.

It is worth noting that shortly after the Geneva Conference Indo-Soviet contacts increased markedly. India accepted the Soviet offer of assistance for her Second Five Year Plan. It may be inferred



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that Nehru attached considerable significance to the Soviet behaviour at Geneva. The atmosphere between New Delhi and Moscow began to clear rapidly after the negotiated settlement on Indo-China at the Geneva Conference. Any Indian reluctance to request Soviet assistance disappeared.

A potential stumbling bloc to further improvement in Indo-Soviet relations was removed in 1954 when a Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet was reached; this settlement, by which India withdrew her troops stationed in Tibetan trading centers and recognized Chinese sovereignty in the region and received in return special trade privileges, was noted approvingly in the Soviet press.<sup>67</sup> The Nehru's visit to Beijing which followed set the stage for the historic exchange of visits with Soviet leaders during the following year. During the course of that year Nehru's Foreign Policy received favourable comment in the Soviet press. In appreciation the Soviets gave manifest support to the Indian claims to the Portuguese enclave of Goa.<sup>68</sup> By the end of the year, some fourteen Indian delegations, ranging from a soccer team to industrialists visited the Soviet Union. Returning Soviet artists noted the Charms of India<sup>69</sup> – a practice which sharply contrasted with Stalinist accounts of the abject poverty of India.

The momentous year of 1955 which marked the culmination of the Soviet efforts to court India commenced with a significant Pravda editorial commemorating India's Republic Day.<sup>70</sup> Not only

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was the Foreign Policy of Jawaharlal Nehru praised, but the domestic accomplishments of the Indian government in the fields of agriculture, education and public health were listed as well. Establishing the ideological rationale for the Soviet aid to India, the editorial accused British and American capital of hampering India's independent development through their competitive struggle to dominate the Indian market.

Soviet aid, therefore, would help India resist western economic penetration and contribute to her struggle for economic independence. Thus, whereas under Stalin economic dependence was taken as proof of Indian political submissiveness, now Indian political independence was acknowledged as fact with the battle for economic independence still in the forefront. The editorial then prepared the Soviet public for the signing only a few days later of the Bhilai agreement on terms more generous than those offered by the Western countries for similar projects in India.<sup>71</sup>

The Bandung Conference, held in April 1955, with much fanfare was the largest and perhaps the most significant gathering of the representative of Afro-Asian countries. the conference promulgated the much heralded Panch Shila or five principles of international affairs, which served as a diplomatic bridge upon which close relations between communist and non-communist states could be constructed.

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The Bandung conference marked the beginning of a new era. For Nehru it was the realization of a long-cherished dream. He saw at Bandung that 'we are the future in Asia and Africa'.<sup>72</sup> In asserting at the conference the importance of this new force in the world he maintained : 'We are not copies of Europeans or Americans or Russians. We are Asians and Africans. It would not be creditable for our dignity and new freedom if we were camp followers of America or Russia or any other country of Europe'.<sup>73</sup>

Bandung thus provided a new experience and belief, shared and cherished by all the participants irrespective of their different creeds, ideologies and alliances. Among the concrete achievements of the conference, however, was the assurance which Chou-En-lai gave, convincingly to the leaders of Asia that China would not participate in any subversive activities. He declared that China would strictly adhere to the Five Principles in her relationship with the countries in the world.<sup>74</sup> Chou virtually dominated the proceedings. His reconciliatory and understanding attitude, which he displayed more often in dealing with the delegates of such nations as Pakistan, succeeded in creating, among the Afro-Asian states, a new image of China as a reasonable and peaceful neighbour.

The Bandung Chorus was unexpectedly interrupted by the Cylonese Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala who launched an attack on another form of colonialism, Russian domination in central and Eastern Europe. Kotelawala's speech created a split at Bandung when

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the western oriented nations rallied to his side in condemnation of Russian colonialism. Nehru saw in this division a threat to Afro-Asian solidarity and to the non-aligned world, and in opposing this disruptive trend he made a positive statement to the effect that he regarded the states of central and Eastern Europe as independent nations and not as the colonies of the Soviet Union. This must have gratified the Russian leaders – Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Despite the criticism, the Soviet Union's reaction to Bandung gave no indication of any offence. The Soviet reaction to Bandung was favourable mainly because the soviet leaders clearly realized that the desire for Afro-Asian solidarity among the Bandung powers was basically an attempt to eliminate Western influence from Asia and Africa.

Nehru's contribution to the successful organization of this conference, his ever-increasing personal rapport with the Chinese Premier, demonstration of the influence that he commanded among the Afro-Asian leaders and, above all, Bandung's advocacy of the Panchsheel spirit with its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stance were bound to be appreciated by the Soviets. By this time, the Soviet leadership was busy preparing a Psychological background at home, to launch a new policy of active relations with the newly independent Asian countries in the spirit of peaceful co-existence. Bandung naturally came in handy for their new course and was praised by leading Soviet academician, E.M. Zhukov. The author, who had

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participated in this conference as an observer, referred to Lenin's view on peaceful co-existence and drew strength from his conviction that close cooperation was quite possible and had become rather much more essential between the communist and the nationalist against their common enemy – world imperialism.<sup>75</sup>

Bandung confirmed the credentials of India as a peace loving country, willing to co-operate with the socialist community, befriend China and support the principles of peaceful co-existence. Impressed by India's ever increasing international stature the Soviet Government invited Nehru to pay a state visit to the USSR in June 1955.

#### **Nehru's Moscow Visit :**

Nehru visited Soviet Union in June 1955 (7-23 June). Referring to Nehru's arrival at Moscow air-port on June 7, K.P.S. Menon writes that "the entire presidium, headed by Bulganin, went to the airfield to receive him". As to the stately banquet organized in honour of the visiting Prime Minister, he further notes that the Kremlin was never "used for such a function since the war, and rarely since the revolution".<sup>76</sup> "To be dramatic, one might say about Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union that he too came, saw and conquered", Menon observed.<sup>77</sup> "No one has ever received a more tumultuous welcome" – Menon recorded in his autobiography.<sup>78</sup> The Washington Post observed that "reddest of the red carpets" was unfolded for Nehru.<sup>79</sup> Pravda editorially welcomed the Indian Prime Minister in a

manner, reserved exclusively for a leader of a communist country.<sup>80</sup> Menon records in his autobiography that when a foreign correspondent asked Nehru as to whether a crowd in Moscow was “organized”, Nehru gave the reply that “you cannot organize men’s hearts”.<sup>81</sup>

During his two week tour of the Soviet Union, Nehru travelled several thousand miles and visited the Republics of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Khazakhstan and the Russian cities of Stalingrad, Yalta, Magnitogorsk (the ‘Steel town’ in the urals) and Leningard wherever he went, he received spectacular receptions and was mobbed by crowds and received numerous gestures of friendship and admiration. The Soviet Government also paid him the unprecedented compliment of being shown round their highly secret atomic power station – he being the first non-communist ever to visit it – and he was deeply impressed by the great achievements of the Soviet Union.

Nehru used this visit to win the confidence of the Soviet leaders. Addressing a record gathering at the Dynamo stadium on June 22, at the end of his visit which was attended by top leaders of the Soviet Union, Nehru observed :

“Even though we pursued a different path in our struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, we admired Lenin and were influenced by his example. In spite of this difference in our methods, there was at no

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time an unfriendly feeling among our people towards the people of the Soviet Union".<sup>82</sup>

While paying tributes to the "great and novel experiment of the Soviet Union", he referred to attempts at creating "a socialist pattern of society" in India "through peaceful methods".<sup>83</sup> Nehru spoke high of the "passion for peace" in the Soviet Union.<sup>84</sup>

In the joint communiqué issued at the end of Nehru's visit, it was resolved that relations between the two would continue to be guided by the principles of Panchsheel. The two Prime Ministers also affirmed that in the observance of these principles by nations in the conduct of their mutual relations lies the main hope of banishing fear and mistrust from their minds and thus lowering world tensions. In the rest of the communiqué they commended the results of the Bandung Conference, and urged the representation of People's Republic of China in the United Nations and peaceful settlement of the Formosa dispute.<sup>85</sup>

According to "The Times", there were 'whole passages' of the joint-statement which are clearly his (Nehru's) and his alone.<sup>86</sup> In his memoirs K.P.S. Menon wrote :

"It must be said that at no time did they (Soviet leaders) try to use the slightest influence, let alone pressure to swing India to their side. They made it clear from the onset

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that they would leave it to us as guests to draft the joint statement. The joint statement was, thus, entirely Indian in style and in substance”.<sup>87</sup>

Nehru's visit produced a powerful impression on the Soviet leaders, who made several references to its significance in their subsequent meetings with heads of other states. Thus, when the Big Four met at Geneva, Bulganin mentioned Nehru's visit as an event of great importance.<sup>88</sup> In his report to the Supreme Soviet on the Geneva Conference of the Big Four in 1955 Bulganin again referred to Nehru's visit and noted that both countries “take the same position on urgent problems concerning the struggle for peace, and this of great importance in the settlement of pressing Asian and Far Eastern problems and in easing international tension”.<sup>89</sup> In June 1955, in his speech at the tenth anniversary session of the United Nations, Molotov referred to the visit of Nehru as “especially noteworthy” for lessening international tensions and promoting peace.<sup>90</sup>

The Soviet trip made a tremendous impact on Nehru, who expressed his gratitude to his hosts by saying, “I am leaving my heart behind”.<sup>91</sup> The Western press did not take kindly to Nehru's visit to the USSR. The New York Times warned Nehru that he might be “skillfully mouse trapped in Moscow”.<sup>92</sup> The London Times commented editorially on June 24 that the Indo-Soviet communiqué would contribute little to the “Peace and equanimity of the world.



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One cannot doubt that it is his (Nehru's) desire to contribute to world peace .... But it is a pity that Mr. Nehru's contribution to this ideal should have been a general acceptance of the Soviet policies".<sup>93</sup> The most absurd reaction of the American press was that because of the general identity of Soviet and Indian views on world issues, India had compromised her policy of non-alignment. But, by and large the rest of the world's press was appreciative, each for some of the achievements of the visit. The Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo) commenting, for instance, that Nehru's visit to Moscow had 'extended the peace area of the Soviet Union.

#### **Return Visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev :**

The return visit to India by Bulganin and Khrushchev in November 1955 marked another watershed in Indo-Soviet relations as India was the first non-communist country they visited. The visit demonstrated a change that was coming over in the relations between the USSR and non-communist nations. Its importance was magnified many times more because of the statements made by the Soviet leaders in the course of their visit. It is worth pointing out that by the end of 1955 Pakistan had become the Western anchor of SEATO and the Eastern anchor of the Baghdad Pact. By then Pakistan had also signed mutual defence agreement with the United States and had received substantial military and economic assistance from that country. On the very day of the Soviet leaders arrival in India, the US

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had announced an offer to construct 20 million dollar airfield in Pakistan.<sup>94</sup>

When the Soviet leaders arrived in New Delhi on November 18, the Indian people fully reciprocated to the guests the same exuberantly popular and affectionate welcome that the Soviet people had given Nehru in the Soviet Union only a few months before. So impressive was the popular reception to the Soviet leaders that the Western press and political leaders who had reacted earlier merely by irritation and annoyance to the Russian reception to Nehru, now reacted to the Indian reception to the Russian leaders by outright resentment. Wherever they went, they received tumultuous popular welcome and were greeted with slogans Hindi-Rusi Ek Hai and Hindi-Rusi Bhai Bhai speaking at a Delhi civic reception to the visitors, Nehru spoke for all Indians when he said :

“This day will go down in history as a very important event. The two visitors represented more than the meeting of the leaders of two great countries.....They signified something deeper and more far-reaching, VIZ., the meeting of the two great people, and this had a great significance”.<sup>95</sup>

The Soviet leaders referred to the identity of Soviet and Indian views on many world issues and paid high tributes to India's contribution to the maintenance and promotion of international peace

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and security : citing the instances of the Korean war, the Indo-China conflict, the Famosa straits crisis, the demand for representation of People's China in the United Nations, the attitudes regarding weapons of mass destruction and disarmament, opposition to military pacts and alliances and emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes. Khrushchev sought to flatter Indians by stating that India was not counted as a 'Great Power' in spite of her standing and achievements because 'the colonizers wish to humiliate your state, your people'. He added that India is a Great Power and she must belong to one of the first places among the great states of the world.

However, from India's point of view the most important pronouncements of the Soviet leaders was the Soviet pledge of unreserved support to its claim on Kashmir. India's stand was publicly and categorically endorsed. In his speech at Srinagar, Khrushchev declared :

“The question of Kashmir was a matter for a Kashmiris to decide. But the question of Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India had been settled by the people of Kashmir when they decided to join the Indian Union. The Soviet Union accepted their verdict”.<sup>96</sup>

It was the first time that any foreign country had openly expressed support for India's hold on Kashmir. Although Nehru later

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said that the Soviet leaders “expressed their opinion after due consideration and great deliberation”.<sup>97</sup>

Equally important was the unequivocal Soviet support to India's stand on Goa. On several occasions during their visit, the Soviet leaders attacked Portugal for refusing to withdraw from Goa and emphatically supported India's claim on it. In practically all major speeches Khrushchev mentioned Goa and forecast its early freedom.<sup>98</sup>

In short the visit demonstrated a historic transformation that was coming over in the relations between the Soviet Union and non-communist nations.<sup>99</sup> The visit was highly successful enterprise in public relations. It made a deep impact on Indian people about the USSR's sincerity in the pursuit of peace in spite of her enormous nuclear power and also her genuine appreciation of India's non-alignment and extension of peace area. The statements of the visiting Soviet leaders, with reference to further Indo-Soviet cooperation in various fields and on Kashmir and Goa, evoked great satisfaction and goodwill in India. The Soviet posture was obviously appreciated in India, especially in the context of the current Republican attitude in the USA, which equated non-alignment with immorality and by including Pakistan in the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact gave India a sense of encirclement.

If 1954 marked the beginning of Sino-Indian brotherhood (i.e. trade agreement), 1955 inaugurated the era of Indo-Soviet brotherhood, and the latter in some measure came to diminish the

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former. The Indian gain from the Indo-Soviet rapport was Russian support for India's claim on Kashmir, a support which from now on was to be continuously displayed at the United Nations. Nehru's status increased and with it rose India's credit in the world market. Indo-Soviet rapport gave further strength to the principles of co-existence, and emboldened the non-aligned nations to remain unaligned, while accepting at the same time money and skills from both the Soviet Union and America. What until recently might have been regarded as impossible in international relations was now made possible by India's example. The Soviet leaders' visit to India also opened up the prospect, as was intended by Nehru, for a rapprochement between the two super-power blocs. But this was take time, for the mutual suspicion and fear that existed between America and the Soviet Union constituted a powerful deterrent to any such rapprochement. Any reconciliatory move that was hedged with suspicion and caution was most likely to end up in a diplomatic imbroglio, as was shown by the events of 1956.

#### **Suez and Hungary :**

The events of 1956 (the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt on 31 October, and the Russian suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in November) put the clock back. It was thus for Nehru a year of hopes and disappointments, and of conflict between high principles and national interests.

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Disappointment and hopes figured in Nehru's attitude towards the Hungarian tragedy, which coincided with the Suez crisis. Although the Indian interests were not directly involved in the Hungarian issues, the Indian leadership was shocked to see the display of stalinian behaviour under Khrushchev. It is a measure of the strength of Indo-Soviet ties that in times of crisis the Indian leadership was motivated with a view to minimizing the damage rather than widening the gap by lining up against the accused. If India's cautious reaction to the Hungarian crisis showed the limitations of her antagonism against Soviet Russia at a time when the latter was supporting her on Kashmir and providing valuable economic assistance, the Soviet Support to Indian proposals on the Suez canal issue revealed the common outlook of both the countries towards some problem created by some western imperial powers. If the crisis created by Soviet invasion of Hungary provided a rude shock to Nehru, the crisis created by the Anglo-French attack on Egypt brought to him the necessity of maintaining India's companionship with Soviet Russia in world affairs and thus when both the crisis were over, the Indo-Soviet relations remained on balance unimpaired.

The continuity of friendly relations between India and the Soviet Union is a salient feature of the Khrushchev period. In the days following Suez and Hungary the course of Indo-Soviet relations travelled the old post-Stalin way, until the time when the Soviet policies towards India were under visible strain, as Russia's relations

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with Red China had fast deteriorated with the increasing involvement of India in it. so far as Indo-Soviet relations were concerned, Hungary was an unhappy occurrence; but since it came along with Suez in the days when a Soviet veto on Kashmir averted the passage of Anglo-American sponsored resolution on Kashmir which favoured the dispatch of UN forces to conduct a plebiscite there, Indo-Soviet relations followed the smooth course out of necessity. Soon after the second general election in April 1957, Khrushchev said :

“The Soviet people greatly value the brotherly friendship with the Indian people, for the growth of which you did so much and which is already demonstrating its firmness as a factor in the world we are confident that the Soviet-Indian friendship will in future grow and strengthen in the minds of peoples of both countries”.<sup>100</sup>

Khrushchev came to India on his second visit in February 1960, when he was on way to Indonesia. His second visit had a larger significance than as an event in the bilateral relations between the two countries, as the Soviet leader was trying to patch up his differences with Mao during this period. Even at a time when he was endeavouring to improve Soviet relations with China, he accepted the Indian government's invitation to break his journey in India while on

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way to Indonesia – an indication of his unwillingness to compromise with Mao on the question of Soviet relations with non-aligned India.

At a time when Khrushchev had reconciled to his Russian position in the Sino-Soviet conflict, an event happened which showed the extent of Khrushchev's consideration for Nehru's feelings even on a matter which involved Russian defence stakes and in which Indian interests as such was not directly involved. The first conference of the non-aligned nations was held at Belgrade in September 1961. On the day before the Belgrade Conference began, on the 30 August the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device at its Arctic testing grounds and announced that this was the beginning of a new series of atomic tests. Never before had an international conference met so immediately or so directly under the shadow of the mushroom cloud, which obviously disturbed Nehru.

There were twice as many non-aligned representatives present at Belgrade as at Bandung, and everyone knew that there could, and should, have been many more. Non-alignment was an idea on the march. Further, at the United Nations the non-aligned countries had shown on several issues that they could act with both independence and responsibility.

Once again at Belgrade, Nehru was able to point out that the course of events since the issue of the invitations had enhanced the conference's intrinsic importance. Like the meetings at Colombo, at the time of the Indo-China settlement, and at Bandung, during the



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offshore islands crisis, that at Belgrade happened to coincide with a period of international tension. This time the issues were more serious than ever before – the bomb, disarmament, Berlin and Germany, nothing less than the purity of the world's air and water. The leaders of the non-aligned had been raised to the status of conservators of nature. This was the challenge that faced them at Belgrade, and they faced it before an expectant and hopeful world.

The real issue at Belgrade was a question of priorities. World peace and colonialism were both important, but which issue, at that particular time, was the more urgent? According to the first eight speakers, including President Tito, Nasser and Nkrumah, it was colonialism. For the ninth speaker, Nehru, the conference's main task, almost its only task, was to do what it could to start negotiations to avert the immediate threat of war, 'for if war comes all else for the moment goes'.

In the closing session, the conference addressed letters to the heads of government of the USSR and USA saying that the neutral leaders were "distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in international situation" and urged them to resume negotiations on dividing issues and save the world from the danger of war.<sup>101</sup> The letter to Khrushchev was brought by President Nkrumah and Nehru, who was, in fact, to come to the Soviet Union on his official visit. Nehru in his speech told Khrushchev that "in the world in these days

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many new important problems have come up and I will be glad to discuss them with you".<sup>102</sup>

Nehru made his major speech on September 8, at the Indo-Soviet friendship rally. He said :

"I came to Moscow from Belgrade where the conference of 25 non-aligned countries was held. At the request of the participants of this conference, President of Ghana and I have brought a message for chairman Khrushchev, in which is expressed the concern for the dangerous developments in international situation. A similar message is addressed to President Kennedy of the USA. In this message the participants of the conference express that the negotiations between these two great powers should start early for the solution of important contemporary problems and for lessening international tension. ....They think that all that is necessary must be done for the solution of these problems in mutually acceptable ways. They feel that only negotiations can lead us to satisfactory results. There is no other way before us besides

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negotiations which would solve these serious problems".<sup>103</sup>

In his reply, Khrushchev defended the resumption of nuclear testing on the plea that the Western powers were pursuing an aggressive line and had not responded to the Soviet proposals for complete and total disarmament. This had forced the USSR to resume testing with "heavy heart and deep regrets".<sup>108</sup> However, the gravity of the talks did not constrain Nehru from thanking the Soviet for their economic aid :

"I am afraid that after we receive this assistance (for India's third plan) my appetite will grow and I will ask for more".<sup>105</sup>

While Khrushchev did not bring the question of contemporary international situation in the short speech, Nehru brought in his still shorter speech. He expressed the hope that some questions concerning contemporary international situation which he had discussed during his brief stay with Khrushchev "would receive more attention".<sup>106</sup> Nehru discussed the German question with the Soviet leaders. In the joint communiqué, the Indian Prime Minister agreed with Khrushchev that :

"The fact of the existence of the German states at present could not be ignored and that

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any attempt to change the frontiers will have dangerous consequence".<sup>107</sup>

Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that the Indian and Soviet views did not coincide on Germany beyond expressing the desirability of peaceful solution to all the parties concerned. Nehru only "noted the views expressed by Chairman Khrushchev" but "was not persuaded by them".<sup>108</sup> It will be too much to presume that there was complete identity of views between the two countries on this issue. Anyhow, it may safely be concluded that a change was visible in India's hitherto followed German policy. It offered a de facto recognition to East Germany, obviously a concession to the demanding Kremlin. There is no denying that India moved closer to the Soviet point on yet another crucial international issue.

Nevertheless, despite some irritants and despite their differences of opinion of various issues, such as methods of economic development or effective international organization, the relations between India and the USSR improved considerably during this period. Despite some obstacles occasionally cropping up largely by the relations of the two countries with other states, the flow proved stronger than the disturbing pulls. The friendly ties were further strengthened as a result of removal of certain misgivings and misunderstandings. The outcome of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, the abolition of the cominform, the reassessment of Gandhi, identity of views on issues like disarmament, Suez crisis and

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above all, the Soviet veto on Kashmir helped in bringing India closer to the USSR.

To sum up, India's foreign policy moved towards more cordial relations with the USSR during this phase. Cultural, economic and political relations were consolidated. India maintained a non-aligned stance on "Cold War" issues vitally affecting the USSR and was less critical publicly of Soviet policy in Hungary or on disarmament than were many other Afro-Asian nations. In short, new Delhi continued to regard good relations with Moscow as a vital part of its foreign policy throughout this period.

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# *Chapter – 3*

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## **CHAPTER – 3**

### **INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS DURING COLD WAR ERA-A STUDY OF ISSUES**

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The ideological differences between the Western powers and the Soviet Union began to assume serious proportions after the Russian Revolution in 1917. The Bolshevism became a nightmare to many western countries, although Soviet Union joined the western powers to fight against Axis powers during Second World War. But, within months after Americans and Russians joined hands and became partners against Hitler there began to appear serious differences over post-war reconstruction policies. The rift between the US and Soviet Union began to develop as each nation planned to advance its own interests in the post war world.

After the War, the world was divided into two hostile blocs the western bloc and the soviet bloc and this global polarization between USA and the Soviet Union came to be known as “Cold War”. The Soviet thrust into Europe had aroused the deepest suspicions of the United States and her Western allies. The fear of Communism led to a widespread impression in the United States that any compromise with the Soviet Union would amount to appeasement of a potential aggressor. The Americans view the confrontation between the two blocs as a conflict in which a gain for one side was necessarily a loss

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for the other. This implied that the Americans would be justified to intervene wherever there is a danger of a Communist success.

The real beginning of the Cold War was the Truman Doctrine, President Truman's decision to provide substantial aid to Greece and Turkey. In his speech on March 12, 1947 he said: "we shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes".<sup>1</sup> With that step the United States came into Europe to try to balance and contain Soviet Power.

The Marshall Plan followed directly from the Truman Doctrine, and effectively divided East and West Europe. Under the Marshall Plan massive economic aid was provided to European countries to help economic recovery. The Soviet Union Ambassador at the UN, Andrei Vyshinsky reacted strongly and said that Marshall Plan had finally split Europe into two camps. Speaking in the UN General Assembly on September 18, he said : "It is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States and direct interference by the latter in the internal affairs of those countries".<sup>2</sup>

The Communists feared that the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine would lead to the formation of a bloc hostile to the interests of the Communists especially to Soviet Union. Some

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eighteen leading European Communist delegates met secretly in Poland and issued a manifesto on October 5, 1947. The manifesto read : "Two opposite political lines have been crystallized. On the one extreme the USSR and democratic countries aim at the whittling down of imperialism and strengthening of democracy. In these conditions the anti-imperialist democratic camp has to close its ranks and draw up and agree on a common platform to work out its tactics against the chief forces of the imperialist camp".<sup>3</sup>

The Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union had further intensified under Eisenhower Dulles team also considered Communism as monolithic. Dulles believed that anti-communism was the only morality. On April 4, 1949, the USA signed the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) with Canada and ten other nations of western Europe pledging mutual defense against Soviet aggression. This had gradually resulted in a series of military alliances on both the sides and intensified the cold war.

It was against this background that Nehru thought the best policy that India should pursue was non-alignment i.e., non-participation in military and political blocs. Nehru believed that non-alignment provided an opportunity to hold an independent position in world affairs. Nehru right from the day's of independence emphasized that non-alignment had nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. It is a policy of playing a positive role in world politics. It is not a mere plea for non-involvement in big power



rivalries. It means the power of independent judgement and action. To Nehru it meant “helping those forces that we consider right and disapproving of the things that we do not like but fundamentally keeping away from other countries and other alignments of power which normally lead to major conflicts”.<sup>4</sup>

Nehru’s refusal to join either of the bloc irritated both the sides. Americans denounced non-alignment as immoral, because Nehru failed to see the things in black and white as the Americans did with regard to the cold war. Acheson wrote in his memoirs, “Nehru and I were not destined to have a pleasant personal relationship. He was one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal”.<sup>5</sup>

Soviet Union under Stalin was very suspicious of every one who was not fully with them. Stalin labelled Nehru running dog of imperialism and denounced non-alignment as a policy of imperialism. After a short period of suspicion Soviet Union abandoned its hard line and its policy towards India underwent a marked change. India’s policy of non-alignment was accepted and recognized as a factor in favour of peace and her declaration that they would follow on independent policy and judge each issue on its merits was warmly welcomed by Moscow. India’s recognition of Communist China; her position on various cold war issues; her disagreement with the United States and her refusal to attend the San-Francisco Conference on

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Japan in 1951, further enhanced her prestige in the eyes of the Soviet Union.

In the words of E. Varga, a prominent Soviet theoretician India was “a most valuable member of the zone of peace and closely cooperates with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People’s Republic for the preservation of peace throughout the world”.<sup>6</sup>

**Israel-Palestine Issue :**

Prior to the 1914-18 war, Palestine was under Turkish occupation as a part of the Ottoman Empire. In return for a British promise of complete national independence for the Arabs, the Palestinians helped the overthrow of Turkish hegemony. As the war drew to a close the British Government went back on its solemn assurances to the Arabs and resumed its game of divide and rule. The result was the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. In a letter to Lord Rothschild, leader of the Zionist movement, Lord Balfour, who was then British Foreign Secretary, expressed Britain’s sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations and declared that, his government favour the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

The British effort to carry out the provisions of the Balfour Declaration met with stiff Arab opposition from the very beginning. Their argument was straight and simple that the Arabs were not responsible for the oppression of the Jews in Europe. Besides, Palestine, with its limited resources, could not cope with large-scale

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Jewish immigration. Finally, the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine would almost certainly exterminate its Arab national and cultural entity. The Arabs in short were not prepared to pay for the sins of the Europeans. All this, however, did not deter the British from opening the gates of Palestine for Jewish immigration. The influx of Jews into Palestine thereafter grew steadily, and in 1925 reached 33,801. This inflamed the politically minded urban Arabs and the result was the Arab-Jewish riots of 1921 and 1929.

By the end of Second World War, the Palestinian Arabs found themselves facing a powerful front composed of vested interests in Britain, America and the Zionist international all aiming at transforming Palestine into a Jewish State. The first formal move in this direction was made in 1946 when a mixed Anglo-American Commission was sent to Palestine. In its report the Commission recommended that Palestine be thrown open to Jewish immigration and that 100,000 more Jews be admitted at once. On a request from Britain the United Nations General Assembly met in an extraordinary session in May 1947 and resolved to send to Palestine a Commission of representatives of eleven states. Eight members of the Commission favoured the partition of the country and the establishment of a Jewish State there, with Jerusalem as an international district. The representatives of the remaining three countries i.e. India, Iran and Yugoslavia on the commission recommended making Palestine a federal State. India with its bitter experience of partition was naturally opposed to the division of Palestine. As Nehru said in 1947:

“we took up certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly a federal state with autonomous parts. It was opposed to both the other attitudes which were before the United Nations. One was partition which has now been adopted : the other was a Unitary State. We suggested a federal state with naturally, an Arab majority in charge of the federal state but with autonomy for the other regions – Jewish regions”.<sup>7</sup> On November 29, 1947 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the majority proposal. This was made possible as both the Soviet Union and the United States gave their support to the partition plan.

#### **India, Soviet Union and the Arab-Israel Conflict :**

Our national leaders and public opinion have throughout consistently upheld the cause of the Arabs. Way back in 1928, when India was still waging its fight for independence, the Indian National Congress expressed its full sympathy with the Palestinian Arabs in their struggle for liberation from the imperialist hold. The parallel between the Palestinian struggle and the Indian struggle was underlined by western imperialism as the common enemy of both. That the Indian National Congress was fully conscious of the fact that the Zionist movement in Palestine was part and parcel of western colonialism.

However, the USSR played a limited role in international affairs during 1917-1945 as it was preoccupied with its internal problems. But immediately after Second World War, the Soviet

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position on the Palestine question was just the opposite of the Western Powers. After the war the Soviet Union like India supported the efforts of the Arab countries for complete Independence. When the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine was set up in December 1945 the Soviet Union opposed it and declared that the settlement of the problem had to come through the United Nations and that it could not be dealt with in any other framework.<sup>8</sup> Soviet experts started analyzing the Arab Nationalist Movement. The establishment of the Arab league in March 1945 was described by a Soviet Commentator as the first stage in the Arab nation's struggle towards independence.<sup>9</sup> In the opinion of V.B. Lutskiy, Palestine state ought to be an Arab State. He said : "The Palestine problem cannot be resolved by imperialist means. The majority of the population of Palestine regards the country as an Arab country and regards the Jews as citizens of an independent and democratic Arab Palestine".<sup>10</sup>

Both Nehru and Soviet Union saw in the Palestine problem a manifestation of the wider problem of colonialism in the Arab countries and branded the Arab-Jewish conflict as a result of the British imperialist policy. They declared the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was a betrayal of Arabs by the British in order to protect their own imperialist interests.

Both Nehru and the Soviet leaders were convinced that the Palestine problem was created by the British and would never be solved by the British. The idea of an independent state of Israel never

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found favour with Indian and Soviet Government, which saw Zionism to be a form of western imperialism, enjoying the patronage of the British, America, etc. Further, the role of Zionism in Palestine was denounced on the ground that "It really did not want independence but the perpetuation of a foreign mandate".<sup>11</sup> To illustrate this the New times quoted Ben-Gurion as having declared in a Zionist Congress in 1938 that "anyone who betrayed Great Britain betrayed Zionism".<sup>12</sup>

Nehru expressed sympathy for the Jews when they were being persecuted and hounded out of various countries of Europe and acknowledged their considerable contribution to the country since they came to Palestine. However, he believed Palestine essentially to be an Arab country and must remain so. The Arabs must not be crushed and suppressed in their own homeland.<sup>13</sup> India could not understand the logic which argued that since many Jews were ill-treated in Europe, Palestine had to give them a home. For Indian statesmen the Jewish refugee problem should be completely separated from the Palestine problem.<sup>14</sup> For Nehru Palestine problem was not an Arab-Jew problem but a struggle for independence.

In 1956 the Soviet Union not only supported Nasser but also congratulated him on "breaking the chain of enslavement of the colonial imperialism".<sup>15</sup> Nasser's decision was regarded as "an act to which a sovereign government has a legal right".<sup>16</sup> The Indian government regarded the aggression from Israel as the battle against

imperialism. India reiterated the opinion that the Suez Canal was an integral part of Egypt, the sovereignty of Egypt was thus beyond question. Nehru like Khrushchev regarded that Egypt was within its right to nationalize the Suez Canal.

India and Soviet Union always supported the legitimate demands of the Arab people. Their consistent, principled stand on the Arab cause remained unchanged and both the governments believed that the only way to a lasting peace in the middle East was to free completely all Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967, to enable the Palestinian Arabs to exercise their legitimate rights, and give all states and people in the area an opportunity to live in peace and security. Thus, the unanimity of views on Arab-Israel conflict that the road to a settlement in West Asia could only be found through reconciliation between Israel and Palestine gave further strength to the Indo-Soviet relations.

**Vietnam Issue :**

The proximity of Vietnam with Chinese has subjected it to intermitten heavy Chinese pressure. For over a thousand years (186 B.C. to 939 A.D.) Annam, as the country was then known, was under Chinese rule. The long period of Chinese rule was followed by an uneasy independence under a succession of Vietnamese emperors. The division of Annam into the two states of Tonkin and Cochinchina in 1673 led to a series of dynastic quarrels which invited foreign intervention. Although the first initiative was taken in 1789

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by a Catholic bishop who landed a party of French soldiers to support one of the warring parties, it failed to establish French control. A new emperor succeeded in uniting the whole Annam and French influence declined. However, seventy years later the persecution of missionaries provided an excuse for a determined French conquest of Indo-China was complete.<sup>17</sup>

In Indo-China the challenge to French colonialism began in 1940,<sup>18</sup> the year when France fell in Europe and when Japan moved into North Vietnam. It was in this situation that Dr. Ho Chi Minh founded the National Independent Front. The Indo-Chinese Communist Party, the leading force, was born in May 1941. The Viet Minh Front led the struggle against the French. But with the occupation of the whole of Vietnam by the Japanese troops on July 24, 1941, the character of the struggle changed.

The Japanese, for reasons of expediency, had followed French to govern Indo-china for them. Meanwhile the Viet Minh stirred action against the Japanese near the Chinese border in North Tonkin. On March 9, 1945, the Japanese, realizing that their fate was sealed, suddenly overthrew the French administration and put Emperor Bao Dai as the head of the nominally independent Vietnam administration uniting Tonkin with Annam. The Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh refused to recognize Bao Dai's government and proclaimed the independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945. After the war, Indo-China was occupied by British and Nationalist Chinese troops



with the 16<sup>th</sup> Parallel as the dividing line between them. The British refused to recognize the Viet Minh and helped French to seize power in Saigon in early 1946. It now became the primary objective of the French to fight the Viet Minh guerillas operating all over the countryside. But, the Chinese impeded French control and refused entry of French troops and civilians into Tonkin, until the France-Chinese Treaty was signed on February 28, 1946 by which the Chinese agreed to withdraw after extracting generous concessions from the French. They also insisted on the French entering into an agreement with Ho Chi Minh before bringing their troops into Tonkin.

Consequently, the French also concluded an agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as a free State with its own government, Parliament, army and finances, forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union. The French government pledged itself to hold a referendum to determine whether Cochin-China should be United with Tonkin and Annam.

On June 1, without holding a referendum, Admiral Thierry d' Argenlieu, High Commissioner for Indo-China announced the French recognition of the "Free republic" of Cochin-China in direct contravention of the French pledge.

Since then, the Franco-Vietnamese relations rapidly deteriorated and finally resulted in open hostilities between the two parties. Serious incidents took place between the French troops and

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the Vietnamese troops at Longson and Haiphong in the North in November 1946, on November 2 and 3, Haiphong was bombed by the French. By December 19, French strongholds were attacked by the Vietnamese and the following day fighting began at Hue, Turane and various other places all over Vietnam. The climax of the battle was reached when Dien Bien Phu fell to the Viet Minh on May 8, 1954, which sounded the death knell of French domination in Indo-China and transferred the question of Vietnam from the battlefield to the conference table. Thus, the fight that started in December 1946 ended only with the signing of a cease-fire agreement in Geneva in 1954.<sup>19</sup>

The cease-fire agreement was signed on July 21, between the High Commands of the French Union Forces and the People's Army by which the two parties agreed to stop fighting and Vietnam was provisionally divided at the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel between the French Union Forces High Command and the people's army of Vietnam. An international Commission composed of India, Canada and Poland was appointed to supervise the armistice with India as Chairman. Significantly, South Vietnam was excluded from the cease-fire agreement at the insistence of D.R.V.N., and hence the South Vietnamese Government denounced the agreement and held that it was not bound by the terms, as it had not signed the document. The Americans also did not accede to the conference declaration and refused to consider themselves bound by the decisions taken at the conference although they declared their intention of respecting the

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terms of the Agreement as long as there was no violation from the other side.<sup>20</sup>

In short, although apparently, the Geneva Agreement brought about a partition of Vietnam at the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel; temporarily, they brought about a cease-fire, but they by no means ended the hostilities between the Viet Minh and Laos.<sup>21</sup>

**Indo-Soviet and Vietnam Issue :**

India showed keen interest in the Vietnamese struggle against the French during 1945-1954. India, in spite of her internal difficulties, could not close her eyes to what went on in Vietnam.<sup>22</sup> Her nationalist leaders were strongly opposed to the resumption of French rule after the Japanese withdrawal. In December 1946, Nehru declared : “our hearts are with the people of Indo-China. The attempt to curb the spirit of freedom in Indo-China has deeply moved the Indian people”.<sup>23</sup>

Again in January 1946, Nehru declared : “we have watched British intervention there with growing anger, shame and helplessness, that Indian troops should be used for doing Britain’s dirty work against our friends who are fighting the same fight as we”.<sup>24</sup>

On February 18, 1947, Nehru stated in the Legislative Assembly that the government of India shared the feelings of public opinion in India in favour of Vietnam and the freedom of the people

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of Indo-China, and was anxious not to be a party in any way to any action which might be prejudicial to their interests. He disclosed that the government had taken steps to limit the number of French aircrafts which might fly across India, and to exercise stricter control in the future. But, he added, although operational or combat type aircraft were not allowed to fly across India, air ambulance and other requirement on their onwards passage out of India were allowed to do so.<sup>25</sup>

Nehru saw American action in Vietnam as a struggle for dominant world position and the continuation, in some form, of imperialism. Therefore, in his view the fight in Indo-China was essentially one of colonialism and imperialism. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, on April 24, 1954, Nehru observed :

“The conflict in Indo-China is in its origin and essential character a movement of resistance to colonialism and the attempt to deal with such resistance by the traditional methods of suppression and divide and rule. Although Foreign intervention have made the issue more complex, but it nevertheless remains basically anti-colonial and nationalistic in character. The recognition of this and the reconciliation of nationalist sentiments for freedom and independence and safe-guarding them against

external pressures can alone form the basis of a settlement and of peace”.<sup>26</sup>

Nehru's stand was one of non-interference and also non-intervention by other nations in Vietnamese affairs. Nehru stated that India was opposed to any foreign army functioning in Asia, he refused to recognize either Ho Chi Minh or Bao Dai and announced that India would follow the developments until the people had reached some decision. Speaking on India's attitudes towards the Indo-Chinese issue Nehru made it clear that, it “is not a negative attitude but a slightly positive one, because we do not want to make it more difficult for Indo-China's fight for independence”.<sup>27</sup> Thus, we see that India adopted a neutral posture in Vietnam in order to help facilitate the solution of the problem and in accordance with its declared policy of non-alignment.

India played an active role in the negotiations that culminated in the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China in 1954. Even later, India's basic position remained the same, i.e., that the people of Vietnam must have the right to decide their own future freely and without any interference. In 1966 Swaran Singh, Minister of External Affairs stated that “we firmly believe that the only way to solve the Vietnam problem is to abandon warlike activities and to hold discussions with the object of implementing the Geneva Agreement so that the people of Vietnam be able to determine the future with their wishes without any interference from any quarter whatsoever”.<sup>28</sup>

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The Indian government believed that the best way of solving the Vietnam crisis was on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and, therefore, extended full support to the Agreement. Since the Agreement provided specific clauses forbidding entry into Vietnam of foreign military personnel or material of any type, except in replacement of permissible quantities already in the country, India regrets that foreign interference has continued in spite of the Geneva Agreement and the reunification of Vietnam remains unachieved. The government of India always worked for the implementation of the Geneva Agreement.<sup>29</sup>

Communism in Vietnam was indigenous but had strong international ties through its leader, Ho Chi Minh, who was the only South East Asian Communist of international stature, had made several visits to Russia, was a founder member of the French Communist Party, founded the Indo-Chinese Communist Party in 1930.

From the very beginning of the crisis the United States came under attack for its alleged intervention in Vietnam by the Soviets as part of a wider plan to suppress national liberation movements in Asia in general and in Vietnam in particular, and the protracted negotiations between the French government and Bao Dai were ascribed to American inspiration. When, on March 8, 1949, an agreement was signed under which Vietnam was described as an independent state within the framework of the French Union, the

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Russians severely criticized and referred to the agreement as a hollow farce.<sup>30</sup>

Soviet Union Like India was always suspicious of the moves of the western powers which, it thought, were aimed at subverting independence and establishing colonies in the weaker states. The American involvement in Vietnam aroused deep concern among the Soviets along with the people and the government of India. From the American point of view the Soviet Union had been behind the communist North Vietnam from the beginning of the Vietnamese conflict, the Secretary of state Acheson on January 12, 1950 admitted that the U.S. "must be prepared to meet wherever possible all thrusts of the Soviet Union".<sup>31</sup> Soviets believed that the Vietnamese had been fighting against the U.S. imperialist aggression for a just cause, that is peaceful reunification of the two Vietnams. From the Soviet point of view, the United States had been an aggressor and the Vietnamese had been fighting for the "liberation" of their country from the clutches of the foreigners. Like Nehru, they believed that the American involvement in Vietnam was a foreigners presence. The United States military activities in Vietnam were termed by the Soviets an "aggression". The Soviets also alleged that the Americans were continuing their economic penetration of the country with the ultimate aim of taking it over completely.<sup>32</sup>

In 1954 a better climate prevailed for the talks on Indo-China. At the conference the DRV's proposal for recognition of

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Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops from these countries the unification of each of them by free elections and the formation of national governments without foreign interference, and a mutual exchange of prisoners of war, was strongly supported by the USSR. In the view of Allan Cameron, it was the Soviet representative Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov who “engineered compromise on the points of greatest contention such as : non-representation of the resistance movements in Cambodia and Laos, the selection of the 17<sup>th</sup> parallel as the cease-fire line, and a two year delay in holding elections”.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the agreements on Indo-China were an important step reducing international tension and both India and Soviet Union played an important part in the peace settlement in Indo-China. It also halted (temporarily) the foreign intervention in Indo-China.

Thus, evidently, the Soviet Union and India stood firm behind the Vietnamese people in their just cause the liberation of Vietnam from foreign imperialist yoke. They promised to stand by the Vietnamese people to the last, and it seems that the world has witnessed that they have kept their words, that is, the people of India and the Soviet Union have always stood firm behind the Vietnamese people in their struggle against the foreign intervention.

**Korean Issue :**

Korea became a cold war issue after the termination of the Second World War. This was the defeat of Japan in the war which



brought the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese forces North of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel by the Russian forces and South of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel by the American forces. Thus Korea was divided into North Korea and South Korea and this parallel separate the North Korea from the South Korea.<sup>34</sup>

It was the failure of the U.S. and the USSR not to agree on steps to implement the wartime promise of independence for Korea, which led the United States to submit the Korean question to the UN General Assembly. Despite the protests of the USSR the General Assembly noted a resolution<sup>35</sup> to establish a United nations Temporary Commission on Korea with authority to observe elections for a national assembly which in turn would establish a national government for Korea. The commission could not function effectively because they were refused facilities to enter North Korea.<sup>36</sup>

Both North Korea and South Korea wanted to re-unite the country under their respective leadership on June 25, 1950 came the catastrophe when North Korean forces crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and fighting started.<sup>37</sup> This issue of the incursion from North Korea into South Korea was brought to the United Nations by the United States. Consequently the Security Council met and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. The council also described the incursion in the absence of the USSR as an act of aggression. A unified command under the UN flag was set up by the Council on July 7, 1950, and General MacArthur was appointed

Supreme Commander of the UN Korean forces. On October 7, 1950, the UN authorized MacArthur to extend the war into North Korea, if necessary. The crisis reached its climax when the UN forces approached the Yalu river and the Chinese volunteers in large number entered Korea. On October 11, 1950, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared that the Chinese people could not 'stand idly while Korea was invaded by the United States and its accomplices'.<sup>38</sup> The intervention of the Chinese volunteer forces, as a reaction to the crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel by the UN command made the UN condemn China as 'aggressor'. The heavily out numbered troops under the command of MacArthur fell back and were unable to restore the line until Chinese were some seventy miles inside South Korea.

After serious reverses, the UN forces began to advance again early in 1951. But there came another heavy North Korean-Chinese counter-attack in April 1951, which developed into a virtual stalemate at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.

It was early in July 1951 that negotiations between the two sides began but could not prove to be a success as they were twice broken off. The exchange of prisoners was a serious problem before the parties concerned. However, they reached an agreement on the repatriation of prisoners on June, 8, 1953 and, later on, signed an armistice agreement on July 27, 1953. The agreement, among other things, provided also for the voluntary repatriation of the prisoners of

war under the supervision of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

### **Indo-Soviet Stand and the Korean Crisis :**

Relations between India and Soviet Union began to show some improvement during the Korean conflict of 1950-1953, essentially because of India's pursuit of a policy of non-alignment. This was the period when the Korean war took dramatic turns, sometimes in favour of the United States-led United Nations and sometimes in favour of North Korea backed by China and the Soviet Union.

India had been concerned with the Korean question in one form or the other and was very anxious for a negotiated settlement of the Korean problem. It was during this crisis that India realized the grim realities of Cold War and in turn, impressed the world with her policy of non-alignment. India wished to play a mediatory role between two Big Powers, not to take a leading role or seek authority in Asia or elsewhere. But, as Nehru said; "we are compelled by circumstances to play our part in Asia and in the world, because we are convinced that unless these basic problems of Asia are solved there can be no world peace".<sup>39</sup>

Immediately after the outbreak of war Nehru on July 13<sup>th</sup> addressed identical messages to Stalin and Acheson<sup>40</sup> in which he proposed to localize the conflict and to facilitate a peaceful and

permanent solution of the Korean crisis by breaking the deadlock in the Security Council and to facilitate the return of the USSR to the Security Council. He also insisted on the restoration of the People's Republic of China's lawful status in the UN.

The Soviet Union responded favourably to this Indian initiative. A reply was sent on July 15 in which it stated that it was "expedient to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council with the mandatory participation of representatives of the five great powers including the People's Republic of China."<sup>41</sup> But Nehru's effort failed because USA rejected the proposal and termed it as an appeasement to aggression. Soviet Union also welcomed India's refusal to send arm forces to Korea and denied support for the Security Council resolution that gave the US led forces the status of UN forces.

Both India and the Soviet Union were of the view that maintenance of world peace was the fundamental objective of their respective foreign policies and the UN was the most effective instrument for maintaining as also restoring international peace and Security. In the case of Korea both agreed that it was their primary consideration to prevent the spread of aggression beyond Korea and in fact to end it their itself. Therefore, India and the Soviet Union severely criticized the September resolution which endorsed the crossing of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel by the UN armed forces. Because both were convinced that this could extend the area of conflict. This

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observation was a result of the declaration made by China on September 30, that China would not stand aside if the UN forces were to cross the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.

Both India and the Soviet Union adopted similar stand that for a speedy solution to the Korean issue, it was important that the People's Republic of China should be recognized and her representative should take a seat in the Council. Nehru believed that the new power in Beijing was a reality and this should be recognized as a fact. At the 5<sup>th</sup> General Assembly the Soviet delegation proposed the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea so that the Korean question could be decided by the Korean people themselves. The Soviet delegate also stressed that an effective settlement to the Korean question could only be achieved with the participation of the People's Republic of China.<sup>42</sup>

In February 1951, both India and the Soviet Union opposed the US sponsored resolution in the UN branding China as aggressor because they were aware of resulting consequences to world peace. India warned against the proposal to brand China as aggressor, and Nehru said : "This proposal cannot lead to peace. It can only lead to an intensification of the conflict and might, perhaps close the door to further negotiations".<sup>43</sup> The Indian government believed that the Beijing's entry into the Korean war was a reaction to the crossing of the parallel line by the UN Command. A more fundamental consideration was a belief that not all problems could be solved by

resorting to military means. In India's view, conciliation, negotiation and mediation could be equally effective methods. This approach was very much in keeping with India's policy of non-alignment and hence received warm welcome from Stalin. India's differing stands on various issues during the crisis, such as her opposition to the US sponsored resolution to brand China as an aggressor, Nehru's call to the United Nations forces not to cross the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, and India's position on the prisoners of war issue made an impact on Soviet policy-makers and thus brought India closer to Russia.

### **Suez Crisis :**

The Universal Suez Canal Company which owned and operated the Suez Canal was an Egyptian joint-stock company registered in Egypt, even though the majority of its share holders were foreigners (the British government being its biggest, owning 43 per cent) and had its office in Paris. It enjoyed a 99 years concession from the Egyptian government, which was due to expire in 1968 after which the control was to revert to Egypt, and Egypt had already announced its intention not to renew the concession. The use of the canal was regulated by an international treaty, the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which in particular assured freedom of navigation in the canal and non-discrimination to all its users. Presumably as a riposte of Anglo-American decision of *withdrawal* suddenly a week earlier of offers of aid to build the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, President Nasser of Egypt announced on July 26, 1956 the

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Egyptian government's nationalization of the Company. The government proposed to use the income from the company to build the Aswan Dam and that the company's share holders would be paid compensation in accordance with the last closing prices. He described the company as an 'exploiting company' and as a 'state within a state'. A couple of days after, in reply to criticism of the move in the West, the Egyptian government pointed out that the company had always been an Egyptian Company and therefore subject to Egyptian law, that nationalization did not in anyway or to any extent effect Egypt's international commitments in respect of the use of the canal under the 1888 Convention, as well as the more recent Anglo-Egyptian agreement of October 1954, and that freedom of navigation on the canal would not be affected in any manner or to any degree.

The reactions of the British and French Governments were quick, sharp and vehement, they denounced the move, and the other Western Governments and the Western press and public opinion were also severely critical. The British, French and United States Governments immediately took certain financial and economic measures against Egypt, the former two also took what were called military and naval precautions within their countries and in the Mediterranean. The three governments held urgent consultations in London and announced on August 2<sup>nd</sup> a plan to hold 24 power (including India) conference at London on the 16<sup>th</sup> in order to consider the establishment of an international agency for the canal to ensure freedom and security of transit with due regard to the interests

of Egypt. The three powers did not question the right of Egypt to enjoy and exercise all the powers of a fully sovereign and independent nation, including the generally recognized right, under appropriate conditions, to nationalize assets, not impressed with an international interests, which are subject to its political authority. But they held that the Egyptian act of nationalization was not such an act, but an 'arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency'. They alleged that the act threatened freedom and security of the canal guaranteed by the 1888 convention.<sup>44</sup>

#### **India, Soviet Union and Suez Crisis :**

The outbreak of the Suez War further cemented the bonds of friendship between India and the Soviet Union. The crisis also revealed the common approach of India and the USSR. The reaction of the governments and people of India and the Soviet Union to the Egyptian act of nationalization was just the opposite of that of the western governments and press. Both India and the Soviet Union termed it as 'a perfectly legitimate and domestic act'. The Soviet government publicly stated that it "considers the decision of the government of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal as a fully lawful act stemming from Egypt's sovereign rights".<sup>45</sup> According to Nehru, the nationalization of the Suez Canal was a step towards the weakening of the domination of European powers over West Asia which had lasted for over a hundred years, 'Asia now was on march, and was emerging to take its rightful place in world affairs'.<sup>46</sup>



Furthermore, in a statement in the Lok Sabha, on August 8, 1956, Nehru said : “The Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian company and, in Egypt’s view, subject to the laws of the country. No question of expropriation has arisen since the shareholders are to be compensated at market value. Even if there remain any outstanding differences in matter, they do not call for developments which lead to an international crisis”.<sup>47</sup>

US advocated calm and patient negotiation and called a conference on August 16, 1956, of 22 countries largely concerned with the problem posed by the nationalization of the Suez. Egypt refused to attend the conference which, according to Nasser, had “no right in anyway to discuss any issue concerning the sovereignty of Egypt or the Sovereignty of her parts”.<sup>48</sup> Nasser Instead proposed a conference of the 45 nations whose ships used the canal so that it could “reach an agreement confirming and guaranteeing the freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal”.<sup>49</sup> His proposal however did not come through.

The approach of Britain, France and US differed from that of India, and the USSR. While Britain and France sought to dramatize the political implications of Egypt’s actions and expected some enforceable decisions, India and the Soviet Union desired to use the conference for purpose of negotiation and to thrash out day to day administrative problems arising from the use of the canal. Besides they did not challenge the right of Egypt to nationalize the canal and

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even agreed to respect the sovereign rights of the nation through whose territory it passed.

Soviet delegation presented a draft communiqué on August 23, to be adopted by the conference, which called for negotiation of a Suez settlement 'solely by peaceful means' through a committee including the USA, Britain, France, India and the USSR. This communiqué if adopted, would have barred the use of force by Britain and France in the event negotiations failed. Failing in this the Soviet delegation favoured the alternative Indian proposal which was termed by the Soviet Foreign Minister as "a plan for a just and peaceful settlement of the Suez problem".<sup>50</sup> The proposal called for an international advisory body, and a new version of the convention which Egypt would be required to sign and which would be made subject to UN sanctions. It did not infringe Egypt's sovereignty and at the same time protected the interests of the user states. But 18 of the 22 nations that attended the conference favoured the American proposal which was to be presented to Nasser by a committee headed by the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Menzies. India and the Soviet Union disassociated themselves from the proposals but urged Nasser to grant an audience to Mr. Menzies even if he was not going to accept them.

Military action against Egypt was first launched by Israel and then joined by Britain and France. All of the three parties, France, Israel and Britain wanted to get rid of Nasser but all of them were

restrained by the US. After a series of meetings between the leaders of the three countries they decided to act independently of the United States.<sup>51</sup> The final agreement was signed on October 23, at Sevres in a secret meeting. Israel invaded the Sinai in the night of October 29-30. It was followed by the Anglo-French ultimatum and aerial attacks. M.S. Venkataramani, however, held the view that the three power aggression could not have been undertaken without the indirect blessings of the US.

The reactions of both the governments and their people to this triple aggression on Egypt was quick and vigorous. In view of the need to stop hostilities India and the Soviet Union and many other democratic countries called upon Israel for immediate withdrawal of all its forces behind the armistice lines. Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon termed this aggression as the battle against imperialism. Nehru held the view that when every United Nations Member should have tried to stop the invasion, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to Egypt. Nehru, reiterated the opinion that the Suez Canal was in Egypt and an integral part of Egypt, the sovereignty of Egypt was thus beyond question. So according to Nehru, "this ultimatum was a violation of the principles of Charter and an aggression against a sovereign country and a threat to violate its territory".<sup>51</sup> Nehru publicly branded Israeli action as a case of naked aggression.

The Soviet government on October 31 declared its condemnation of the triple aggression against Egypt and demanded

that in order to preserve peace and security in the Middle East the Security Council must take prompt measures to end this aggression.<sup>52</sup> The Soviet government on November 5, 1956 demanded that Britain, France and Israel immediately halt the hostilities against Egypt and warned them that “responsibility for all possible consequences of such actions rests with the British and French governments”.<sup>53</sup>

The Soviet government took a firm stand in defence of Egypt and its resolve to take an active part in curbing the aggression. In a message to US President Eisenhower, Bulganin asked for the collaboration of the American Mediterranean fleet with the Soviet Navy and air force to stop the aggression. He warned the British and French Premiers “that their aggression on Egypt could turn into a catastrophe for them since the Soviet Union was firmly resolve to use force to destroy the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle East”.<sup>54</sup> The Soviet Union also proposed to send its volunteers “to defend the freedom of Egyptian people”.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, the diplomatic efforts and unparalleled support given by both India and the Soviet Union to the people of Egypt helped to take off the steam from the dangerous crisis and averted a major catastrophe. As the New York Herald Tribune wrote on November 12, 1956 that the “Soviet warning was what in fact compelled Britain, France and Israel to pull out”.<sup>56</sup>

Assessing the role India had played in the crisis, Romesh Chandra wrote in an article, entitled ‘The Aggression against Egypt

and its Lessons for the work of the Indian Peace Movement', that the "stand taken by India against aggression helped considerably in rousing opinion in Asia and Africa and indeed in the whole world, including Britain and France, against the war".<sup>57</sup>

### **Hungarian Issue :**

A closer examination would suggest that the events in Hungary in October 1956 were almost similar to what had happened in many parts of the world in the fifties. The Hungarian people revolted against the USSR. Their main demand was the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed under the Warsaw Pact and restoration of Imry Nagy to power. A civil conflict broke out. On October 31, the New Hungarian government headed by Imry Nagy informed the UN Secretary General about Hungary's decision to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. It appealed the UN to guarantee Hungary's permanent neutrality. Moreover after Soviet forces withdrawal, there was a good deal of mutual killings. A rival government under J. Kadar was set up, and finally at dawn, on November 4, the Soviet troops started suppressing the revolutionary movement with an iron hand ultimately they succeeded in crushing the popular upsurge in a ruthless manner.

For once, the Indian judgment of an issue had taken time for deliverance. For, as Nehru had said, India, not having any senior Indian diplomat present at the time in Budapest was not in a position to ascertain the facts about the events that had occurred. India, however, did receive news of the happenings from various sources,

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Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, Western newspapers and the Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin himself. But Nehru could not take any one of them as authentic, since each of the sources had a stake in the issue. The Yugoslavs were keen to see that the defiance by Hungary would not be too open as to spread over to the rest of East Europe which could make Russia doubly repressive, thereby endangering in the process, Yugoslavia itself. The western press, Nehru felt, had a tendency to seize an opportunity of this kind to blow the issue out of all proportions. Mr. Bulganin's version of the events however came as late as November 8 and that too, at India's request. In any case, it was the version of a country which was the main party in question. Not being therefore, in a position to procure reliable information about the issue at stake, India opted to be cautious in expressing any opinion concerning the Issue.<sup>58</sup> Besides, Nehru was anxious not to make any critical statement of the Soviet Union which had taken a firm stand against the Anglo-French aggression in Egypt. He, therefore refrained from criticizing the Soviet Union in public.

In his first comment at a press conference on October 25, Nehru said that it was clear to him that the Hungarian Revolution was a "nationalistic upsurge".<sup>59</sup> Speaking at the 9<sup>th</sup> General Conference of the UNESCO in New Delhi, Nehru publicly expressed his views and observed that: "we see today in Egypt as well as Hungary both human dignity and freedom outraged and the force of modern arms used to suppress peoples and to gain political objectives".<sup>60</sup> The official attitude of the government of India was reflected in a resolution

passed by the All India Congress Committee (AICC) on 9<sup>th</sup> November. It expressed grave concern about the developments in Western Asia and Europe and expressed strong condemnation of the Anglo-French aggression. It also expressed the hope that foreign troops would be withdrawn from Hungary and the Hungarian people would decide their own future by peaceful methods. There was no reference in the resolution to the Soviet action in Hungary. Later, in answer to criticism from some AICC members Nehru referred to the letter of Premier Bulganin in which the Soviet leader stated that they went back to Budapest at the invitation of the new government and said that they would pull out as early as possible and as soon as order has been established. Nehru felt that the Hungarian problem was complicated and the government of India wanted to help and not to hinder.

During the emergency session of the UN General Assembly the Indian delegation abstained on most of the Assembly Resolutions concerning Hungary. India abstained on the resolution passed on November 4, because the resolution while asking the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces from Hungary immediately, also called for free elections to be held under the supervision of UN observers designated by the Secretary General. India's representative to the UN, Krishna Menon, objected to the several parts of the resolution, particularly those condemning the Soviet action and calling for an investigation under UN auspices into Hungary's internal affairs. But India's abstention could not be treated, argued Menon, as "unconcerned or

neutral, for India would never be neutral where human freedom was at stake”.<sup>61</sup>

On November 9 came the controversial vote by the Indian delegate which provoked the most anger in the west and criticism at home. The resolution urged the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces, suggested holding o elections in Hungary under the auspices of the United Nations. All of the non-aligned Asian and Middle Eastern nations abstained with the exceptions of India and Ceylon which joined the Communist bloc in casting negative vote.<sup>62</sup> In explaining his vote, Krishna Menon said, “we cannot subscribe to the idea that any sovereign state can agree to elections under the UN organization”.<sup>63</sup> Replying to criticism in Parliament, Nehru explained that provision about election was contrary to the UN Charter. He also referred to the ‘Cold war’ context in which the resolution was adopted. To him, it was not a responsible resolution and the motive behind it was to run down India.<sup>64</sup> The Indian vote against the resolution Nehru said, “was a correct vote and if a similar situation arises, in future, we shall again vote in the same way”.<sup>65</sup>

The Indian vote against the resolution was bitterly criticized in many countries as well as in India. Speaking in Madras on November 17, Jayaprakash Narayan remarked: “I am concerned over our foreign policy. We are following a double standard, one standard of measurement for Egypt and another for Hungary. That is why I am opposing it”.<sup>66</sup>



Nehru realized the depth of feelings in India over her opposition to the November 9 resolution on Hungary. In Parliament on November 16 Nehru said that, "There was no immediate aggression in Hungary in the sense of something militarily happening as there was in the case of Egypt. It was really a continuing intervention of Soviet armies in Hungary based on the Warsaw Pact. The fact is that as subsequent events have shown, the Soviet armies were there against the wishes of the Hungarian people".<sup>67</sup> On November 19, Nehru remarked, "From the very beginning we made it clear that in our opinion, the people of Hungary should be allowed to determine their future according to their own wishes and that foreign troops should be withdrawn".<sup>68</sup>

We can safely conclude that Nehru's reaction through out the crisis was slow, cautious and hesitant.<sup>69</sup> Nehru, while had expressed sympathy with the people of Hungary and even criticized the Soviet intervention, he wished to avoid straining his friendship with the Soviet Union. From the Indian point of view, the security of her vital interest lay in not antagonizing the USSR when the latter was supporting her on Kashmir issue and providing valuable economic assistance rather than the Western powers in the Hungarian crisis.

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62. Ibid., 571<sup>st</sup> mtg., p.79.
63. Ibid., 571<sup>st</sup> mtg., p.68.
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66. The Hindu, November 18, 1956.
67. Suimal Dutt, 'With Nehru in the Foreign Office', 1977, p.181.
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# *Chapter – 4*

*China, India and The Soviet  
Union : The Emerging Triangle*

## CHAPTER – 4

### CHINA, INDIA & THE SOVIET UNION : THE EMERGING TRIANGLE

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The contacts between India and China date back to ancient times. Even long before the spread of Buddhism to China and Japan. Hindu traders were carrying on commerce with those countries. Buddhism gave a new impetus to these contacts, and a new synthesis of culture on a remarkable scale took place between India and China. In spite of the absence of any official contacts between the two Governments, the peoples of India and China continued to cherish feelings of affection for each other. They continued to maintain a live interest in their respective struggles for emancipation. The Indian National Congress, which met at Madras in 1927, passed a resolution<sup>1</sup> sending its “warmest greetings to the people of China and its assurances of full sympathy with them in their fight for emancipation”. The Congress also expressed its resentment against the use of Indian troops by the British Government to further their imperialist designs in China and to hinder and prevent the Chinese people from gaining their freedom.

When Japan attacked China in 1937, the All India Congress Committee, which met at Calcutta condemned Japan as *trying to* emulate the Western imperialists. In order to express its solidarity

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with China, India observed many China days against Japanese aggression. The first of its kind was observed on September 26, 1937. Nehru in a press statement said on September 14, 1937, "I suggest that Sunday September 26, should be observed as a special day for this purpose, when we should condemn the Japanese aggression on China and send our full sympathy to the Chinese people".<sup>2</sup> The AICC commended the heroic struggle of the Chinese people for maintaining the integrity and the independence of their country. The committee went further and called upon the Indian people to refrain from the use of goods of Japanese origins as a mark of their sympathy with the people of China.<sup>3</sup> The Congress which met the following year at Haripura passed a similar resolution. In 1938, the Congress gave a practical demonstration of its sympathy for the Chinese people by deciding to send a Medical Mission to China. The Medical Mission which was sent in 1939, with Dr. M. Atal at its head succeeded by its devotion to duty in establishing Indo-Chinese relations on a firm basis of goodwill and affection. The visit in 1941 of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Madame Chiang to India served to cement the feelings of solidarity existing between the peoples of China and India.

Nehru looked at China as India's natural ally. Among foreign countries, China drew his utmost attention and that was why China found maximum coverage in his writings and works. He *longed* for every piece of news from China. After Japan's invasion on China, he at once condemned Japan's undeclared war and atrocities perpetrated by the aggressor on the innocent Chinese people. It was

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his desire to see the Chinese people resisting the Japanese in the hour of trial and suffering with his own eyes, and convey the support and sympathy of Indian people to the Chinese people personally.

After sending the Indian Medical Mission to China, Mao Zedong had thanked the Indian National Congress in his letter of May 24, 1939, and had expressed pleasure and privilege of receiving the mission. He had praised their spirit of sharing hardships with Eighth Route Army which Mao said left a profound impression on all who came in touch with them.<sup>4</sup> Nehru replied to Mao on July 11, 1939. It was here in this letter that Nehru expressed his wish to visit China, as he wrote, "There is just a possibility of my going to China for a brief period at the end of August or in September if the international situation permits it. In the event of my going there, I shall look forward with great pleasure to meet you and paying my homage to the men of the 8<sup>th</sup> Route Army".<sup>5</sup> The purpose of his visit as he had said was to forge an alliance between Indian and Chinese nations and enable the movements of independence of the Indian and Chinese people to establish intimate contacts.<sup>6</sup>

When India became free in 1947, the first Government which came forward to establish diplomatic relations with her was the Nationalist Government of China. In 1949, however, the Chinese Nationalist Government was overthrown by the communist who established the Central People's Government. In October 1949, the People's Republic proclaimed itself as the only lawful Government of



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china and expressed a desire to enter into diplomatic relations with India. The Government of India accorded de jure recognition to the New Government of China on December 30, 1949, and reached an agreement with the People's Republic of China for the establishment of diplomatic relations. In order to strengthen the cultural relations between the two countries a Chinese Cultural Delegation visited India during the last quarter of 1951. The Delegation stayed for over six weeks in India and visited places of historical, scientific and cultural importance.<sup>7</sup> An Indian cultural Delegation visited China during the second quarter of 1952.

Chinese Communists did not agree with the foreign policy of India. According to them a foreign policy which was independent of the two blocs was irresolute and this was neither desirable nor possible. Before the formal proclamation of their Government their press had very often attacked the Indian Government and stated that it was the agent of the Imperialists. Replying to a message of greetings from the Indian Communist leader, Mao Tse-Tung stated on October 19, 1949:

“I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in

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the Socialist and People's Democratic family; that day will end the imperialist reactionary era in the history of mankind".<sup>8</sup>

This statement was made by Mao before he became the formal Head of the State. There was no doubt that the attitude of the Chinese Communists towards the present Indian Government would be fundamentally the same as that outlined in Mao's letter quoted above. But this did not prevent the two Governments maintaining friendly relations with each other on a diplomatic level.

#### **The Tibetan Problem :**

A source of friction between the Government of India and China was the question of Tibet. Tibet was traditionally ruled by the Dalai Lama and the Panchan Lama. Early in the 1920's the two lamas disagreed on some political issues, including that of the extant of British influence in Lhasa. Since 1924 the Panchan Lama had lived in China. He intended to come back to Tibet with the communist armies, who wanted to 'liberate' Tibet. Also, these circumstances tempted the Dalai Lama to make a futile request to the British and American Government to receive diplomatic mission from him, perhaps with the ultimate aim of asking for military aid against communist pressure.

The Dalai Lama had been in effect absolute ruler over Western Tibet for the past many years. The Panchen Lama, who had some influence in Eastern Tibet, was potentially a religious and

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political rival. From a purely legal standpoint China's Suzerainty over Tibet was accepted by other Powers. But in practice Tibet was autonomous. In 1904 Lord Curzon, the Governor-General of India sent a military mission to Lhasa and forced a treaty on the Tibetan government. China ratified the treaty two years later, both Britain and China engaging not to annex Tibetan territory. To some extent the Republic of India inherited British responsibilities in Tibet, which meant accepting Chinese Suzerainty over Tibet on condition that China would respect its autonomy. But radical and epoch-making changes were taking place in China as a whole, and it would have been futile to expect that Tibet would remain unaffected. Her fantastically feudal structure of society would have to change in relation to the changes in China.

In July 1949 there was a report of an incident in Tibet, which aroused interest in other parts of the world. It was stated that the local authorities had expelled the Nationalist Government's Mission from the country. The Chinese Communists contended that this was done under the instigation of the British and American Imperialists and their 'stooge', the Indian Nehru Government with the Ultimate purpose of repudiating the Chinese central government's authority over Tibet there. An Indian Government representative visited Tibet on July 24. Later the government of India declared that no revolt had occurred in the country. The incident created *considerable resentment in Communist China against the Indian Government.*

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Almost immediately after the establishment of People's Republic of China Beijing announced that it would shortly march into Tibet. India protested at once. New Delhi warned the new government that military action in Tibet would jeopardize India's efforts to get recognition for Mao's government, and its entry into the United Nations. Beijing ignored the warning and walked into Tibet, claiming it was an integral part of China and entirely a domestic problem. At that time, India was willing to accede to China a relationship with Tibet akin to India's with Bhutan, but no more. The Chinese responded by wondering whether India was preparing to make Tibet a second Bhutan an action, incidentally, which would have earned the applause of Harry Truman, for it would mean a second front for China, with the situation tense in Korea. Nehru believed that this region could see the beginning of a third world war and decided to handle the issue with the utmost care.

In the last week of June 1950, conflict broke out in Korea with the North Koreans crossing the frontiers then Known as the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. In the Security Council, North Korea was declared the aggressor and the United State of America was authorized to enforce the sanctions by sending troops on October 2, 1950, Chou-En-lai, in a midnight interview with the Indian Ambassador, whilst thanking Nehru profusely for all that he had done in the cause of peace, clearly indicated that if the Americans crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel, China would intervene in Korea. Prime Minister Nehru continued his efforts to

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bring peace and to nullify the U.N. Resolution authorizing the united states to cross the frontiers.

Thus whilst India and her Ambassador were engaged with the problem of Korea and Chou-En-lai was outwardly effusive about Pandit Nehru's efforts to advocate China's cause in the United Nations and for the establishment of peace, the Chinese quietly moved into Tibet to implement their predetermined plan. The Indian Ambassador Pannikar knew nothing about it. He has mentioned in his book, *In Two Chinas*, that "by the middle of the month (October, 1950) rumours of a Chinese invasion of Tibet began to circulate. Visits and representations to the Foreign office brought no results. The Foreign office officials were polite but silent. Things were certainly moving on that side. The only information I was able to ring out of them was that certain pacificatory measures were being taken in west sikang, that is on the borders of Tibet proper".

On October 7, 1950, the Chinese launched an attack on Eastern Tibet and quickly occupied chamdo and defeated and slaughtered or captured most of the Tibetan troops, including Governor Ngapo Shape. China did not think it necessary to take India into confidence. On October 27, India sent its first protest note to the Chinese Government against military measures being taken in Tibet. Indian Ambassador Pannikar asked for details and conveyed 'Delhi's surprise and regret', adding that this would also make it difficult for India to support the Mao Government's admission into the United

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Nations. China's reply was firm : 'Tibet is an integral part of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of china'. For good measure, China warned India that no foreign interference would be tolerated.

Whilst the exchange of notes between India and China was going on Tibet requested India to sponsor her case in the United Nations but was informed that she should send her appeal direct. Tibetan National Assembly and cabinet addressed on 7 November 1950 a complaint to the United Nations seeking the world body's help to preserve her independence tracing the history of Tibet from the earliest times and taking its stand on the Simla Convention of 1914, where Tibet accepted nominal Chinese Suzerainty conditionally, the representation went on to say, "The armed invasion of Tibet for the incorporation of Tibet in Communist China through sheer physical force is a clear case of aggression. As long as the people of Tibet are compelled by force to become a part of China against their will and consent, the present invasion of Tibet will be the grossest instance of the violation of the weak by the strong". But this effort failed due to the converted actions of the major world powers. India also decided not to worsen the international situation by condemning China in the form of United Nations. El Salvador was the only country which wanted the General Assembly to take action against this act of unprovoked aggression on November 24, when the General Assembly Considered this question, the British delegate argued that, as the legal position of Tibet was not clear, it would be better if the matter was

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allowed to wait till the Assembly had a better idea of the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. The Indian delegate said that the Indian government was certain that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means. His reason for this hope was that the Chinese forces had ceased to advance after the fall of Chamdo. India, therefore, supported the United Kingdom's proposal that the question should be adjourned.

But the USSR took a more strong position while supporting the adjournment. The Soviet delegate said that the representative of El Salvador did not cite any international instrument in support of the argument that Tibet was an independent country. He contended that Chinese Sovereignty over Tibet had been recognized for a long time by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR; and that the question was one which came essentially within the national jurisdiction of China. He questioned the United Nations right to consider Tibet, and that if it did so it would be guilty of unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of the Chinese people.

Ultimately the Tibetan leaders had to agree to Beijings terms, and they signed an agreement (17 points) on May 23, 1951. What emerged from the agreement was not the 'legitimate Tibetan autonomy within the framework of Chinese Suzerainty, as the Government of India wanted, but full fledged Chinese Sovereignty over Tibet, with restricted Tibetan rights to autonomy in certain limited spheres'. Thus Tibet lost the autonomy which she had enjoyed

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for centuries and which had developed into an almost independent status since 1912.

After the Tibetan question was closed, in its policy towards China the Indian government showed that it appreciated the need to recognize the appearance of a common border between India and China and did much to build up friendly relations with the Chinese People's Republic. One of India's more significant actions in this direction was its criticism of the draft "Peace Treaty" with Japan prepared by the United States and its refusal to take part in the conference convened to discuss the draft treaty in September 1951 in San Francisco and to sign the treaty. One of the reasons for the Indian Government action was the fact that the treaty failed to stipulate that Taiwan was to be returned to the Chinese People's Republic. On the question of Taiwan, India while pleading for a peaceful solution, had all along supported Chinese claims to the Island. Since India accepted the government controlling the mainland of China as the real Government of China, she felt that Taiwan should go to New China.

Tibetan leaders comment on this agreement did not become known until after the Revolt<sup>9</sup> when the Dalai Lama fled to India and said at a press conference that Tibetans were forced to agree under the threat of military action and out of desire to save the country from total destruction.

A wide gulf divided the Chinese and the Tibetans, and hopes for conciliation and cooperation becoming dimmer everyday and the



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situation being regarded as dangerous by the Dalai Lama's advisors, the Dalai Lama and his Government secretly left the country for India. It was after the departure of Dalai Lama from Tibet that a full-scale rebellion broke out on March 20, 1959, according to the information reaching the Government of India. A factual account of the rebellion, which continued for weeks, has not yet become available. There was no foreign correspondents in Tibet, and the stories published in Indian and Western newspapers came from the border of Assam or from Hong Kong and were based on traveller's tails.

Repercussions in India of what had been going on in Tibet were natural because India had trade and cultural relations with Tibet for a long time, because some 12,000 refugees from Tibet had entered India, because China's entry into Tibet had given rise to serious problems pertaining to the Indo-Tibetan border, and because of several other things. On top of this all was the charge, again and again repeated by the Chinese, that Kalimpong had been a centre of the Tibetan rebel organization, and they urged the Government of India to repress the subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibet region. The uprising in Tibet was put down by China and the Chinese army entrenched itself well across the borders of India.

At first Nehru was reluctant to discuss the situation as he did not want to open himself to charges of interference in China's domestic affairs.<sup>10</sup> But Beijing did not appreciate Nehru's stance.

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Also the Chinese were annoyed by the criticism levied against Beijing by the Dalai Lama after the Tibetan spiritual leader and his entourage were given political asylum in India. Left with no other recourse, Nehru pointed out that the magnitude of the Tibetan uprising reflected a strong feeling of nationalism. He urged that fighting cease and that the Chinese respect the earlier autonomy which was promised to the Tibetans. He then expressed his hope that China and India should not develop feelings of hostility towards each other over the issue. But hostility did exist and Sino-Indian relations continued to deteriorate.<sup>11</sup>

In their first announcement in March of the Tibetan Revolt the Russians backed the Chinese contentions, but thereafter the Russian press remained silent when the Chinese intensified their reproaches against India's alleged role in the upheaval. It can be assumed that the Kremlin derived, a modicum of satisfaction from China's problems in Tibet, as Khrushchev recalled Beijing's criticism of his handling of the Eastern European situation after the debunking of Stalin in 1956. Khrushchev reluctance to support China's accusations against India reflected the increasing friction in Sino-Soviet relations, as well as his reluctance to jeopardize his carefully – nurtured friendship with India.

#### **Panchsheel Agreement :**

China's occupation of Tibet was in itself an expression of Supreme unconcern for Indian sensibilities. Chinese publications repeatedly printed maps showing large areas of India as part of China.

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Only after the Korean truce talks began and Beijing's policies begin to shift towards a more conciliatory line. But this shift was not a response to India's policy of conciliation toward China. Instead it reflected a general shift in her international tactics. China declared in 1952 that "countries with differing social systems and ways of life can co-exist peacefully".<sup>12</sup>

India welcomed the thaw in China's policy and may for this reason have believed the time was propitious to define formally a new relationship between the two countries. Negotiations were begun in Beijing on December 31, 1953. Although quick agreement was expected, the negotiations dragged on for four months. Dr. Krishnalal Shridharane, Amrit Bazar Patrika's well informed political analyst, speculated that India unable to consider Tibet "an absolute foreign country" wanted to maintain its trade agencies even though this right exceeded normal diplomatic privileges, while China wanted "to show that India cannot inherit the traditions left behind in Tibet by British imperialism".<sup>13</sup>

The negotiations lasted longer than expected. It took four months for agreement to be reached. The Eastern Economist of Bombay speculated that the signing of the accord was timed by the Chinese to coincide with the Colombo conference in Ceylon, while The Hindustan Times linked the sudden successful conclusion of negotiations with opening of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

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The formal title of the Sino-Indian Pact on Tibet is Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India. With this agreement whose preamble included the declaration of Panchsheel pledging the two countries to respect the territorial integrity, and to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of each, India also signed away her right to ask the Government of China now or in future for Tibet's autonomy, in which she had displayed a great interest in 1950, and which the Chinese themselves, under the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951, were pledged to maintain.

Parliamentary and Public reaction in India to the new pact was nevertheless generally favourable working within the realization that free India did not want to continue the same privileges in Tibet which the British had exercised, India was satisfied that she would be able to maintain her trade and cultural relations with Tibet. The Press glorified India's new approach to international affairs. The National Herald wrote, "with Tibet having become 'The Tibetan region of China' changes became inevitable and since India does not seek extra territorial advantages in any country she was willing to regularize relationship with Tibet through Beijing".<sup>14</sup> Nehru was given credit by Amrit Bazar Patrika for "getting a tacit Chinese approval of Mc Mohan Line".<sup>15</sup> The General View was that Beijing "with its firm control over Tibet" could not be expected to acquiesce in India's retention of rights and privileges which had been "rendered obsolete",

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and that India's "vital trade and cultural interests" had been "safeguarded by putting them on a more stable basis."<sup>16</sup> The Agreement was supposed to have satisfied "in a very large measure the requirements of both the countries".<sup>17</sup>

The signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement with regard to Tibet in 1954 was perhaps, the proper occasion when the question of a categorical acceptance by China of the traditional frontiers between India and Tibet should have been raised and settled once for all. "There has been no reference to maps and disputes about the border", wrote the National Herald, and added, "there could have been none". The explanation given was : "the frontiers, as Prime Minister Nehru had occasion to remind the House of the People a few weeks ago, remains fixed and cannot be altered".<sup>18</sup> The Agreement on the part of China "to respect the territorial integrity of India" under the declaration of Panchsheel was regarded as sufficient, the general view in India being that the traditional frontiers of India were well known and beyond any challenge. Nehru himself was not completely oblivious of the importance of good relations with China from the point of view of maintaining India's frontiers secure.

But the most significant development during this period was the Soviet endorsement of Panchsheel. The Soviet Union supported Panchsheel from the time of its endorsement by China. The Soviet Party newspaper wrote : "There cannot be any doubt that the acceptance of these important principles by Asian as well as other

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countries would diminish the possibility of wars, serve to alleviate tension in the world community and improve valuable cooperation between the countries”.<sup>19</sup> In September 1954, during the visit of the Soviet leaders to China, the Soviet Union Officially acknowledged her acceptance of the five principles contained in Panchsheel. This was exactly when the South East Asian Organization was formed.

To Nehru, the signing of the Panchsheel meant that India and China, “which have now almost above 1800 miles of frontiers, should live in terms of peace and friendliness and should respect each other’s sovereignty and integrity, should agree not to interfere with each other in any way and not to commit aggression on each other”.<sup>20</sup> Since Nehru “time and again” reiterated India’s contention that the Mc. Mohan line marked her border with China, “where was the need”, it was asked, “to raise the border line question all over again”? But unfortunately it did not work out this way. The Praja Socialist weekly newspaper vigil expressed it well at the time when it editorialized, “It is rather an irony that a treaty which guarantees between India and China peaceful coexistence and mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty should be the first international document to set a seal on the abolition of Tibet’s autonomy”.<sup>21</sup>

While addressing the Geneva Conference on April 28, 1954 Chou En-lai had made a highly significant plea for solidarity. He had urged the countries of Asia to “consult among themselves with a view to seeking common measures to safeguard peace and security in

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Asia".<sup>22</sup> Two months later when Chou visited New Delhi from Geneva, he discussed with Nehru this same thing, suggesting the concept of an "Asian consultative committee" and the extension of a "peace area". While Nehru himself had earlier proposed a series of bilateral non-aggression pacts among non-aligned nations he was definitely opposed to China's concept of solidarity. The Lucknow Pioneer commented on the difference between India's belief in co-existence and China's broader ambition. Probably reflecting the views of the government, the paper wrote : "India subscribe wholeheartedly to the demand of 'Asia for the Asians' but she will not tolerate the domination of the continent by a single great power in the name of unity".<sup>23</sup>

#### **The Sino-Indian Border Dispute :**

Within three months of the signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet, on July 1954 Chinese armed forces entered the Bara Hoti area in the central sector and claimed that Bara Hoti was traditional Chinese territory. The Government of India, however, treated the intrusion as an act of misunderstanding on the part of the Chinese. While the dispute with regard to Bara Hoti was pending, in September 1955 the Chinese soldiers entered Damzan, some ten miles South of Niti Pass, recognized as one of the border passes by the 1954 and 'clearly within Indian territory', and when the attention of the Chinese government was drawn to this 'trespass' they coolly asserted that it was within the Tibet region of China. Also in 1956, Chinese

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Patrols willfully crossed three times into India over the Shipki pass in the border province of Himachal Pradesh and an armed Party camped on Indian territory near Milang in Uttar Pradesh.<sup>24</sup> In October 1957 Chinese troops reached Walong in the Lohit Frontier Sector of India's Northeast Frontier Agency.<sup>25</sup>

In 1956-57 the Chinese had taken possession of the undemarcated, uninhabited Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.<sup>26</sup> There the Chinese built a motorable road linking Sinkiang with Tibet. The road had the immediate value of enabling the Chinese to send more troops and equipments from Sinkiang across the Aksai Chin into rebellious Tibet. The Government of India expressed its 'surprise and regret' that the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through what was indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the government of India and without even informing the government of India.

Following the publication, in an official Chinese magazine, China Pictorial of July 1958 of a map of China showing China's historical claims to part of Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency. It was contended that the borders imposed on a weak China under duress by Imperial Britain were subject to renegotiations. These claims were reiterated in September 1958. Early in 1959 Chou En-lai let it be known that his nation would forego its recent claims and accept the Mc. Mohan line as the boundary in the eastern sector if India would recognize China's claim to the Aksai Chin area. In reality



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Chou was asking for Indian acceptance of a fait accompli. Nehru rejected this precondition for a settlement as unacceptable, and moved to step up Indian defenses in the remainder of Ladakh. Several Skirmishes took place in mid 1959 between Chinese and Indian patrols in the area, and the border conflicts was brought to the world's attention.

The border conflict placed the Soviets in the precarious position of choosing between a "fraternal" state with whom relations were deteriorating rapidly or a state with whom relations were being carefully cultivated. The stakes in this decision were quite high confronted by a direct military threat from a communist power, the Indian government might have overreacted by swinging sharply to the west for military and political support, and perhaps even abandoning the policy of non-alignment. Moreover, it had to consider that Indian military dependence upon the West might have led to the construction of American military bases in the border areas, contiguous not only to China but also to the Soviet Union.

After a clash occurred near Longju in the NEFA in late August, a Radio Moscow broadcast and subsequent TASS bulletin on September 9 called on the two Governments to resolve their border problems :

"The incident on the Chinese-Indian border is certainly deplorable...The Chinese and Soviet peoples are linked by the unbreakable bonds

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of fraternal friendship....friendly cooperation between the USSR and India is successfully developing in keeping with the idea of peaceful coexistence...Its (the dispute's) inspirers are trying to discredit the idea of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems and to prevent the strengthening of the Asian people's solidarity in the struggle for consolidation of national independence".<sup>27</sup>

This was the first occasion on which the USSR, had not automatically extended full public support to a communist country engaged in a conflict with a non-communist state.

So far as the Chinese were concerned Soviet neutrality virtually amounted to Soviet support of the ruling elite, the bourgeoisie nationalists of India. The Chinese condemned the soviet communiqué of September 9 as 'tendentious' and maintained that, "It revealed our differences to the world".<sup>28</sup> The Chinese later revealed that this Soviet neutrality was an act of treachery.

The government of India also saw the significance of the Soviet statement. At a press conference in New Delhi on September 11, Nehru reflected on the meaning of the TASS statement "considering everything, the statement was a fair one and an unusual one for the Soviet Government to sponsor".<sup>29</sup> Krishna Menon was

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more precise. It was the first time, he noted, that the USSR has ever come out “speaking about peaceful settlement between communist and non-communist parties”. When probed about the possibility of Russian mediation in the dispute, the Indian defence minister replied that India and China could settle the matter themselves.<sup>30</sup>

It was hoped in New Delhi that Khrushchev could exert some restraint on his Chinese comrades. In October, the Soviet premier flew to Beijing shortly after his September meeting in the United States with President Eisenhower. He tried to persuade the Chinese that improved Soviet-American relations did not imply that he was truckling under the imperialists. The CCP leaders, however, were not impressed with Khrushchev’s explanation of his recent conduct. Khrushchev publicly urged the merits of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and warned the Chinese against any attempt to test the stability of the imperialist system by force.

Khrushchev’s plea that “disputes should be settled by negotiations” evidently did not impress the Chinese shortly after his return from Beijing, a border incident occurred in Ladakh in which nine policemen were killed. The first reaction in the Soviet press to the incident was an article in Pravda on October 29, six days after the news was released by New Delhi. The Pravda account printed both the Indian and Chinese versions of the incident. All the essential facts and contradictions of the two conflicting accounts were included, but no commentary was given. Then on October 30, in a major policy

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speech to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev made extensive reference to the incident. After repeating that the USSR was 'bound by unbreakable bonds of friendship' to the Chinese People's Republic and also to India, 'with whom we are successfully developing friendly relations; he continued :

“we are especially sorry that these incidents have resulted in loss of life to both sides. Nothing can make up for the loss of the parents and relatives of the victims. We would be happy if there were no more incidents on the Sino-Indian frontier [and] if the existing frontier disputes were settled by way of friendly negotiations to the mutual satisfaction of both sides”.<sup>31</sup>

A week later Khrushchev called the whole dispute “sad” and “stupid”. On December 19 a high ranking Soviet diplomat openly spoke of his government's “embarrassment” over the border situation. “It is more than untimely”, he said, “it would be inopportune at any time”.<sup>32</sup> And on December 22 the Soviet press departed from its normal procedure and for the first time published an Indian charge against China without waiting for the Chinese rebuttal.<sup>33</sup>

The reaction within official New Delhi circles was that the Soviet attitude was indirectly helpful to India. While the Soviets had not expressed any opinion publicly on the merits of the dispute, they

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had not supported the Chinese. By October's end, Nehru appeared to be losing hope for a "reasonable negotiated settlement" with China. He sent a "confidential memorandum" to Indian diplomats abroad, preparing them for the eventuality of India using armed forces to push the Chinese from occupied territory in Ladakh.<sup>34</sup> Henceforth in his public statements he drew a clear distinction between the conduct of the Soviets and the Chinese. On October 21 he told a Calcutta Press Conference that Khrushchev was eager and anxious for a East-West settlement, "but the same eagerness for peace is not there" in China's case. Nehru then asserted : "I consider the USSR first of all as having reached normalcy after a revolution. Secondly, I consider the USSR as a territorially satisfied power of course, they might have a desire for supremacy in economic and other fields. But China has not gotten over the first flush of its revolutionary mentality". The USSR, as Nehru has pointed on an earlier occasion, adapted itself to changing realities. "In other countries where communist parties function without that touch of reality and a sense of responsibility they become much more rigid".<sup>35</sup>

On the same theme Nehru told the Lok Sabha in November :

"There is a marked difference between the broad approach of the USSR to world problems and the Chinese approach. I do not think there is any country in the world....Which is more anxious for peace than the USSR. And I think that is the general view of people-even of

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their opponents. But I doubt if there is any country in the world which cares less for peace than China today".<sup>36</sup>

The USSR was characterized by Nehru as working for a peaceful settlement of world problems, while China was characterized as caring little for peace and as being opposed to any constructive moves by the Soviet in this direction.

In answer to those in his own Congress party who thought that India should make basic changes in its defence policy, Nehru cautioned that if India were to enter into an alliance with the western powers, Russia would then be forced to support China. Nehru felt that the USSR was the only country which could possibly restrain the Chinese, but as early as November 5, 1959, he voiced some doubt whether China would heed the USSR.<sup>37</sup>

#### **The Chinese Invasion on India :**

Indo-Soviet friendship was put to test in the face of the Chinese hostility culminating in armed aggression in October 1962. China attacked India in both sectors, NEFA and Ladakh. Though the Chinese later claimed that they had consulted the Soviets regarding the aggressive action they were going to take against India, the latter denied any foreknowledge of it. Moreover, there was no official Soviet comments on the Chinese claim that India had provoked a Chinese counter attack. The rapidity with which the Chinese forces marched into the Indian territory (so much so that within four days they had captured all the land they claimed to be theirs), exploded the

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myth that India took the first provocative step in launching the war. The Soviet leadership also seemed to be unhappy for their inability to deter the Chinese from indulging in such a misadventure.

As soon as Nehru came to know of the explosive situation, he immediately got Khrushchev informed of this development. Within hours through the Soviet envoy in Delhi Khrushchev's message was received in which he expressed his regret over the fighting between two friendly nations and called for a ceasefire to be followed by negotiations between the two countries. On October 24, the Chinese proposed a ceasefire on the condition that the line of actual control on that day should be the new border line between the two countries. On October 25, editorials of Pravda and Izvestia praised the Chinese three – point peace proposal as constructive even after India's outright rejection of these proposals and implicitly blamed India for holding up the negotiations in Sino-Indian border dispute, and further endorsed the Chinese views on the Mc. Mohan line.<sup>38</sup> On October 29, the Soviet sponsored world peace council refused to discuss an Indian motion on the Chinese aggression on India.<sup>39</sup> In the UN General Assembly, the Soviets asked India to accept the Chinese peace proposal for ending the border conflict.<sup>40</sup>

The Soviets knew that the acceptance of the Chinese proposal by India under duress was unthinkable as it would *cause loss* of face to Nehru. But they had to make the move under the stress of serious situation. It may be recalled that on October 24 the American

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President had declared blockade to the ships carrying war material to Cuba. This in itself was a challenge to the Soviet Union which if resisted would result in a war between the two Super Powers. To meet this crucial situation, the Soviet Union decided to rally the communist camp behind it on the Cuban front and there was no question of alienating China at this stage by taking an anti-China stand on Sino-Indian border war. The best way to get an unhesitating support of a communist ally was to extend support to it in its policies which even though they were not in good taste and were earlier opposed by Moscow.

On his part Nehru not only rejected Russia's call for a cease-fire but also imposing preconditions of his own. He asserted that the Chinese forces must return to the pre-September 20, 1962 positions before any negotiations could take place.<sup>41</sup> Nehru undoubtedly was disturbed by the Pravda editorial of October 25, but withheld comments. His sentiments were conveyed to Khrushchev several days later by several Indian officials, including K.D. Malviya, the minister of oil, who had a two hour meeting with the Soviet premier.

But China like India, was not satisfied with the Soviet stand. The Russians, even during the height of Cuban crisis, had not supported the charge of aggression made by Beijing against New Delhi. The Chinese had given their fullest backing to Khrushchev, but according to an October 31 editorial in Jenmin Jih Pao, the Soviet leader had bowed to the "United States imperialist attempt to



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browbeat the people of Cuba” and had removed his missiles from Cuba. As a final exhortation to the Soviets, the Chinese published a statement, “More on Nehru’s philosophy in the light of the Sino-Indian boundary”, which held that Moscow should renounce the “reactionary” Indian government and return to the folds of Marxism-Leninism.<sup>42</sup>

As if in reply to the blunt Chinese demands, Moscow gradually shifted its stance on the border dispute during the first week of November. In an important editorial in Pravda on November 5 the USSR again called for a negotiated settlement between India and China. There was danger that the conflict might, spread, and it was in both nations’ interest that this should not happen. But in contrast to its October 25 editorial, Pravda did not term the supporters of India’s national effort “Chauvinistic,” and in no way endorsed Beijing’s proposals over those of New Delhi. In a veiled criticism of China, Pravda pointed out that the non-democratic forces in India were using the present crisis as an excuse to put pressure on the “progressive elements” to end the policy of non-alignment. The following day, Soviet Deputy Premier Alexei Kosygin called for a cease-fire on a reasonable basis and added that “there are no basic contradictions between India and China that could not be solved in round-table talks”.<sup>43</sup> Several days later the position taken by the USSR in the November 5 editorial was endorsed by the Premiers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and later by the other Socialist nations.

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Considering its prevailing alliance with China and its other cold war commitments, the Soviet Union was not prepared to say openly anything stronger on the issue. India was fully aware that the Soviet Union was basically sympathetic to India, and on November 9 Nehru expressed confidence that the USSR would fulfill its previous pledges of assistance, including the first consignment of MIGs scheduled for delivery in December. But Soviets tactically delayed the delivery of MIGs....The Soviets undoubtedly wished to see Sino-Indian hostilities ended but it was not known to what extent, if any, Moscow influenced Beijing's decision to declare unilateral ceasefire on November 20. It might be added that the USSR encouraged the mediatory efforts of the six nonaligned Afro-Asian states which met in Ceylon in December 1962 and put forth the so-called Colombo Proposals to resolve the Sino-Indian dispute.

Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on December 12, Khrushchev referred to the Sino-Indian border Strife.<sup>44</sup> He welcomed the Chinese gesture in declaring unilateral cease-fire but he questioned the propriety of this step by asking how could it be called a reasonable step when it was taken after so many lives had been lost. In his view, it would have been better if the parties had not at all resorted to hostilities. Likewise, he questioned the Chinese bonafides in withdrawing its troops to the lines on which the conflict began; it would have been better if the troops had not at all moved from their original points. By implication, he warned China that the Chinese action was drawing India away from the path of nonalignment

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towards the “imperialist camp”. In effect Khrushchev disapproved the entire policy of China towards India.

It may sound somewhat odd but it was believed in certain quarters that the Sino-Indian war was brought to an end by the pressure that the Soviet Union tried to exert on the Chinese particularly by their threat to cut off oil supplies to China’s air force. The Soviet Union was said to have taken this step at the instance of India. This seems to be too facile a way to view an international event which was going to cause world wide repercussions. Moreover, Khrushchev, endowed as he was with a strong common sense, would have been the last man to think in terms of a proposal which, he knew, the Chinese would immediately spurn. He also knew that the Chinese had the resources to buy oil in international market, particularly from Romania, their close ally.

The Chinese attack on India was an essay in the Chinese forcing tactics. It forced Moscow into taking a definite stand between Chinese comrades and Indian friends, especially when there were divided USSR opinion over Soviet conduct in Cuba. But by providing military and economic assistance to India, the Soviets made it clear that they opposed the Chinese move.

The Soviet military aid in 1962 was meager compared to the massive flow of military assistance provided by the West, but it had tremendous political implications in view of the Sino-Soviet mutual defence pact of 1956. It enabled India to grasp the much needed

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Soviet Support when her political neutrality was slipping under the impact of the Chinese attack.

The speed with which the West rushed assistance after the border clash, earned tremendous goodwill for those countries among Indian leaders. It is important to note that the US welcomed 1962 Soviet assistance to India.

At the end of 1962, the total situation stood as follows : China more adamant toward Moscow, and belligerent towards India; Moscow more eager to edge towards India, and India more amenable to the west.

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# *Chapter – 5*

*Economic and Defence  
Co-operation with Soviet Union*



## CHAPTER – 5

### ECONOMIC and DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITH SOVIET UNION

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The contacts between the people's of India and Russia went back before the period of British occupation of India or the communist revolution in Russia. These relations, however, were not merely cultural but economic too. A Russian writer maintains that trade between the Indian and Russians was going on in the 18<sup>th</sup> century A.D.<sup>1</sup> There is now fairly well established evidence to support the history of Indo-Russian trade from the 17<sup>th</sup> century onwards. The famous Russian Czar, Peter 1, took some interest in establishing trade relations with Moghal India and accordingly he instructed his Vice-Admiral, D. Vilster, to go to India with a view to negotiating for trade.<sup>2</sup> There were about hundred Indian merchants who were doing business in various commodities at Astrahan in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The Indian merchants were coming with their goods from Astrahan to Navgorad, Moscow, northern Kavkaz and Petersburg Peter III on showed special interest in India. On March 22, 1762, he directed that the trade with the east and “especially with India” be developed “as it is the only way to develop the economy of Russia and improve the lot of her people”.<sup>3</sup> The famous Russian Pundit, M.V. Lamonosov, who lived in the middle of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and whose authority on

different branches of knowledge made him known as “living encyclopaedia”, recorded the growing Indo-Russian trade and cultural ties in his days.<sup>4</sup>

After the British conquest of India, Indo-Russian trade did not stop, but changed its route via London. In the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russia was one of the principal importers of Indian cotton. She occupied 5<sup>th</sup> place among importers of Indian cotton. In the sixties of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in the Petersburg port alone more than four million pods of Indian goods were imported.<sup>5</sup> According to some Russian economists of those days, every third textile article woven in Russia was made of Indian cotton.<sup>6</sup> Exhibitions of Indian goods were held in Petersburg and Moscow in early 1870, which proved to be a grand success. Many Russian newspapers published articles about Indian tea, jute and cotton. Towards the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russia occupied a major place in the foreign trade of British India, in the ten years of the last century her place varied from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup> in British India's overall foreign trade.<sup>7</sup>

One of the reasons why Indo-Russian trade increased irrespective of the type of regimes existing in both countries was that, after the opening of the Suez canal, Russia's Odessa was the nearest European port to India and hence the trade was proving economical.

Compared to the Indo-Russian trade under Tsarist regime, the position of the Indo-Soviet trade after the October Revolution remained more or less similar. Major Indian commodities that were

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imported by Soviet Russia from British India during this period were jute, tea and cotton. The volume of India's trade with the USSR was almost negligible in consideration of the total jute, tea and cotton exports of India. For instance, in 1931, raw jute exported to communist Russia represented less than 1 per cent and gunny bags 3 per cent of the total exports of jute from India.<sup>8</sup> Prior to the Russian Revolution, India had quite a large share in the Russian import of tea. According to 1913 figures, 11.1 per cent of the total tea exported from India went to Russia, but the percentage heavily fell in 1931-32 when only 0.7 per cent of India's total tea exports went to the USSR, as the Russian preferred Chinese tea to the Indian.<sup>9</sup> Principal Soviet exports to India during pre-independence period were mineral oils, wood and timber, paper and paste board, dyeing and tanning substances, chemicals, sugar, etc.<sup>10</sup>

#### **Economic Policy Under Stalin :**

Post-War Soviet economy was stronger and the USSR was in search of foreign markets towards the close of the Stalinist era. By the beginning of 1952 her foreign trade amounted to 18,000 million roubles a year, about three times the pre-war figure.<sup>11</sup> Soviet exports and imports in 1938 were around 0.2 and 0.3 billion roubles respectively; by the 1950 they had gone upto 1.6 and 1.3 billion roubles.<sup>12</sup> But the search for the markets, on the part of the USSR had not led it to develop any meaningful trade relations with India under Stalin. In accordance with separate pacts made in 1948, 1949 and

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1951, the Soviet Union agreed to supply wheat in exchange for Indian tea, tobacco, jute, etc. During the whole of 1953 Indo-Soviet trade amounted to Rs.81 lakhs both ways.<sup>13</sup> In fact, Indo-Russian trade relations towards the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century were much better, both in terms of quantity and a variety of goods exchanged. During the last days of Stalin the Soviet were realizing that the self-imposed isolation of the USSR from the newly independent non-communist countries was going against to their economic interests. In the report submitted to the 19<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Party in 1952, Malenkov stated that one of the four-fold objectives of soviet Union's foreign policy was to increase trade relations with all countries.<sup>14</sup> In the same year India was among the 42 countries which participated in the International Economic Conference held in Moscow. In his speech at the conference, the President of the USSR chamber of commerce expressed willingness of the USSR to increase trade relations with India and other newly independent countries on mutually advantageous terms. He stated that the trade could be balanced in terms of imports and exports and could be made in local currencies of the countries concerned. As he put it :

“Soviet foreign trade organizations are prepared to establish and develop commercial relations with business interests in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Malaya and other South-East Asian countries. The mere mention of such a state

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as India speak of the potential broad prospects of expanding trade in this part of Asia.”<sup>15</sup>

Thus it becomes clear that despite the failure on the part of the USSR to establish any large-scale trade relations with India, a desire had become manifest towards the end of the Stalinist era to increase economic relations with India on mutually advantageous terms. Indian merchants, who attended the International Economic Conference in 1952, were able, to some extent, to assess Soviet export potentialities and import requirements. During the same period, following the Soviet participation in the International Industrial exhibition held in Bombay in 1952, the Indian public too had a chance to acquaint itself with Soviet goods. On this occasion the Russian pavilion turned out to be a major attraction to Indian visitors. It exhibited mainly agricultural machines like excavators, tractors and industrial products like automobiles, textile machines motors, radios, opticals, etc.

#### **Policy Under Khrushchev :**

A real start in Indo-Soviet economic transactions was effected by the new Soviet regime after the death of Stalin. As both the Soviet Union and India follow development plans of five or more years, to suit the convenience of both parties, five year trade agreements were concluded between the two governments in the following period. This enabled the Indian government to have in

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advance a clear view of the quantum of assistance available from the Soviet Union for each one of its five year plans. As the Soviet planners too estimate their industrial production in terms of five year programme, such five year trade transactions prove helpful to them too. The First Five Year Trade Agreement was concluded between the two governments on 2 December 1953.

The distinguishing feature of the agreement was that the trade between the two countries was to be carried on in Indian rupee and the imports and exports of both countries were to balance with each other. Thus the traditional handicap of the Indian foreign trade – that it was to be in a western currency and the Indian imports were to exceed her export to the west – were removed. As the Soviet Trade Representative in India commented upon it.

“Owing to such agreements India could, for the first time in her history, get a real opportunity to develop her trade on a balanced basis-a basis on which proceeds from the sales of her goods as well as repayments of credits are to be fully used by the Soviet Union exclusively for the purchase of Indian goods. It was also for the first time that the Indian rupee was recognized as a currency for payment in

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foreign trade and other transactions with an industrial country.”<sup>16</sup>

The prospect of Soviet aid was attractive to India primarily because the Soviets were willing to help the expansion of India's public sector, particularly in the field of heavy industry. Negotiations for Soviet assistance in building an Indian steel plant were begun in September 1954. A Russian survey team selected a site and signed the agreement for the Bhilai plant in Madhya Pradesh five months later. To finance the project the USSR authorized credits worth about rupees 64.38 crores for use in India's Second Five Year Plan. It was projected that the Bhilai Plant, with its million ton capacity, would help to raise India's annual output of steel to six million tons by the end of the Second Five Year Plan.

Bhilai was the first major project undertaken by the Soviets in a non-communist nation, and much careful planning went into its preparation and construction. The favourable impression made by the Soviet technicians and their on the job training of their Indian counterparts had been contrasted with the west German and British efforts in constructing steel plants at Rourkela and Durgapur for the Indian public sector. In conjunction with the Bhilai project, over 800 Indian engineers and skilled workers gained productions experience in Soviet factories.

The Russians did an excellent job at Bhilai; the plant, though started later than the one at Rourkela, reached its full

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production capacity before any other steel plant in the public sector. The distinguishing feature of Bhilai is best stated in the words of Earl C. Smith, Chief Metallurgist and Director of Research of the Republic Steel corporation of the USA, in whose opinion Bhilai is “better designed for continuous production than anything that I have seen either in the USA or in Russia proper”.<sup>17</sup>

Other Soviet assistance for India authorized during the Second Five Year Plan included credits for structural steel to be used in the construction of several large industrial plants. A Russian Survey in February 1957 recommended that a plant be built in Ranchi to produce eventually about three-fourths of India's needs for new steel plant machinery. The Ranchi plant was to produce 80,000 tons of machinery for steel industry. On reaching the designed capacity this plant was to produce metallurgical equipment sufficient to build steel plant with a capacity of one million tons per year, i.e. equal to the Bhilai plant before its expansion. It had an expansion capacity for 165,000 tons a year. The coal mining machinery plant at Durgapur had an annual production capacity of 45,000 tons of various machinery and equipment, including coal-cutters and loaders, conveyors, electric locomotives, fans, pumps, winches, etc. The products of this plant would enable the full mechanization of mines to the capacity of 8 million tons per year.

Negotiations for the Soviet contribution to India's Third Five Year Plan began late in 1958. In May 1959 the Indian minister of



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steel, mines, and fuel headed an eighteen member delegation to the USSR. The group reviewed the progress of projects already undertaken in collaboration with the USSR and discussed potential projects for India's Third Five Year Plan.<sup>18</sup> In September 1959 the USSR announced that it would contribute credits worth rupees 180 crores for the plan. The agreement in February 1960 called for :

1. Expansion of the Bhilai Works capacity to 2.5 million tons of steel per year;
2. Expansion of the Ranchi heavy machinery plant in Bihar to 80,000 tons output per year;
3. Completion of the oil refinery at Barauni, Bihar-Capacity planned for 2.6 million gallons of crude oil per year;
4. Manufacture of heavy electrical equipment and precision instruments;
5. Exploration, development, and production of oil and gas in Cambay and other areas.
6. Expansion of mining equipment plants;
7. Expansion of the capacity of the Neyveli and Korba Power Plants.<sup>19</sup>

Significantly the Soviets announced their contribution to India's Third Five Year Plan in September 1959, the very month when the world learned for the first time of the Sino-Indian dispute. In August 1960 New Delhi revealed that the USSR had offered an

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additional rupees 60 crores for use by the Third Five Year Plan. Coming shortly after the Bucharest Conference of June 1960, this additional Soviet aid to India had important political significance. Among other issues at Bucharest, Premier Khrushchev and Marshal Peng had clashed sharply on the respective policies of the USSR and China towards India. The USSR answered the Chinese charge that their aid was being used to bolster up the “reactionary” Nehru government by further increasing its developmental aid to India. On February 20, 1961, the Soviet deputy premier, A.N. Kosygin, arrived in Delhi for talks with the Planning Commission on utilization of the aid, and the following day Six projects, to be financed by the rupees 60 crore pledge, were announced. The projects included :

1. A hydroelectric plant on the bank of the Bhakra with a planned capacity of 480,000 kilowatts;
2. an oil refinery in Gujrat;
3. a washery for coking coal at Kathara in Bihar – capacity three million tons per year;
4. a refractories plant near Bhilai to produce annually 125,000 tons of magnesite and fire clay;
5. oil exploration in Cambay;
6. production of pumps and compressors.

The total Soviet Commitment to the Third Five Year Plan was increased to rupees 240 crores (about \$500 million US) by the

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additional credits authorized in February 1961. In addition, several eastern European allies of the USSR were encouraged to give assistance to the Plan (Czechoslovakia pledged rupees 23.10 crores and Poland 14.3 crores by January 1961).

Detailed plans for the Barauni project were discussed during the Kosygin visit to India in February 1961. K.D. Malaviya, who in June 1960 had conducted talks with the Soviets on the import and refining of oil by the Indian government, returned to Moscow in October 1962. At the height of the Sino-Indian crisis he conveyed Nehru's views on the possible consequences that the military setback might have on India's policy of nonalignment. At that time the Russians promised to speed up aid to India's coal and oil industries.<sup>20</sup>

The Soviets themselves gave considerable publicity to the construction of the refinery at Barauni. An editorial in Pravda in January 1963, for example, stressed that "with assistance of the Soviet specialists, Indian technicians and engineers are mastering the most modern means of construction. Many of these methods are being adopted for the first time in India".<sup>21</sup> The Soviet aid to India constituted almost a third of an estimated total of \$3.56 billion in Soviet credits and grants extended to the less developed non-communist countries between January 1, 1954, and June 30, 1962. During this period the bulk of the credits were given in 1955 (\$116 million) to cover the exchange costs of the Bhilai plant; in 1956 (\$126 million) for the purchase of steel products; and in 1959 (\$375 million)

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and in 1960 (\$125 million) for those projects listed in this chapter. Almost all of the Soviet aid is in the form of credits, repayable in goods at two and a half per cent interest over twelve years with a two year grace period. The Indian government had been repaying the Soviet bloc credits almost as per schedule. With the exception of several small grants valued at about \$6 million (For the Suratgarh model farm in Northern Rajasthan, equipment for the Bombay Institute of Technology, and personal airplanes for Nehru and Krishna Menon), the Soviet assistance during Nehru's era was almost entirely in the form of repayable credits, in contrast to the substantial proportion of grants contained in America's contribution to Indian development.

Late in 1963 it was announced that the USSR's assistance for India's Fourth Five Year Plan would equal the \$500 million pledged to the Third Five Year Plan. As before, the emphasis would be towards helping to strengthen the basic industries in the public sector. The major Soviet project during the Fourth Five Year Plan will be the Bokaro Steel Plant, which when completed will be India's fourth public sector steel plant. Amid much publicity the Soviets agreed on May 1, 1964, to finance the construction at Bokaro, an undertaking which the United States had considered for some time but declined. The USSR then decided to subsidize the 1.5 million ton first stage of the plant, which would later be expanded to a four million ton annual capacity. On February 19, 1965, the minister of steel, Sanjiva Reddy, told the Lok Sabha that the Russians had thus far

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extended rupees 1,005 million (\$211 million) for the first stage of the plant. He predicted that Bokaro would begin its production in 1970. The heavy engineering plant at Ranchi was expected to supply 40 percent of the needed machinery for Bokaro.

The first decade of Soviet aid to India ended in February 1965. During that period the USSR had authorized an estimated 4,842 million rupees (\$1,017 million U.S.) in loans for various developmental projects in India.<sup>22</sup>

#### **Mutually Advantageous Trade :**

The Soviet Union's foreign trade with the developing countries is normally balanced throughout all these years, and therefore, gives opportunities to her trading partners to increase their exports in proportion to the imports from the Soviet Union. Because of its rapidly expanding economy with an annual growth rate of around 7-8 per cent, and with its helpful trade policy, the Soviet Government offered unprecedented opportunities to developing countries like India to increase their exports. In 1938, foreign trade of the Soviet Union was around 0.2 billion roubles; soon after the war in 1946 it went up to 0.6 billion roubles and in the following 17 years it increased 12 times till the end of 1963.<sup>23</sup> In 1963 her trade with East Germany and Czechoslovakia alone exceeded her trade with the rest of the non-communist world.

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In the non-communist developing countries, India topped the list of trading partners of the USSR in 1963; next came the U.A.R. and the Mali federation. Soviet trade with India increased from 162.8 million roubles in 1958 to 285 million roubles in 1963.<sup>24</sup> As a matter of policy Indo-Soviet trade was doubled every five years between 1953 and 1963 and in the trade agreement concluded in 1963 it was again agreed to double the trade turn over from 1,000 million rupees in 1963 to 2,100 million rupees in 1966.<sup>25</sup>

Indo-Soviet trade continued to increase in volume, and the 1955 agreement had to be replaced by another five-year pact in November 1958.<sup>26</sup> The greatest increase were in 1955-56, when Indian imports rose from \$5.2 million to \$26.2 million and exports increased from \$6.4 million to \$31.3 million over the one-year span. In 1958 India's-imports from the USSR, valued at \$45.6 million, constituted approximately 1.8 per cent of its total imports. Exports to the USSR in 1958 totaled about \$49 million, or 4.2 per cent of India's overall exports. The percentage increase in Indo-Soviet trade from 1953-59 was very impressive. Russian statisticians almost always pointed to these percentages representing a "fifteen fold increase" from 1951-1959 rather than to the actual total volume of the trade. In fact only slightly more than one per cent of the USSR's total world trade in 1959 was conducted with India, but this did not negate the political advantages which accrued from the trade combined with the programme of economic and technological assistance, changing trade patterns provide an effective indicator of the direction of Soviet

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policy.<sup>27</sup> Increased commerce helped to normalize and later to solidify a cooperative relationship with India.

In the 1960's India became the USSR's most important trading partner among the developing nations while India's main trading partners in the early 1960's were still the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan, the percentage of India's trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist countries continued to increase. By 1963-64 the USSR ranked fourth behind these nations in total trade with India, and in 1965-66 the Soviets displaced Japan as the third ranked.<sup>28</sup> An Indo-Soviet agreement, signed in Moscow on June 10, 1963, had called for an average annual increase during 1964-68 double that of the 1962 volume of trade.

In 1966 the estimated total trade between the two countries was rupees 198 crores (\$416.8 million), and in 1967, rupees 280 crores (\$373.3 million after devaluation at the new exchange rate of \$ 1= 7.5 Indian rupees).<sup>29</sup> The projected total trade for 1968 was rupees 300 crores (\$400 million).

The most important Indian exports have been jute and tea, which together accounted for 35 per cent of India's total exports in 1964-65 and for 27.5 per cent of India's exports to the communist nations. During the same year, coffee, cashews, tobacco and iron ore each accounted for from 5 to 6 per cent of Indian exports. On the other hand, machinery (excluding electric) comprised fifty four percent of the value of Indian imports from the communist nations in

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1964-65, followed by base metals (15.2 per cent) and electrical machinery and appliances. These and previous Soviet goods were important in providing an infrastructure for public-sector industrial development in India's Second and Third Five Year Plans.<sup>30</sup>

During the 1950s India's percentage of the world's total trade decreased, as she was hard pressed even to maintain her 1948 level of exports.<sup>31</sup> The Indian government was seriously concerned over the yearly decline in its sterling balance.<sup>32</sup> Thus India welcomed the trade agreements with the USSR and Eastern Europe which called for a parity in the value of the products exported and imported. Trade with the USSR and other communist nations was expected to help ease the strain on New Delhi's balance of payments difficulties and to help create long-term stability and growth for exports.

The manner in which the USSR's aid policy was implemented during this period proved to be of great help to the planners in India unlike the US Government, which requires annual Congressional sanction for its foreign aid programme, the Soviet Government has followed a policy of sanctioning aids quite in advance to help the Indian planners to work out future programmes in their development plans. This helpful Soviet attitude has considerably eased difficulties of planning in India. Thus, for instance, loans amounting in the aggregate to Rs.2,803 million authorized by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia during the second plan period



were for projects not included in that plan but figuring in the Third Plan Programme.<sup>33</sup>

### **Limitations :**

Even though Indo-Soviet economic relations had thus developed to the advantage of both countries, and especially to India's advantage, the growth suffered from certain limitations. The phenomenal growth of Indian imports of Soviet machinery was due to the needs of India's development plans. There appears to be a sectoral imbalance in Indo-Soviet trade. In exporting her machinery to India, the Soviet trading organizations supply the needs of India's public sector economy, but in importing Indian goods the Soviet trading organizations depended upon the Indian suppliers in the private sector. That is to say, the Indian Government purchased Soviet machinery for use in the industries directly run by her, but it is not in a position to supply the various agricultural and consumer goods required by the Soviet market and therefore depended upon the supplies from private traders in India. In these circumstances, unless the Indian private sector is directly brought in trading relations with the Soviet market, both in terms of exports and imports; it is unlikely that the growth of Indo-Soviet economic transactions would keep up the existing pace, once India reached the self-reliant stage in her economy. At such a stage India's public sector demands from Soviet market are likely to shrink; unless the private sector compensated the probable shrinkage in public sector demands, the soviet trading

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organizations may find their Indian market not so attractive from the point of view of exporting their own goods.

Apparently, due to such limitations, Indo-Soviet trade had neither kept the pace of growth of Soviet foreign trade during this period, nor in fact disturbed the past pattern of India's foreign trade. The Soviet Union's global exports shot up from an estimated 4,298 million dollars in 1958 to 7,272 million dollars in 1963, but India's share during this period fell from over 3 percent to 1.6 percent. Similarly global imports in the Soviet Union soared from an estimated 4,350 million dollars to 7,059 million dollars during these years; but India's share languished at 1 percent in 1958 and 1.4 percent in 1963.<sup>34</sup> From the Indian side too, even though the Soviet Union came up to the third place in India's foreign trade partners by 1963, the position of India's major western trade partners remained unaffected, as the gap between the leading western trade partners and Russia had been too much. For example, India's sales to the Soviet Union in 1963 formed about 6 percent of India's total exports, but the sales to Britain formed 22 percent and to the United States 16 percent.<sup>35</sup>

Besides the relative inferiority in quality of Soviet goods compared to the goods from the western countries, which by itself might affect adversely Indian demands at a later stage when trade by aid would diminish or vanish, efforts to increase bilateral trade during this period also seemed to have suffered from, what one observer called, "Sporadic efforts" on both sides. Of the six aid agreements,

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five came between February 1955 and September 1959. Only one new aid agreement was signed in the following five years.<sup>36</sup> Another factor which seemed to have created some misunderstanding is the unfortunate tendency in certain quarters in New Delhi to “treat the Soviet Union as the rescuer of last resort”. The impression seemed to have existed that India during this period approached the Soviet Union only when her western partners rebuffed her. In case of Bokaro, for example, the Soviet Union was sounded for about two years, but there was no follow-up as some people in New Delhi wanted the US Government to make up its mind. A formal approach was made to the USSR at a later date only when the Americans rejected such a plant in India’s public sector.<sup>37</sup>

The more important determinant of foreign trade of major powers in the post-war period, including the foreign trade of the United States of America and that of the Soviet Union, was the political considerations involved in aiding or trading with the country concerned. As the Indian economic commentator put it :

“What we get by way of trade is largely determined by our own evaluation of Soviet association, by our trading preferences, by the speed with which aid is utilized and trade expanded, and, above all, by our willingness to base some of our plans on the use of Soviet equipment and

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technology. At the Soviet end the limits are set by Soviet resources, but more particularly by the value attached to the Indian links. The problems involved here are, therefore, not merely of economic significance, but they also concern respective attitudes, evaluation, preferences and policies".<sup>38</sup>

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union's overall policy towards India, including its economic policy, was motivated by the considerations of strengthening India's independence from the west and her utility against China. It is in this context that the policy of non-alignment received support in Moscow, as it was serving its ends too. As the Soviet Union's economic aid programme to India had lessened India's economic dependence upon the west and thus made her non-alignment policy more meaningful, the lack of importance attached to non-alignment itself or to India in the Kremlin's foreign policy considerations, or the development of strained relationship between the two countries, might take away the aid that came from Moscow to New Delhi and diminish the pace of growth of their trade too.

**Soviet Military Assistance to India :**

There is still another important aspect of the friendly Indo-Soviet relations which had a direct bearing on our country's defence

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and security. India, four years after independence, was forced by historical circumstances to lean on industrialized nations of the west for the purchase of arms, including sophisticated weapons. But the western powers and the USA in supplying highly strategic weapons to India formulated its policy by what it called “balance of power in the region”. This is confirmed by the fact that during the Chinese aggression on India in 1962 and thereafter up to 1965 – when the USA placed an arms embargo – the total US military assistance received by India constituted only a negligible percent of the defence budget of any year. On the other hand, Pakistan which had joined the CENTO and SEATO, in the first year of its military partnership with the USA, received from Washington 30 B-57 bombers, 20 F-104 star fighters, 120 F-86 sabre-jets and a large number of C-130 giant transport aircraft and other types of military hardware.

By 1959, indications started coming to New Delhi that China was likely to create problems on the Indo-China border. Though it was a period of euphoria of “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai”, India’s defence experts had started paying attention to the strengthening of the country’s defences on the border. It was in this situation that India made an approach to Washington for the supply of C-130 transport planes and helicopters to enable its men and material to be carried to high altitude areas. The USA summarily turned down this request.

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Seen in this context, the Soviet Union's decision to help India in building industries in the public sector, particularly in the field of precision instruments, oil, aircraft, etc. had a direct bearing on India's defence preparedness. In 1955 military attaches were first exchanged by India and the USSR and assigned to their respective embassies in New Delhi and Moscow. As early as May 1957 Nehru mentioned that "there is nothing to prevent India from purchasing Soviet aircraft or any other type of machine" from the USSR if it desired to do so. He denied that the Soviets as yet had made an offer to supply aircraft or that India had requested to purchase aircraft from the USSR.

"what has happened and what normally happens is that our Defense Ministry keeps in touch with developments in various countries; whether it is the USA, Great Britain the USSR or any other country.....It is true that apart from defense.....the Soviet leaders...(have) said, generally speaking, that they would like to cooperate with us and help us wherever they could".<sup>39</sup>

After both India's and the USSR's relations with China worsened, the Soviets offered to supply certain kinds of aircraft to the Indian Defence Ministry. An Indian delegation went to Moscow in

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October 1960 to negotiate the purchase of Russian transport planes, helicopters, and heavy road making equipment.

In March 1961 it was announced that India had purchased from the USSR eight AN-12 transports for use in the Ladakh area.<sup>40</sup> Forty Russian pilots, navigators, and mechanics came to India to instruct Indians in the operation and maintenance of the aircraft. Some concern was evinced by opposition members in Parliament that the Soviet airmen were permitted to go into strategic areas on their training missions. In answer to a question put to him by Dr. Kunzru in the Rajya Sabha on March 31, Nehru replied that “adequate precaution has been taken to see that no secret information could leak out”. In 1964 it was estimated that thirty AN-12 transport planes had thus far been purchased from the USSR and that an unknown number of MI – 14 helicopters had also been purchased, more than twenty of which had been delivered by May of that year.<sup>41</sup>

The Indian procurement of Soviet MIGs has been a controversial and rumor-fraught issue. From 1959 on, the Defence Ministry, headed by Krishna Menon, sought to increase the strength of the Indian armed forces and to move in the direction of military self sufficiency. One key priority was the obtaining of aircraft equal in capability to the F-104s supplied by the United States to Pakistan. In 1962 negotiations were carried on with both Britain and the USSR for the purchase of supersonic aircraft and for help in building aircraft factories in India.<sup>42</sup> Nehru on June 23 told the Lok Sabha that the

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United States was attempting to block India from getting the MIGs. Several weeks later the Indian government signed an agreement under which the Russians would assist India in manufacturing a modified MIG engine for the Indian built HF-24. In October it was announced that the Soviets would supply two squadrons of MIG-21s to match Pakistan's F-104s and would later build several factories in India for the manufacture of MIGs and ancillary equipment. The soviet decision to supply the aircraft to India became another of the numerous grievances the Chinese were accumulating against India and the USSR. After prolonged speculation on whether or not the MIGs would be delivered, a consignment of four fighters arrived in Bombay in February 1963. In all, perhaps another eight partially equipped MIGs were received by India in the year that followed. Factory sites were selected by April in Maharashtra and Orissa for the manufacture of the MIG airframes and engines. Six months later, plans were revealed for a factory in Hyderabad which would produce air to air missiles and radar equipment for the aircraft.

For some time it was unclear whether the Soviets actually were going ahead with the MIG factories as scheduled. In an article in the Washington Post on December 17, 1963, Selig Harrison noted that one reason for the USSR's vacillation was that the cost estimates for the project rose from the original "\$143 million at its inception in August, 1962, to a current working figure of \$336 million". He also indicated that there were important differences of opinion in Indian



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official circles over the MIG question. American Supersonic planes would have been preferred – at least in 1962-63 by the Indian air force and Finance Ministry. The air force in particular was concerned that a long term commitment to the MIG programme might enable the USSR to wield undue influence over its activities. Concern was expressed lest the Soviets supply only the blueprints for the factories, rather than assume total responsibility until the plants are completed. Early in February 1964, the Indian Defence Minister, Y.B. Chavan, declared with certainty that the projects were going according to schedule. Addressing pressmen at Nagpur, Chavan said that it was only “wishful rumour” by some who did not want the project to materialize. Then he announced that the first group of Soviet experts would arrive shortly to commence work.<sup>43</sup>

In August 1963 an Indian military mission was sent to Moscow to procure equipment, including missiles, to be used for India's defences against China.<sup>44</sup> In May 1964 it was reported that a missile programme for India, estimated to cost “slightly more than \$40 million”, had been worked out and that fifty ground to air missiles had already been delivered. The cost included radar equipment and fixed and mobile installations. By mid 1964 India had also received from the USSR air-to-air missiles, samples of infantry support weapons, and army engineering equipment.<sup>45</sup>

An authority on the Indian defence programme characterized India's post-1962 military planning as based upon four major

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assumptions : “the people’s Republic of China posed the major threat to Indian security; a Pakistani threat could materialize at any time; Sino-Pakistan collusion against India was conceivable; and India required a credible military sanction for her diplomacy”.<sup>46</sup> In this context Soviet military aid assumed great importance to India after the suspension of shipments of American and British military equipment to India and Pakistan during the fighting in September 1965. Since 1945 the flow of Soviet military wares to India has increased considerably. It was reported in May 1968 that the USSR was in the process of sending India about one hundred SU-7 fighter bombers. The aircraft were designed for close air support and would complement the MIG high altitude fighters. During his January 1968 visit to New Delhi, Premier Kosygin attended India’s Republic Day celebration and witnessed a flyover of Soviet supplied MIGs and transports and the first Russian built surface-to-air missiles shown publicly in India. Surface-to-air missiles have been deployed at least since 1965 for the defence of a number of major Indian cities.<sup>47</sup>

#### **Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations :**

The cultural contacts between India, and Russia went back hundreds of years ago. Recent excavations and researches have brought to light links from Buddhist times to medieval ages and later. Russian literature and outstanding writers like Tolstoy, Gorky, Chekhov, Turgenev, Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Gogol and many others have always been popular in India. The new cultural resurgence

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which took place after the October Revolution, the poems of Mayakovsky, the novels of Sholokhov, the films of Eisenstein, stirred the imagination of the Indian people. Translations of Russian literary masterpieces began to appear in Indian languages.

With the establishment of diplomatic relations, the cultural exchange between the two countries grew apace. Delegations from the USSR to India and from India to USSR became a normal feature. Translations of Indian classics and modern writings were undertaken in the Soviet Union and a corresponding effort was made in India. Soviet films in India and Indian films in the USSR were shown widely and appreciated by large audiences. The works of Tagore and Nehru, of Premchand and other luminaries were made available to Soviet readers. Music and song and dance forged warmer and warmer bonds between the two countries.

The activities of the Indo-Soviet cultural society, formed on March 14, 1952, and of the society for Soviet Indian cultural Relations, established on January 24, 1958, have contributed a great deal in stimulating interest in each other's culture.

Soon after independence in October 1947, S.M. Nanavati, a Bombay businessman, visited the USSR in a trade delegation. He was greatly impressed by all aspects of Soviet life, and the phenomenal recovery the country had made so soon after the ravages of World War II. At a meeting organized by the Friends of the Soviet Union in

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Bombay on April 3, 1948 he spoke of the cultural activities in the USSR :

“their theatres and operas are much better than those of the British and the Americans. They have great love for their artistes. The state looks after them while the people simply worship them. Their folk dances are very, very beautiful and they have wonderful festivals”.<sup>48</sup>

In September 1950, Soviet film festivals were organized in Bombay and Calcutta. These were followed at the end of December by a delegation of film artistes, including Nikolai Cherkassov, People's Artist of the USSR, and V.I. Pudovkin, the famous film director, which came to India. They toured many cities and met people from all walks of life. They acquainted themselves with the achievements of Indian art, theatre, film and drama and were greatly impressed by the artistic sensibility of the Indians.

In the summer of 1953, a troupe of Indian dancers, singers and musicians visited the Soviet Union.

In August of the same year, India sent an exhibition of Indian art consisting of reproductions of Ajanta and Ellora, Moghul and Rajput miniatures, and several specimens of modern Indian painting.

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On January 15, 1954, a 31-member troupe of Soviet musicians and dancers including Maya Plisetskaya, the famous ballerina, arrived in Bombay. It was headed by the USSR Deputy Minister of Culture N. Besspalov.

Cultural contacts embraced other fields also. A delegation headed by Academician G.F. Alexandrov of the USSR Academy of sciences arrived in India to attend the 41<sup>st</sup> session of the Indian Science Congress, held in Hyderabad from January 2 to 7, 1954. Nehru gave a luncheon in honour of Academician Alexandrov and A.V. Engelhardt. On January 31, this delegation presented to Nehru a collection of books in Russian which included translations of Indian epics – the Mahabharata and the Ramayan.

In December 1954, Ali Sardar Jafri and Khwaja Ahmad Abbas went to Moscow to attend the Soviet writer's Congress. In the same month N. K. Singh's *The History of India* was issued in Moscow in Russian.

The year 1956 started with the inauguration of the Indian Children's Art Exhibition in Moscow, and with the visit of a cultural delegation from Uzbekistan to New Delhi.

In September 1956 an Indian delegation of educationists visited the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Ambassador received from Nehru 11 prizes won by the Soviet Children in the Shankar's weekly Painting Competition. On October 29, 1956, Nehru after inaugurating

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the “Public Education in the USSR” exhibition in Delhi noted in the visitor’s book : “After seeing it new ideas came to my mind and the hope arose that in our country also education will develop rapidly and our children will also get full opportunity to learn and do big things”.

The growing Soviet interest in Indian culture was also evidenced at the Indian Film Festival held in Udarnik Cinema in Moscow in October of the same year.

In December, the Soviet circus performed in Bombay, Madras, Calcutta and Delhi and “as a mark of soviet friendship with India” the amount fetched from shows was donated to Nehru’s National Relief Fund.

An important event was the adaptation on stage of the Ramayana by Natalia Guseva. It was presented by the Central Children’s Theatre of Moscow in 1961. Mrs. K.P.S. Menon helped in the production of this play. It has continued to draw packed halls whenever it has been staged.

An agreement was signed on October 17 1965, for establishing the Institute of Russian Studies in India. It was an important landmark in the growing cultural cooperation between the two countries.

In February 1969 the death centenary of the great Urdu poet Mirza Ghalib was widely celebrated in the Soviet Union, where works of and commentaries on Ghalib were published in Russian and other

languages of the USSR. Several jubilee sessions, dedicated to Ghalib's memory were held in different parts of the Soviet Union. A delegation of Soviet academicians, headed by Babajan Gafurov, came to India to take part in the celebrations here.

India has been existing as an independent state for more than five decades. During all these years friendly relations developed successfully, facilitating the advance of world culture and universal progress. This factor is of enormous international importance.

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<i>Exports to</i>	<i>Imports from</i>	
USA	1,469,990,000	5,253,420,000
United Kingdom	1,454,960,000	1,491,086,000
USSR	928,730,000	825,260,000
Japan	569,180,000	791,890,000

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# *CONCLUSION*

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A study of Nehru's policies and attitudes towards the USSR is both a crucial and meaningful study of India's foreign policy. Nehru's desire to establish friendly and tactical relations with the Soviet Union was an important event in international affairs as it was the first effective expression of the policy of non-alignment as enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru. His foreign policy made him stand out as a great leader of the world, as a champion of the cause of international brotherhood and world peace. It was a new and fresh approach in a world divided into two power blocs. Nehru refused to take sides in the historical quarrels of the two super powers and started promoting international understanding and peace through dialogue and discussion. It was in this spirit that Nehru extended his hand of friendship to the Soviet Union.

His visit to Europe in 1927 and participation in the Brussels Congress against imperialism marked a turning point in his life and thought. Contact with nationalist leaders from different parts of the world and revolutionaries of Europe, who were fighting against imperialism gave him not only better insight into the nature of imperialism but also a world-wide picture of the forces which were ranged against it. He at once realized that the fight against imperialism was not to be construed in a narrow nationalist spirit but

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in a wider framework. While all these heightened his anti-imperialist feelings, he also became convinced that it was necessary to work in close cooperation with the different forces which were ranged against imperialism. Among these forces, he considered Soviet Union as the foremost. His admiration for what the Soviets had done to bring about a new order began to unfold itself at this time.

It was in this mood of admiration for the Soviet Union and his keen interest in socialism that Nehru visited Moscow in 1927. He was deeply impressed by the social and economic achievements of Soviet Union and he saw their relevance to India's own future development. He was already deeply impressed by the foreign policy course pursued by the new Soviet State, particularly its declarations on self-determination for peoples, including the subject nations.

The study of India's relations with the USSR reveals that despite wide differences in outlook and policy great advance towards mutual understanding and cooperation was made. In spite of the earlier Soviet indifference and basic differences in Socio-political systems of the two countries, mutual relations improved markedly from 1953 onwards. There were many factors which demanded India to move closer to the USSR. Among many underlying factors, geo-political considerations are of considerable importance. Secondly, there was the practical consideration of the Soviet economic aid. Thirdly, to secure political and diplomatic support on Kashmir issue.

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The most important factor was the identity of views of both the countries on imperialism, colonialism and racialism.

However, it was the US military pact with Pakistan which transformed the entire context of Indo-Soviet relations and greatly affected India's policy. To Nehru, the military alliances were opposed to non-aligned India's view that military blocs were a step towards war rather than peace. He was also convinced that the inclusion of Pakistan into military alliances would threaten to introduce a system of military blocs into India's immediate neighbourhood, thereby transforming the subcontinent into a theatre of cold war and at the same time would strengthen the latter not against the USSR but against India with which many important and explosive problems still remained unresolved. In short, military pacts had given India a sense of encirclement. The US military presence in the subcontinent and massive flow of American arms into Pakistan had a tremendous impact on India's policy makers. As a result India began to move closer to the USSR. The indication of this trend was Nehru's acceptance of Soviet invitation to visit Moscow. It was largely around Nehru's perspective of the world, his initiatives and preferences that India's relations with the USSR developed. The image of Soviet Union in his mind was that of anti-imperialist nation trying to build a new socialist order. He attached highest priority to India's relations with the USSR. Nehru's policies on the international issues involving the subcontinent were dominated primarily by domestic conditions and pressures. And on these matters Soviet support for the Indian

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positions on Kashmir and Goa were of crucial importance. Besides, the USSR respected and encouraged India's desire to remain non-aligned and helped to enhance her international prestige.

By 1955, India had achieved considerable success in its long cherished aim of establishing an understanding with the USSR without entering into any formal pact or alliance. Nehru's visit to the USSR in early 1955 was one of the most important events in the annals of Indo-Soviet relations. The enthusiastic reception given to Nehru in the Soviet Union and later, the hearty reception accorded to the Soviet leaders in India manifested the feelings of the genuine respect, sympathy and friendship developing between the two nations. The exchange of state visits affirmed the tremendous goodwill that had been generated in the preceding two years in relation between the two countries.

The Sino-Indian conflict of interests and the Sino-Soviet rift further contributed to this trend of Indo-Soviet friendship. In the period between 1956-1959, India gained in stature as an influential non-aligned power between the Soviet and the western blocs. In her efforts to maintain peace in the 1956 Suez crisis, India received full backing from most of the Afro-Asian countries. China, being an integral part of the Soviet bloc, could not exert an independent voice in world politics. In contrast to this, India became significant as an independent force capable of exerting influence in international affairs.

## CONCLUSION

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In the year 1958-59 Sino-Soviet relations showed signs of strain. The emerging differences between Moscow and Beijing coincided with major Soviet attempts at rapprochement with the west. China's changing attitude on Sino-Indian border problem in 1958-59 resulted in chillness between India and China. Therefore, when China claimed 25,000 square miles of Indian territory in the beginning of 1959, India suddenly faced hostile China.

Hostility to India was a deliberate choice of policy on the part of China. It was no longer in China's interest to play second fiddle to the Soviet Union. In asserting China's claims to leadership of the communist bloc and in attaining what China believed to be a more equitable distribution of power, it became necessary to disrupt the existing equilibrium of forces in South Asia. This could be achieved only by destroying India's prestige. It was a policy designed to expose India's weakness in order to consolidate China's position among the Afro-Asian countries. At the same time China wanted to challenge the Soviet thesis of co-existence with the West, and USSR's support to India's policy of nonalignment. Thus, China became a source of common concern to both the countries. This added a new dimension to Delhi-Moscow relationship and greatly strengthened the bonds of friendship between the two countries. Their national interests demanded close collaboration with each-other to contain China.



## **CONCLUSION**

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The attractive power of the Soviet relationship for India was heightened by identification of the USSR with the national aspirations of industrial independence. Beside the Bhilai Steel Plant, Soviet finances and technical help were available to India in creating a fairly large complex of basic industries manufacturing heavy electrical equipment, mining and allied machinery, precision instruments, drugs and aluminum. Other areas of Indo-Soviet collaboration included power plants, oil exploration, oil refineries and iron-ore mining. Trade with the USSR enabled India to make good the ground lost in the western market. As far as military equipment was concerned, India turned to the USSR for help and received a good deal of it. When India was frustrated in obtaining F-104 aircrafts, it found Moscow willing to offer the MIG-21, to meet India's peculiar border requirements and later help in setting up a factory to manufacture the planes in India.

Moreover, both India and the Soviet Union attached great significance to peaceful settlement of international issues, specifically through the United Nations. These crisis appeared as a common concern of Soviet Union and India alike as they characterized them as western colonialism. Thus Nehru and Soviet leaders had their identical viewpoints on many international issues and, particularly, colonial problems and they were endorsing each others viewpoints too.

## CONCLUSION

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Nevertheless, the course of relationship during this decade had not always been quite smooth. There were, of course, differences in the international aspirations and policies of the two nations during this period. For instance, Nehru had regretted the harsh Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the resumption of nuclear tests on the eve of the 1961 non-aligned conference. He had also opposed Khrushchev's threat to send volunteers into the Middle East and the Congo and the Soviet Prime Minister's 'Troika' plan to revise the UN secretariat. On the other hand, Soviet leaders had resented among other things, India's criticism though mild of their policies towards Hungary and Yugoslavia and India's contribution to the UN peace-keeping forces in Congo. But the differences did not interfere with the broad accord on fundamentals that had developed during Nehru Khrushchev era. The friendship was put to severe tests, but it emerged successfully with added confidence and trust.

To sum up, it may be said that a community of interests between India and the USSR resulted in the steady growth of friendship and mutual diplomatic support. India-USSR relations developed on the basis of mutuality of interests and similarity of actions and reactions to a variety of challenges to both. Though, for different reasons, both were interested in limiting the US presence in Asia, checking the arms flow to Pakistan opposing SEATO, CENTO and NATO, and at a later stage, containing China. Almost through out this decade i.e. from 1953-1964, India had a sense of common purpose with the USSR. During this decade, the USSR remained

## CONCLUSION

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India's principal source of strength in international affairs, as well as in her material needs. It goes to the credit of shrewd diplomacy of Jawaharlal Nehru that without entering into any formal treaty or alliance or giving the impression of being subservient to the USSR, he secured all from the USSR to suit the national interest of India. India under Nehru's stewardship always retained the freedom of action in her foreign policy.

Even after the disintegration of Soviet Union the relations between the Russian Federation and India remained unchanged and there is a great scope for deepening the bilateral ties in future as well. The Indo-Russian relations are based on the strong foundations of good neighbourly ties, liberal political ideology, convergence of national interests, geopolitical settings, economic opportunities and international interdependence.

The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 dealt a blow to India's foreign policy framework. Events happened with such rapidity for which India had not prepared itself. The shock was the more devastating as it was so unexpected and the collapse was so dramatic. India could not remain untouched of the consequences of the events taking place in international scenario. For India, the events in Soviet Union had been a major blow because changes in Soviet Union occurred at a time when India herself was going through a severe economic crisis and an internal turmoil of

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such a magnitude which changed the nature of the political complexion of India.

Some important steps were taken to sort out these problems as early as January 1993 by the then President Boris Yeltsin when he visited India. He tried to recreate the spirit of the Indo-Soviet friendship. During the visit he conveyed the impression that Russia put a high value on Indo-Russian relations. He described India and Russia as natural partners and that the Indian and Russian interests were identical. Significantly, he reiterated Russian support for India's position in Kashmir. At the same time India was turning again to Moscow with a long and expensive list for modern weaponry and hence emerged as the largest arm purchaser from Russia.

The most concrete expression of the new thinking was provided during the visit to India of the then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in December 1998, when he told reporters that it would be very good if Russia China and India were able to form a regional bloc. A lot depends in the region on the policies of China, Russia and India, he said that India is a great power and our relationship is based on mutual interest and joint aspirations of the two countries for stability in the world. Primakov also reiterated the Russian stand that Russia supports India's claim to a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

Many developments had and were taking place to reveal the identity of viewpoints as well as long term convergence of interests

## CONCLUSION

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between New Delhi and Moscow. The events involving Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the bypassing of the United Nations, the devastation of Iraq, the spread of religious fanaticism, the Kargil war all these happenings continued to bring them together.

Putin's visit in December 2002, sealed a new special relationship between India and Russia. President Putin described that he was the best friend of India. A statement endorsed by Prime Minister Vajpayee, describing the Russian leader as a trusted friend of India. The Putin-Vajpayee summit produced a strong statement called upon Pakistan to fulfill its obligations by preventing infiltration of terrorists across the line of control and eliminating the infrastructure of terrorism as a pre-requisite for the renewal of peaceful dialogue. Russia unambiguously endorsed India's stand that the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore declaration provide the sole framework within which any India-Pakistan dialogue should eventually take place.

Significantly, on Iraq issue the two sides expressed complete unanimity of views, opposing unilateral use of force and supporting a comprehensive settlement of the issues only through political and diplomatic efforts under the UN aegis.

To sum up it can be concluded that there is a great scope for deepening the Indo-Russian relations not only to create conditions for improving the socio-economic conditions of their people but also to play an important role in shaping the future world order. The unipolar

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world order which came into existence after the break-up of the Soviet Union can be replaced by the multipolar world order if India, Russia and China came closer to each other to counter the Anglo-American hegemony. This relationship is equally marked by the absence of any national irritants, no border disputes, and no negative legacy of history. The identity of their views on the political and economic order and on major international issues ensures that their 'strategic partnership' would contribute to play the role in shaping the 21<sup>st</sup> century world order.

# *APPENDIX*

## **APPENDIX**

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### **Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement, 2 December 1953**

The Government of India and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, animated by the desire to develop trade relations between the two countries, have agreed on the following :

#### ***Article –I***

1. Both the Government will, in every possible way, develop and strengthen the trade relations between the two countries on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. They will study and with utmost goodwill take decisions on the suggestions which either of them would like to present for consideration of the other with the purpose of achieving closer economic relations.
2. For the goods imported and exported from one country to the other, both the Governments pledge themselves to grant maximum facilities allowed by their respective laws, rules and regulations.
3. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall, not, however, apply to the grant or continuance of any



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- a) advantages accorded by either of the Governments to contiguous countries, in order to facilitate frontier traffic;
  - b) advantages resulting from any Customs Union or free areas to which either of the Governments is or may become a party;
  - c) preferences or advantages accorded by India to any country, existing on the date of this agreement or in replacement of such preferences or advantages that existed prior to the 15<sup>th</sup> August, 1951; or
  - d) advantages accorded by virtue of a multilateral economic agreement relating to international commerce.
4. Mercantile ships of both countries while entering, staying in or leaving the ports of the other country will enjoy the most favoured facilities granted by the respective laws, rules and regulations to ships under the third countries' flags. This principle shall not apply to the ships engaged in coastal navigation.

**Article II**

The export of goods from the U.S.S.R. to India and from India to the U.S.S.R. during the period of validity of the present

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Agreement will be carried upon by the two Governments for every contractual year. The goods agreed for export from the U.S.S.R. to India and from India to the U.S.S.R. during the first year of the present Agreement are set out in schedules A and B respectively.

*Article III*

The import and export of the goods stipulated in Article II will be carried out in accordance with the import, export and foreign exchange regulations in force from time to time in either country and on the basis of contracts to be concluded between the Indian Parties on the one side and the Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations on the other.

*Article IV*

The provisions of the present Agreement do not affect the rights of the Indian Parties and the Soviet Foreign Trade Organizations to conclude between themselves, subject to the import, export and foreign exchange regulations in force from time to time in both the countries, commercial transactions for the import or export of goods not included in the schedules referred to in Article II.

*Article V*

The two Governments will render all possible assistance for the export and import of the goods mentioned in Article II and those

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to be exported and imported under the transactions referred to in Article IV.

***Article VI***

All payments between India and the U.S.S.R. described in Article VII may be made in Indian Rupees. For this purpose the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. will maintain one or more accounts with one or more commercial banks in India authorized to deal in foreign exchange. In addition, the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. will, if that Bank considers necessary, maintain another account with the Reserve Bank of India. All the commercial transactions to be financed in Rupees will take place through the account (accounts) maintained with the commercial bank (banks). The account with the Reserve Bank of India will be used only for replenishing the balances with the commercial bank (banks) as and when necessary.

Payments permitted under the Indian Exchange Control laws to be made by residents of India to residents of the U.S.S.R. will be effected by crediting the amount of such payments to the above mentioned account (accounts) of the State Bank of U.S.S.R. with the commercial bank (banks). Payments to be made to residents in India by residents in the U.S.S.R. will be effected by debiting the said account (accounts) with the commercial bank (banks). The account (accounts) will be replenished as necessary by one of the following methods, namely :

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- (a) by transfer of funds from another account of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. with another commercial bank or with the Reserve Bank of India; or
- (b) by the sale of Sterling to the bank concerned.

**Article VII**

The provisions of the present Agreement cover the following payments:

- (a) payments for the goods delivered under the present agreement;
- (b) payments connected with commercial transactions and covering insurance, freight (in case of shipment of goods by Indian or Soviet ships), port charges, storage and forwarding expenses and bunkering;
- (c) payments for distribution of films;
- (d) payments for technical assistance;
- (e) payments of the expenses connected with the tours of a commercial or cultural nature as well as those of official delegations;
- (f) payments for the maintenance of the Embassy of India in the U.S.S.R. and of the Embassy and the Trade Representation of the U.S.S.R. in India; and

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- (g) other non-commercial payments on which agreement may be reached between the Reserve Bank of India and the State Bank of the U.S.S.R.

***Article VIII***

Any balances in the Rupee accounts maintained by the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. with the Reserve Bank of India or with a commercial bank (banks) authorized to deal in foreign exchanges, will be convertible on demand into Sterling at the usual banks selling rate for Sterling as fixed from time to time by the Indian Exchange Banks Association. The above mentioned balances will also be convertible into Sterling after the expiry of the present Agreement.

***Article IX***

Both the Governments will render all possible assistance for the shipping of the goods to be exported or imported under the present Agreement from one country to the other as far as possible by Indian and Soviet ships.

***Article X***

The present Agreement will come into force from the date of its signature and will remain valid for a period of five years.

The Agreement can be extended or renewed by negotiation between the Parties to be commenced three months prior to its expiry.

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Done in New Delhi on the 2<sup>nd</sup> day of December 1953, in two original copies, each of them in English and Russian, both texts being equally authentic.

(Sd.) H.V.R. IENGAR,  
*On behalf of the Government  
of India*

(Sd.) M.A. MENSNIKOV  
*On behalf of the Government of  
the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics*

**Soviet-Indian Agreement on Shipping Service, 6 April 1956 :**

The Government of India and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the Joint Soviet-Indian Communiqué issued on 13<sup>th</sup> December 1955, for the purpose of further development of economic co-operation and expansion of trade between the two countries, have agreed as follows:

***Article I***

For the purpose of maintaining regular cargo shipping communication between the Indian ports of Bombay and Calcutta on the one part and the Soviet ports of Odessa and Novorossisk on the other part, a regular steamship service is hereby organized with equal tonnage participation of Indian and Soviet vessels.

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***Article II***

The vessels specified in Appendix No.I (not included here) to the present agreement are assigned for the service mentioned in Article I.

Each party has the right to substitute its vessels mentioned above by other vessels, as well as to assign by mutual agreement additional vessels depending upon the volume of cargo moving and other circumstances relevant to the operation of the service and involving the necessity of such substitution or increase in the number of vessels.

The schedule of sailings of the service shall be fixed every three months after mutual consultation and agreement between the organizations specified in Article VII of the present agreement and shall be announced a month in advance of the following three-month period.

***Article III***

The parties to the present agreement shall each operate their respective ships assigned to this service independently and bear responsibility for financial results of such operation as well as for any kind of claims which may arise in connection with the operation of the vessels.

*Article IV*

Indian vessels in the Soviet ports and Soviet vessels in the Indian ports shall upon their entry into, stay in and departure from the ports, enjoy the most favourable conditions allowed by the corresponding laws, rules and regulations applications applicable to those ports.

All the dues on the vessels assigned to the service shall be levied at the ports of India and at the ports of the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the laws and regulations which are in force at the ports of the two countries.

Tonnage dues on Indian vessels assigned to the regular service shall be levied on such vessel in the ports of the U.S.S.R. at preferential rates and only once a year irrespective of number of calls.

No income-tax shall be levied or collected by the Government of India on the freight earnings at Indian ports of Soviet ships and no income-tax shall be levied or collected by the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the freight earnings of Indian ships at Soviet ports.

*Article V*

In pursuance of their general policy of minimizing delays to shipping and accelerating their turn-round at the ports, the parties to the agreement will, consistently with their international obligations



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and the laws and regulations applicable to each port, adopt all possible further measures for the improvement of work such as:

- (a) increasing the norms of output of loading and unloading;
- (b) introduction of one or two additional work shifts as the case may be;
- (c) working on Sundays and on holidays other than closed holidays;
- (d) earmarking berths for the loading and unloading of special commodities;

Where such measures are in the opinion of the Port Authority concerned operationally feasible and conducive to the better working of the port generally.

***Article VI***

All payments arising out of the operation of the service including payments for freight for transportation of cargoes on vessels on the regular line covering the Indian-Soviet goods turnover shall be effected in accordance with the provisions of the trade Agreement dated 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1953 between the Government of India and the Government of the U.S.S.R.

Freight shall be paid in accordance with the rates indicated in Appendix No.II (not included in this issue) to the present

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agreement. These rates are liable to modification and revision from time to time by mutual agreement between the organizations specified in Article VII of the present agreement.

Settlement of freight shall be effected by the organizations specified in Article VIII of the present agreement by means of submitting invoices for collection through authorized banks of their respective countries.

***Article VII***

For co-ordination of all questions connected with the operation of the service the Government of India hereby nominate the Directorate-General of Shipping as representative on their part and the Government of the U.S.S.R. likewise nominate the Vsesojuznoje Objedinenje "Sovfracht" as representative on their part.

In particular, these organizations are entrusted to compute the schedule of sailings, to distribute cargoes between the vessels of both the parties on a parity basis, to revise freight rates, and to solve all other questions connected with the actual operation of the service.

For this purpose, the Directorate-General of Shipping may have a representative in Moscow and the Vsesojuznoje Objedinenje "Sovfracht" may have a representative in Delhi.

***Article VIII***

By agreement between the organizations specified in Article VII of the present agreement, the ships of the regular steamship service may call at Indian and Soviet ports other than those specified in Article I and also at ports of third countries.

***Article IX***

The Indian ships at the Soviet ports will be handled by "Inflot". The handling of Soviet vessels at the Indian ports will be effected by Indian firms to be appointed by the Soviet party as their agents in consultation with the Directorate-General of Shipping, Government of India.

Indian vessels in the Soviet ports and Soviet vessels in the Indian ports may receive bunkers (liquid and coal), lubricating materials and other provisions including food-stuffs for the crew at usual prices and on usual conditions prevailing at the ports of both the countries.

***Article X***

The present agreement will come into force from the date of its signing and shall continue to be in force until either party declare their intention to terminate it by giving three months' notice in writing to the other party.

**Soviet-Indian Trade Agreement, 16 November 1958**

The Government of India and the Government of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, animated by the desire to develop trade relations and to increase the volume of trade between them to as high a level as possible, have agreed upon the following :

*Article I*

1. Both the Governments will, in every possible way, develop and strengthen the trade relations between the two countries on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. They will study, and with utmost goodwill take decisions on, the suggestions which either of them would like to present for consideration of the other with the purpose of achieving closer economic relations.
2. For the goods imported and exported from one country to the other, both the Governments pledge themselves to grant maximum facilities allowed by their respective laws, rules and regulations. In any case the said goods will enjoy full most favoured nation treatment with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on imports or exports or in connection therewith, with respect to the methods of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to rules, formalities and charges in connection with customs clearing operations.

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Further, the two countries will accord to each other in respect of the issuance of import and export licences treatment no less favourable than that granted to any other country in the Soft Currency Area or to any other country with which the contracting country makes payments in its own national currency.

Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by either of the Contracting Parties to any product originating in the territory of a third country or destined for its territory, shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in the territory of either of the contracting parties or destined to be imported into its territory.

3. The provisions of the above clauses shall not, however, apply to the grant or continuance of any.
  - (a) advantages accorded by either Government to contiguous countries with the purpose of facilitating frontier traffic;
  - (b) preferences or advantages accorded by India to any third country and existing on December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1953 or in replacement of such preferences or advantages that existed prior to the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 1947.

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***Article II***

The export of goods from India to the U.S.S.R. and from the U.S.S.R. to India during the period of validity of the present Agreement will be carried out in accordance with schedules to be agreed upon between the two Governments for every calendar year before the beginning of the year to which they refer. The goods agreed upon for export from the U.S.S.R. to India and from India to the U.S.S.R. during the first year of the present Agreement are set out in schedules 'A' and 'B' respectively.

***Article III***

The import and export of the goods stipulated in Article II will be carried out in accordance with the export, import, and foreign exchange regulations in force from time to time in either country and on the basis of contracts to be concluded between Indian physical and juridical parties, including Indian State owned organizations, on the one side, and Soviet foreign trade organizations, on the other.

***Article IV***

The provisions of the present Agreement do not affect the rights of the Indian physical and juridical parties and the Soviet foreign trade organizations to conclude between themselves subject to the import, export, and foreign exchange regulations, in force from time to time in both the countries, commercial transactions for the

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import or export of goods not included in the schedules referred to in Article II.

***Article V***

The two Governments will render all possible assistance for the export and import of the goods mentioned in Article II, and those to be exported and imported under the transactions referred to in Article IV.

***Article VI***

1. All payments between India and the U.S.S.R. described in Article VII, will be effected in Indian rupees.
2. For this purpose the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. will maintain a Central Account with the Reserve Bank of India and one or more accounts with one or more Commercial Banks in India authorized to deal in foreign exchange.
3. (a) The Central Account will be used for depositing the rupee holdings, for replenishing the accounts with the Commercial Banks, and for operating transactions relating to technical credit.  
  
(b) The Accounts with the Commercial Banks in India will be used for carrying out all other operations mentioned in Article VII.

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4. (a) The Central Account will be replenished by transfers of funds from the accounts with the Commercial Banks mentioned in Clause 2, and by receipts under the technical credit.
- (b) The Accounts with the Commercial Banks will be replenished by transfers of funds from other similar accounts mentioned in Clause 2 and from the Central Account.
- (c) Payments permitted in accordance with the Indian Foreign Exchange Control Laws and Regulations and the rules made there under, will be effected on the basis of this Agreement to the physical and juridical persons residing in the U.S.S.R., by the physical and juridical persons residing in India, by crediting the amount of such payments to the said Accounts of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. with the Commercial Bank (Banks). Likewise the payments to be effected by the physical and juridical persons residing in the U.S.S.R. to the physical and juridical persons residing in India, will be effected by debiting the said account (accounts) with the Commercial Bank (Banks) in India.



***Article VII***

The following payments will be effected through the accounts mentioned in Article VI:

- (a) Payments for goods exported and imported in accordance with this Agreement;
- (b) Payments connected with commercial transactions and covering insurance, foreign port charges, storage, for warding expenses and bunkring;
- (c) Payments for distribution of films;
- (d) Payments for technical assistance, including maintenance of experts and technicians and for technical and other training;
- (e) Payments for expenses connected with tours of a commercial and cultural nature and of official delegations;
- (f) Payments of the expenses for the maintenance of the Embassy of India in the U.S.S.R. and of the Embassy and Trade Representation of the U.S.S.R. in India;
- (g) Any other payments on which agreement may be reached between the Reserve Bank of India and the State Bank of the U.S.S.R.

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*Article VIII*

Any balances in the Rupee Accounts of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. or any debt of the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. in connection with the grant of technical credit will upon expiry of this Agreement, be used during the ensuing 6 months for the purchase of Indian or Soviet goods, as the case may be, or will be settled in such other way as may be agreed upon between the two Parties.

*Article X*

Both the Governments will render all possible assistance for the shipment of the goods to be exported or imported under this Agreement from one country to the other as far as possible in Indian and Soviet ships.

*Article XI*

In order to facilitate the implementation of this agreement the two Governments shall consult with each other as and when necessary, in respect of matters connected therewith.

For this purpose the representatives of the two Governments will meet, on request by either party, at a place and time to be mutually agreed upon, the meeting being held on a date within 45 days of the request.

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**Article XII**

The present Agreement will come into force on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1959 and will remain valid for a period of five years.

The Agreement can be extended or renewed by negotiations between the parties to be commenced three months prior to its expiry.

The current Trade Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of India dated December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1953, is extended up to 31<sup>st</sup> December, 1958.

Done in Moscow on the 16<sup>th</sup> day of November 1958, in two original copies, each of them in Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

*By Authority  
of the Government of India  
Signed  
K.P.S. MENON*

*By Authority  
of the Government of the Union  
of Soviet Socialist Republics Signed  
POTOLICHEO*

**Joint Statement by Indian and Soviet Trade Minister, 24 October 1960 :**

At the invitation of the Government of India, His Excellency Mr. N.S. Patolichev, Minister for Foreign Trade of the USSR arrived in India on Friday, October 21, 1960. During his stay in the country, His Excellency was received by the President of India and the Prime Minister. He held discussions with the Minister for Commerce and

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Industry, the Minister for Steel Mines and Fuel and the Minister for Mines and Oil, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and businessmen in regard to the expansion of trade between India and the USSR. He also visited Calcutta and his programme includes a visit to Bombay. The officials on the two sides have also held detailed discussions.

The working of the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement signed on November 16, 1958, was reviewed by Mr. Patolichev and Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister for Commerce and Industry, in the context of India's developmental plans during the Third Plan period. It was noted with gratification that considerable improvement had taken place in the mutual trade between the two countries. The further development of the market for Indian goods in the USSR and the requirements in India of industrial raw materials and machinery from the Soviet Union were then broadly considered. The measures to be taken by both the sides for planning and enlargement of the trade between the two countries in terms of rupees and the repayment of credits in terms of goods during the remaining three years of the Trade Agreement were examined, and a broad understanding was reached on the need for increasing the volume of trade and diversifying its content. The anticipation is that at the end of the Trade Agreement period, the present level of exports and imports will have nearly doubled itself.

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Exports from India will cover fabricated materials as well as agricultural products. Among the manufactures are rolled steel products, metal manufactures for household purposes, handicrafts, leather footwear, coir goods, jute and woollen fabrics. Increasingly larger quantities of tea, coffee, spices, tobacco, shellac, mica, vegetable and essential oils are expected to be purchased by the USSR. The USSR will also buy an increasing proportion of hides and skins in tanned and semi-tanned varieties.

On the side of imports from the USSR, non-ferrous metals, newsprint, tin plate, steel materials, oil products and machinery and equipment for the various metallurgical, powder and construction projects in the country will be available.

**Press Statement on the Grant of Rs.600 Million Soviet Credit to India, 21 February 1961**

In the presence of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, the First Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R. Mr. A.N. Kosygin, and the Finance Minister of India, Mr. Morarji Desai, an agreement was signed in New Delhi on February 21, 1961 for further economic collaboration between the Governments of India and the U.S.S.R. The agreement provides for the establishment of industrial enterprises and other projects in India under a long term credit of 112.5 million roubles (approximately Rs.600 million) extended to the Government of India by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

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The agreement follows a series of discussions between representatives of the two Governments in New Delhi which began on the 8<sup>th</sup> February 1961, in a cordial atmosphere and with mutual understanding.

The enterprises and projects which will be financed through this credit area:

1. Hydro-electric Power Station on the right bank of Bhakra with a total capacity of 480,000 KW by the establishment of four complete units of Hydro-generators with a capacity of 120,000 KW each.
2. Oil Refinery in Gujarat with a capacity for refining two million tons of crude oil per year (Fuel Scheme) together with Thermal Power Plant for the Refinery.
3. Washery for Coking Coal with a capacity of three million tons of coal per year at Kathara in Bihar.
4. Refractories Plant near Bhilai for production of about 125,000 tons of magnesite and fire-clay products per year.
5. Exploration, development and production of oil and gas by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission in Cambay Ankleshwar and in other areas.
6. Production of Pumps and Compressors-Preparation of techno-economic report.

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The Soviet organizations will prepare detailed project reports and working drawings required for the establishment of the above enterprises and projects, supply equipment, machinery, spare parts and other materials as well as render technical assistance in the establishment of the projects and putting them into operation.

Mr. S.A. Skachkov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for Foreign Economic Relations, signed for his Government and Mr. L.K. Jha, Economic Secretary, Ministry of Finance, signed for the Government of India.

The signing of this Agreement will further strengthen Soviet Indian co-operation and will serve the cause of further development of the friendship between the peoples of both the countries.

**Soviet Indian Joint Communiqué on Completion of Bhilai Plant, 3 March 1961**

The historic visits of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchov to India and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to the USSR have laid the firm foundations of development of the friendly relations and co-operation between the people of the Soviet Union and the people of India on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The Agreements entered into between the Government of the USSR and the Government of India in the field of economic and cultural relations are the proof of such a co-operation.

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The Agreement signed on February 2, 1955 for the construction at Bhilai of an integrated Iron and Steel Works is a striking example of the Soviet-Indian economic co-operation. In accordance with this Agreement for the establishment of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and S.A. Skachkov, Chairman of the USSR for External Economic Relations, who are at present in India at the invitation of the Government of India, and Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister of Steel, Mines and Fuel of the Government of India, note with great satisfaction that the construction of the integrated Iron and Steel Works at Bhilai with the capacity of one million tons of steel ingots per year has proceeded generally according to plan. Thanks to the desire of both the parties to perform efficiently their obligations under the Agreement and the close co-operation of the Soviet specialists with Indian engineers, technicians and workers, the construction work of the factory, which has been provided for with the equipment and mechanisms of high technical standard, has been completed and the main shops required for establishing a capacity of one million tons per year have been put into operation. This colossal task has been accomplished in a relatively short period and before the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period of India. This is a significant event in the economic life of the Indian people.

The first blast furnace was commissioned and the production of iron started as far back as February 1959. Since then with the help of Soviet experts Indian technicians and workers of whom more than 600 had undergone industrial training in the Soviet Union have



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progressively learnt the technique of production. More than one million tons of pig iron and about 400,000 tons of rolled steel besides various types of chemical by products have already been produced. With the continuance of this co-operation there is every reason to hope that production to full capacity will be reached within a short period.

The Agreement between the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of India dated February 12, 1960 provides for the expansion of the Bhilai Steel Works with the assistance of the USSR to the capacity of up to 2.5 million tons of steel ingots per year. The preparatory work on the expansion has been already started. During the construction of the first stage of one million tons, Soviet specialists have already transmitted a good deal of their knowledge and experience to Indian engineers and workers on the construction of the works and have thus helped to create Indian cadres capable of independent work. With the experience so gained, there is good reason to believe that the work on the expansion of the works will be successfully accomplished and the bonds of friendship and co-operation between the two countries will be further developed and strengthened.

**“Negotiations is the road to Settling the Conflict”, *Pravda* Editorial on India-China Conflict, 5 November 1962 :**

It is not the first week that armed clashes resulting in numerous casualties are occurring on the Indo-Chinese border. The

ferocity of the clashes and political tension are mounting instead of diminishing. This causes serious concern to world public opinion, all those who stand for peace and progress. Soviet people, the peoples of socialist countries, are deeply concerned over the developments. The point is that these are clashes between two great countries, one of which is a socialist state, and the other a great force in a large group of young sovereign states actively participating in the struggle against colonialism, for peace and international security. More, the conflict has arisen between neighbour countries which in the past maintained traditional friendly relations.

Can the People's Republic of China or the Republic of India be interested in the development of the armed conflict? By no means. The Chinese people are dedicating their efforts to constructive labour, working with enthusiasm for realizing the plans of socialist construction. The desire for war is alien to the very nature of a socialist state. Military complications can only worsen the position of the Indian people too. The continuation of the conflict exhausts the economic resources of India, limited as they are, sidetracks the Indian people from solving the tasks of social and cultural regeneration of the country that confront them, of carrying to the end the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution. Facts show that it is those circles in India which strive to suppress the progressive democratic forces of the country, to push India from the position of non-alignment into the arms of aggressive military blocs, that want to use for their own purposes the atmosphere of war hysteria.

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The expansion of the scale of hostilities on the Indo-Chinese border can profit only the imperialist camp, the forces of world reaction which never miss a chance to set friendly peoples at loggerheads, to sow dissension in the ranks of the fighters for peace, democracy and progress, to counterpoise the socialist countries to young sovereign states which have achieved national independence.

The imperialist circles are trying to utilize the present conflict for their own incendiary purposes. The main participants in the aggressive military blocs of the Western powers would like to make some pickings out of the hostilities on the Indo-Chinese border. The imperialists plainly strive to set the two great Asian nations at loggerheads. Persistently they are trying to butt into the conflict, with a persistence worthy of a better cause, they are pouring oil on the flames, they are persistently offering arms and assistance to one of the sides, expecting thus to increase the scale of the clash. It is not accidental that on the part of the ruling circles of the United States and other Western powers one does not hear appeals for a cease-fire on the Indo-Chinese border.

Such intrigues of the imperialist camp are all the more dangerous that they are taking place in the conditions of continuing attempts of the forces of war to keep up international tension caused by the provocative actions of the militaristic quarters of the United States in the Caribbean area. The present international situation

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makes imperative the consolidation of all peace-loving forces in order to wage a joint struggle for ensuring international security.

As to the Soviet Government, from the very beginning of the conflict on the Indo-Chinese border, it has urged a negotiated solution of the dispute.

The People's Republic of China is a state whose relations with the Soviet Union are fraternal and based on the common fundamental aims of building socialism and communism. With India the Soviet Union is bound by good friendly relations which we prize highly. The Soviet people cannot remain indifferent seeing how flows the blood of our brothers and friends, the Chinese and the Indian peoples. Therefore, the Soviet people feel that in the present situation nothing should be done to aggravate it, but it is necessary to cease fire and sit down at the round table of negotiations without setting any terms.

The threat of expansion of the Indo-Chinese conflict and the dangerous plans which the Western militaristic forces are hatching in this connection, evoke legitimate anxiety of the peoples which are India's and China's neighbours. Deeply concerned are all the states which, together with representatives of India and China, took part in the Bandung Conference and signed the historic declaration on peaceful co-existence which made a major contribution to the cause of world peace. Public opinion of these countries with good reason points out that the present conflict harms both sides participating in it,

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harms all peace-loving peoples, and insistently suggests that it be settled peacefully.

“Indonesian workers”, says, for instance, a letter addressed by the Central Federation of Indonesian Trade Unions to the Governments of India and the People’s Republic of China, “like the people and workers of India and of People’s China, do not want war between two Asian countries which support the ten Bandung principles. Neither side will gain from differences among Asian and African countries. These differences can profit only the imperialists”. “We who are friends both of India and China”, declares the Cambodian newspaper *Depeche du Cambodge*, “believe that at all costs it is essential to avoid the use of force”. The Cairo *Al Gumhuria* writes: “..... The serious events occurring on the Chinese-Indian border fill with bitterness the hearts of all Asian and African peoples”. Appeals to end hostilities were addressed to the participants in the conflict by many outstanding political leaders of Afro-Asian countries.

It is perfectly obvious that the longer the conflict lasts, the more casualties there will be, the more obstacles to a peaceful solution will accumulate on each side. If firing continues, the conflict will extend and deepen, an ever greater part will be played not so much by questions of disputed territories, as by considerations of prestige. The continuation of the conflict would lead to more extensive mobilization of manpower and material resources on both

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sides, which could lead to a prolonged bloody war. This would bring tremendous calamities on the peoples of both states, and would most adversely affect the international situation.

There is a way out of the present situation. The long experience accumulated by the history of international relations shows that to end a conflict it is necessary to start with the main thing, to ceasefire, to overcome the war hysteria. The bloodshed cannot be allowed to continue.

The Soviet people are of the firm opinion: in the present situation the thing to do is to ceasefire and start negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the conflict. They sincerely want the representatives of India and China to sit down at the conference table as quickly as possible. It is necessary to patiently analyze the questions at issue, display a spirit of understanding and co-operation, to make an effort to find a mutually acceptable solution. Such a decision would be in the interests of the Chinese and Indian peoples, would serve the cause of preserving and strengthening peace in Asia and the world over.

**Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement, 10 June 1963 :**

The Government of India and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics noting with satisfaction the successful development of trade relations and being desirous of further increase

of the volume of trade between the two parties, have agreed upon the following :

*Article – I*

The Contracting Parties will, in every possible way, develop and strengthen trade relations between the two countries on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. They will study and with utmost goodwill take decision on the suggestions which either of them would like to present for considerations of the other with the purpose of achieving closer economic relations.

*Article – II*

The Contracting Parties will accord upon importation and exportation of goods from one country to the other maximum facilities allowed by their respective laws, rules and regulations. In any case the said goods shall enjoy full most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on imports or exports or in connection therewith, with respect to the methods of levying such duties and charges, with respect to rules, formalities and charges in connection with customs clearing operations, and with respect to the application of internal taxes or other charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with imported goods.

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The Contracting Parties will accord to each other in respect of the issuance of import and export licences treatment no less favourable than that granted to any other country.

***Article – III***

Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by either of the Contracting Parties to import or export of any product originating in the territory of a third country or destined for its territory, shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in the territory of either of the Contracting Parties or destined to be imported into its territory.

The provisions of Articles II and III shall not, however, apply to the grant or continuance of any

- a) advantages accorded by either Government to contiguous countries with purpose of facilitating frontier traffic;
- b) preferences or advantages accorded by India to any third country and existing on December 2, 1953 or in replacement of such preferences or advantages that existed prior to the 15<sup>th</sup> of August, 1947.

***Article – IV***

Juridical and physical persons of either Contracting Party shall enjoy the most-favoured-nation treatment in respect of personal protection and protection of property when effecting commercial



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activities in the territory of the other Party provided that the enjoyment of this treatment shall be subject to the laws and regulations of such other Party which are generally applicable to all foreigners alike.

*Article – V*

Mercantile ships of either country with or without cargoes, therein will, while entering, staying in or leaving the ports of the other country, enjoy regulations to ships under third countries' flags. This principle shall not, however, apply to ships engaged in coastal navigation.

*Article – VI*

The export of goods from India to the U.S.S.R. and from the U.S.S.R. to India during the period of validity of the present Agreement will be carried out in accordance with the Schedules to be agreed upon between the two Governments from time to time. The schedules, as agreed, are attached to the Agreement.

The provisions of the present Agreement do not affect the rights of the Indian physical and juridical parties and the Soviet foreign trade organizations to conclude between themselves, subject to the import, export and foreign exchange regulations, in force from time to time in both the countries, commercial transactions *for the* import or export of goods not included in the schedules.

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*Article –V II*

The import and export of the goods stipulated in Article VI will be carried out in accordance with the export, import and foreign exchange regulations in force from time to time in either country and on the basis of contracts to be concluded between Indian physical and juridical parties including Indian State-owned organization on the one side and Soviet foreign trade organization on the other.

*Article – VIII*

1. All payments of commercial and non-commercial nature between India and the U.S.S.R., will be effected in Indian rupees.
2. For this purpose, the Bank for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. will maintain a Central Account with the Reserve Bank of India and one or more accounts with one or more commercial banks in India authorized to deal in foreign exchange.
3. (a) The Central Accounts will be used for depositing the rupee holdings, for replenishing the accounts with the commercial banks, and for operating transactions relating to technical credit.

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(b) The accounts with the commercial banks will be replenished by carrying out all operations of commercial and non-commercial nature.

4. (a) The Central Account will be replenished by transfers of funds from the accounts with the commercial banks mentioned in clause 2, and by receipts under the technical credit.

(b) The Accounts with commercial banks will be replenished by transfers of the funds from other similar accounts mentioned in clause 2 and from the Central Accounts.

(c) Payments permitted in accordance with the Indian Foreign Exchange Control Laws and Regulations and the rules made thereunder will be effected on the basis of this Agreement to the physical and juridical persons residing in the U.S.S.R. by the physical and juridical persons residing in India, by crediting the amount of such payment to the said account (accounts) of the Bank for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. with the Commercial bank (banks). Likewise the payments to be effected by the physical and juridical persons residing in the U.S.S.R. to the physical and juridical persons residing in India, will be effected by debiting the said account (accounts) with the commercial bank (banks) in India.

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*Article – IX*

The Reserve Bank of India and the Bank for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. will jointly establish the technical procedure of keeping the accounts under this Agreement.

*Article – X*

Any balances in the Rupee Accounts of the Bank for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. in connection with the grant of technical credit will, upon expiry of this Agreement, be used during the ensuing six months for the purchase of Indian or Soviet goods, as the case may be, or shall be settled in such other way as may be agreed upon between the two parties.

*Article – XI*

The two Governments will render all possible assistance for the shipment of the goods exported and imported under this Agreement from one country to the other as far as possible in Indian and Soviet ships.

*Article – XII*

The Contracting Parties shall consult with each other, as and when necessary, in respect of the matters connected with the implementation of the Agreement.

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For this purpose representatives of both Parties will meet on request by either Party at a place and time to be mutually agreed upon but not later than 45 days after the date of the request.

***Article – XIII***

The present Agreement will come into force on January 1, 1964 and will remain valid for a period of five years.

The Agreement may be extended or renewed by negotiations between contracting Parties.

Done in Moscow on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 1963 in two original copies each in the English and Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

(Sd.) MANUBHAI SHAH,  
*By Authority of the Government  
of India*

(Sd.) N.S. PATOLICHEV  
*By Authority of the Government of  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

**Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Between the  
Republic of India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 9  
August 1971 :**

*Desirous* of expanding and consolidating the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

*Believing* that the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both the States as well as the interests of lasting peace in Asia and the world,

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*Determined* to promote the consolidation of universal peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the relaxation of international tensions and the final elimination of the remnants of colonialism,

*Upholding* their firm faith in the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between States with different political and social systems,

*Convinced* that in the world today international problems can only be solved by cooperation and not by conflict,

*Reaffirming* their determination to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Character,

The Republic of India on the one side, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side,

*Have*, decided to conclude the present Treaty, for which purpose the following Plenipotentiaries have been appointed :

On behalf of the Republic of India :

Sardar Swaran Singh,

Minister of External Affairs.

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic :

Mr. A.A. Gromyko,

Minster of Foreign Affairs.

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Who, having each presented their Credentials, which are found to be in proper form and due order,

*Have Agreed* as follows :

***Article –I***

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries and their peoples. Each Party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other Party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness and comprehensive cooperation existing between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.

***Article –II***

Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible way to ensure enduring peace and security of their people, the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.

*Article – III*

Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and Nations, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination.

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other States to achieve these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

*Article –IV*

The Republic of India respects the peace loving policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all nations.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of universal peace and international security and in the lessening of tensions in the world.

*Article – V*

Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security, attaching great importance to their mutual cooperation in the international field for achieving those aims, the High Contracting Parties will maintain regular contacts with each other on major



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international problems affecting the interests of both the States by means of meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special envoys of the two Governments, and through diplomatic channels.

*Article – VI*

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technological cooperation between them, the High Contracting Parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually advantageous and comprehensive cooperation in these fields as well as expand trade, transport and communications between them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries as specified in the Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement of December 26, 1970.

*Article – VII*

The High Contracting Parties shall promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.

*Article – VIII*

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties

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solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party.

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other Party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage on the other High Contracting Party.

***Article – IX***

Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.

***Article – X***

Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more states, which is incompatible with this Treaty. Each High Contracting Party further declares that no obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and any other State or States, which might cause military damage to the other Party.

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***Article – XI***

This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty years and will be automatically extended for each successive period of five years unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other High Contracting Party twelve months prior to the expiration of the Treaty. The Treaty will be subject to ratification and will come into force on the date of the exchange of Instruments of Ratification which will take place in Moscow within one month of the signing of this Treaty.

***Article – XII***

Any difference of interpretation of any Article or Articles of this Treaty which may arise between the High Contracting Parties will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The said Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Hindi, Russian and English, all texts being equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one.

*On behalf of the  
Republic of India*

SWARAN SINGH  
Minister of  
External Affairs

*On behalf of the  
Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republic*  
A.A. GROMYKO  
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs

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